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Abstract
The government of Ghana borrows from both domestic and foreign sources to finance the budget
deficit. By the year 2013, the domestic debt was 55% of the public debt. Government domestic
borrowing is competitive and can potentially crowd out the private corporate sector. Therefore,
the specific research problem addressed in this study was whether the Ghanaian government’s
domestic debt (DEBT) caused financial crowding out (FCO) in Ghana. FCO theory is not
conclusive and not proven specifically for Ghana, so the purpose of this research was to
investigate its presence in Ghana. The neoclassical theory of FCO underpinned the research. The
2 research questions investigated FCO along the quantity and cost channels. The research
examined the relationship between DEBT as the independent variable, the quantity of private
sector credit (PSCREDIT), and the net interest margin (NIM) of banks as dependent variables.
Covariates were macroeconomic and banking industry variables. The research population was
the banking sector of the financial services industry. The research was correlational, and it used
time series data from the Bank of Ghana and the World Bank. Data analysis used the
autoregressive distributed lag method. The analysis returned a negative relationship between
DEBT and PSCREDIT, and a positve relationship between NIM and DEBT. These results
indicated the presence of FCO along both the quantity and cost channels. The research provides
policymakers a means of quantifying the extent and effects of fiscal policies. The study may
contribute to positive social change by promoting the revision of fiscal policies to favor the
private corporate sector to invest, create jobs, and grow the Ghanaian economy.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Accessing credit to finance businesses in Ghana is an ongoing challenge
(Haselip, Desgain, & Mackenzie, 2014; Musa & Acheampong, 2015; Sarbah & Wen,
2013). A World Bank (2014) study in Ghana found that, in 2013, banks financed only
12.6% and 26.8% private sector corporations’ (PSCs) investment and working
capitals respectively. The government of Ghana (GoG) also borrows extensively from
the domestic market and, by the year 2013, 55% of the public debt was from domestic
sources (Ministry of Finance, 2015). In this quantitative research, therefore, I
hypothesized and investigated the presence of financial crowding out (FCO) in Ghana
as defined by Graham, Leary, and Roberts (2014).
The dissertation is in five chapters. In this first chapter, I provided a
background to the study and stated the problem, the purpose, the hypotheses, and
research questions. I also discuss the significance of the study and its implications for
social change. In Chapter 2, I present a review of the literature on FCO and a
preliminary examination of the methods for assessing FCO an economy. In Chapter 3,
I present the design of the research and discuss my data collection and analysis
methods. In Chapter 4, I discuss my data collection, analysis, and hypothesis testing. I
conclude with Chapter 5, in which I discuss my findings and their contribution to
positive social change; I also conclude and make recommendations for future
research.
Background of the Study
Several factors determine how firms gain access to credit for their operations
in a country. Researchers including Gimet and Lagoarde-Segot, (2012), Joeveer
(2013), and Love and Peria (2015) identified these factors and noted that they operate
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at the levels of the economy, firm, household, and lending institutions or banks. At the
national level, the determinants are market and macroeconomic factors. The
macroeconomic factors result from government policies that affect inflation, the gross
domestic product (GDP) and other economic indicators. Firm-level access to credit
results from the size of the firm and corporate policies on the capital structure of the
corporation. I discuss these factors in detail in the following sections.
Market Factors
The effect of market factors on access to credit refers to competition among
the financial service providers in the country. Competition in the banking sector has a
direct relationship with access to credit (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Singer, 2013;
Gimet & Lagoarde-Segot, 2012; Love & Peria, 2015). When a few large banks
dominate the industry, no degree of competition in the sector is likely to exist. Love
and Peria (2015) confirmed that the resulting low competition reduces firms’ access to
finance.
Macroeconomic Factors
The two major policies that emanate from the macroeconomic conditions in a
country are the monetary and the fiscal policies. Monetary policy relates to the supply
and management of money in the economy, whereas fiscal policy refers to the
management of the government’s budget. Gimet and Lagoarde-Segot (2012)
intimated that governments’ macroeconomic policies affect access to finance because
of the effect of such policies on inflation, the size of the economy, savings rate,
government borrowing, treasury bill rates, and exchange rates.
Fiscal policy emerges as a deficit management strategy. Kugbee and Insah
(2015) noted that the policy options available to governments are bailouts from
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international financial organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank, defaulting on debts, borrowing from internal and external
sources, or issuing debt against securities to the central bank. Other policy options for
managing budget deficits include cutting public spending, boosting the revenue base
through increased taxation, or implementing measures that will promote economic
growth.
Researchers differ in their opinions regarding the role of fiscal policy on FCO.
Mallick (2013) explained the position of theorists concerning deficit financing.
According to Mallick, the Ricardian theorists suggest deficit financing will not affect
the supply of credit whereas the Keynesian theorists argue that the policy will crowdin credit. The neoclassical theorists, on the other hand, contend that such policies
would stifle economic development by crowding out private sector credit. Ghana’s
experience seems to reflect the neoclassical viewpoint because Adom and Williams
(2012) found that increased taxation drove some Ghanaian firms into the informal
sector to avoid paying taxes, effectively rendering such a policy counterproductive.
Firm-Specific Factors in Access to Credit
Firm-level characteristics that affect access to credit include the size, asset
tangibility, and leverage for listed companies (Joeveer, 2013); financial distress
(Myers & Majluf, 1984); or the presence of low deficits (Bhaduri, 2015). The
financing policy of the company is another characteristic that may determine their use
of credit. According to the pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984), a firm
might adopt a financing model based on a hierarchized source of funding comprising
retained earnings, debt, and equity. Firms may also prefer equity because of
asymmetric information or existing debt (Fulghieri, Garcia, & Hackbarth, 2013).

4
Household-Specific Factors in Access to Credit
Households and individuals supply funds to banks in the form of deposits that
become loans to borrowers. Thus, a direct relationship exists between deposits and the
volume of loans that banks can make. Per the liquidity preference theory (Keynes,
1936) and the quantitative theory of credit, (Werner, 2012) deposits will increase with
increasing savings interest rate. These theories notwithstanding, Hanson, Shleifer,
Stein, and Vishny (2015) concluded that households might be motivated to deposit
their funds with banks for safety, ease of access, and the assurance of prudent
investment. Households may also divert their funds from the banks due to
consumption needs, instability in the banking system, or the existence of alternative
forms of investment including government bonds and treasury bills.
Bank-Specific Factors in Access to Credit
Lending policy. Standards and policies set by the lending institutions do not
qualify every firm for credit. The requirements for collateral or other forms of security
can be a barrier to accessing credit from banks as noted by Akudugu (2012), Musa
and Acheampong (2015), and Sarbah and Wen (2013). Asogwa and Okeke (2013)
study of the Nigerian financial market revealed that a policy of lending to the
government was one of the contributory factors to the lack of credit to the private
sector. Such a policy may be a risk management strategy, but it could be a setback for
firms intending to borrow. Other policies, such as investment in high-interest treasury
bills (Fayed, 2013) and other low-risk securities by banks, can be responsible for
financially crowding out the private sector.
Reserves. Werner (2012) noted in the quantitative theory of credit that the
central bank and commercial banks create money by making loans. Central banks
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require banks to reserve a percentage (R) of deposits. They can then extend credit to
households and firms up to 100-R the reserve amount. However, banks can make
loans by increasing their reserves without receiving money from depositors.
Commercial bank reserves held by the central bank can determine the volume of
credit available in an economy.
Gap in Theory
Given the above arguments, several factors influence firms’ access to credit
including FCO. The FCO theory is, however, still evolving as evidenced by Aisen and
Hauner (2013), who stated that substantial amounts of literature support every opinion
on the subject. For example, Sharpe (2013) posited that crowding out occurred only in
nonsovereign countries, whereas Gjini, Durres, and Kukeli (2012) doubted the theory
and argued that it may exist in the West but not in Eastern Europe. In emerging
economies, Fayed (2013) found crowding in in the long term in Egypt but noted that
high treasury bill rates could trigger crowding out. Asogwa and Okeke (2013), on the
other hand, found FCO in Nigeria but also noted that it has a Granger causality
relationship with budget deficits.
Sheriff and Amoako (2014) indicated a short-term relationship between
interest rate spread (IRS) and government debt in Ghana. However, Ho and Saunders
(1981) had argued that the IRS does not represent the full cost of financial
intermediation. Other variables, such as fees and commissions, operational costs, and
industry characteristics, add up to the cost of credit. The authors, therefore, proposed
the use of the net interest margin (NIM) as an accurate reflection of the cost of
financial intermediation. Also, my definition of FCO refers to both the cost and the
quantity of credit, a definition that Sheriff and Amoako (2014) did not consider in
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their study. Therefore, in my research, I extended their work by replacing the IRS
with the NIM. I also included additional variables in the model to yield a better
picture of the extent of FCO in the Ghanaian economy. Following Djankov, McLiesh,
and Shleifer (2007), I used the GDP as a deflator to make the results comparable with
results from other countries and, hopefully, to contribute toward convergence of the
theory.
Problem Statement
The GoG borrows from domestic and foreign sources to finance the budget
deficit. In 2013, 55% of the public debt in Ghana was from domestic sources
(Ministry of Finance, 2015). The government’s domestic borrowing is competitive
and has potential crowding out effect on PSCs. FCO theory is not conclusive (Aisen
& Hauner, 2013) and is not proven specifically for Ghana. Therefore, the specific
research problem that I addressed in this study was whether government’s domestic
debt caused FCO in Ghana. I correlated private sector credit with the government’s
domestic debt to investigate FCO along the quantity channel (Djankov et al., 2007;
Fayed, 2013). I also correlated the NIM of banks with government’s domestic debt to
investigate FCO along the cost channel. I sourced data from the Bank of Ghana (BoG)
and the World Bank. My findings showed that FCO existed in Ghana. Results
contribute to positive social change by supporting a re-evaluation and a revision of
Ghana’s fiscal policies to favor the private corporate sector.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this quantitative research was to investigate the presence of
FCO in Ghana. My investigation was along the quantity and cost channels. I
correlated government debt, my independent variable, with the quantity of private
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sector credit, my independent variable, along the quantity channel in the first instance.
In the second model, I correlated government debt as an independent variable, with
the cost of credit represented by the NIM as the independent variable along the cost
channel. My data were time series from the Bank of Ghana and the World Bank
databases. The results indicated the presence of FCO in Ghana along both channels
and provided practitioners a means to quantify the extent and effect of government
fiscal policies on the private corporate sector.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
I investigated the phenomenon of FCO in Ghana that is, whether the
government’s domestic debt competed with credit to the private corporate sector. I
asked two questions along the quantity and cost channels respectively to form the
basis of my research. The first question and the associated hypothesis were:
RQ1: What was the relationship between government’s domestic debt and the
volume of private sector credit?
The hypotheses I tested for the first research question were:
H01: There was no significant relationship between government’s domestic
debt and the volume of private sector credit.
Ha1: There was a significant relationship between government’s domestic debt
and the volume of private sector credit.
In testing the first hypothesis, I used multiple regression data analysis
processes to correlate volume of private sector credit with the government’s domestic
debt and other macroeconomic covariates. The dependent variable was the volume of
private sector credit. The independent variable was the government’s domestic debt
comprising loans to central government and its agencies, treasury bill, and bond

8
purchases by banks. Covariates were macroeconomic variables comprising the GDP,
the treasury bill rate, and the level of financial intermediation.
The second research question and associated hypotheses were:
RQ2: What was the relationship between government’s domestic debt and the
cost of credit to the private sector in Ghana?
The hypotheses I tested for the second research question were:
H02: There was no significant relationship between government’s domestic
debt and the cost of credit to the private sector
Ha2: There was a significant relationship between government’s domestic debt
and the cost of credit to Ghanaian private sector corporations.
For the second hypothesis, I used multiple regression analytic processes to
correlate the dependent variable, the NIM, with the independent variable, the
government’s domestic debt. Covariates were a vector of macroeconomic variables
for the country, a vector of bank operational variables, and a vector of industry
variables.
Theoretical Foundation
Three schools of economic thought or theories define and describe the FCO
phenomenon. These are the Ricardian equivalence theory, the Keynesian theory, and
the neoclassical theory. Each theory reflects a unique position regarding FCO.
Barro (1989) expounding the Ricardian equivalence theory, argued a null
effect of deficits on interest rates. Barro explained that rational households increase
their savings in anticipation of higher taxes in the presence of deficits. Savings
improve the cash holding of banks, thus reducing the need to increase interest rates to
attract deposits. Many researchers have attempted to refute the theory. Schlicht
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(2013), for example, stated that its premise, the rational behavior expectation of
households, invalidated it because it omitted interest payments on the public debt. The
author averred that extracting interest payment on government debt from households
will reduce the volume of their savings and affect the cost of credit. Caparole (2015)
also argued against the Ricardian equivalence theory. Caparole’s research of the effect
of taxation on interest rates found a significant negative relationship between the two,
which led the researcher to conclude that the Ricardian theory is inconsistent with the
theory of FCO.
Mahmoudzadeh, Sadeghi, and Sadeghi (2013) elucidated the Keynesian
approach to FCO that government spending complements credit supply. Deficits,
according to the authors, signal positive economic conditions to the private corporate
sector, which responds with higher investments in the economy. Therefore, applying
the Keynesian theory should result in a crowd-in in credit demand and investments in
the economy. However, when Balcerzak and Rogalska (2014) analyzed data from
different countries using the Keynesian investment-savings, liquidity-money (IS-LM)
framework, they concluded that the theory did not yield consistent results.
Econometric factors relevant to specific countries led to different outcomes. They also
found contradicting results from the same country when they applied other methods or
used different data periods, leading them to conclude that the Keynesian theory is not
a reliable tool for research into FCO.
The neoclassical theory evolved from the classical theory espoused by Adam
Smith according to Lawson (2013). In classical theory, the distribution of the
production of an economy is proportional to the cost incurred by different strata of
society to produce it. Hence, the price of a product will reflect the cost of production.

10
Researchers, however, quickly noted that people are willing to pay more than the
production cost to acquire a product leading to the formulation of the neoclassical
theory. Neoclassicists use their theory to explain the notion of value, that is, the
relationship between an object and its acquirer, that led to the formulation of relations
between demand, supply, and price. Weintraub (2002) stated that neoclassical theory
dominated economic discussions. Researchers use the theory to spawn new theories
rooted in its basic assumptions. Thus, there is a neoclassical theory of FCO, which
was my choice of theory for this study.
The neoclassical theory of FCO, as discussed by Claeys, Moreno, and
Surinach (2012), posits that increases in budget deficits have a direct correlation with
interest rates. The rationale behind this theory is that government borrows to finance
its budget deficit. The demand for credit by the government will consequently exert
upward pressure on interest rates. Higher interest rates increase the probability of
bankruptcy for borrowing firms, and thus they will refrain from issuing debt; that is,
they will be crowded out. The neoclassical theory, therefore, is an appropriate
analytical theory for explaining the phenomenon of FCO in an economy. I am,
therefore, adopting the neoclassical theory for my research.
Nature of the Study
The two major strands of research are the qualitative and quantitative methods.
Qualitative researchers explore the thoughts, actions, and speeches of persons to
arrive at context specific conclusions (Kaczynski, Salmona, & Smith, 2014). Findings
are not generalizable to whole populations. Quantitative research, on the other hand,
allows the use of large datasets, hypothesis testing, and deductive reasoning to arrive
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at replicable conclusions. The choice of method is, therefore, a function of the nature
of the data and the objective of the research.
The objective of my research was to investigate the presence of FCO in
Ghana. The research replicates similar studies and is an attempt to generalize their
findings to Ghana. I adopted a quantitative approach because my objectives, data,
analytical method, and application were amenable to that approach. I used the method
of Johnson (2001) to classify my research as correlational and explanatory.
Study Variables
Cost of credit model. Following the steps of Ho and Saunders (1981) and
Mensah and Abor (2014), I adopted the NIM to represent the cost of credit. The
independent variable for estimating the cost of credit was the government’s domestic
debt. Covariates were macroeconomic, banking, and industry variables.
Quantity of credit model. I followed in the steps of previous researchers
including Djankov et al., (2007) and Fayed (2013) and used the quantity of credit to
the private corporate sector as my dependent variable. My independent variable was
the government’s domestic debt. Macroeconomic variables constituted my covariates.
Data sources. I limited the research population to the Ghanaian financial
sector operators who report to the Bank of Ghana as was reported in the 2016 Annual
Report of the BoG (Bank of Ghana, 2017). I sourced my data from the BoG and the
World Bank’s Database.
Data Analysis Process
Following the steps of Agca and Celasun (2012) and Fayed (2013), I adopted
multivariate regression analysis processes to study the correlation respectively
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between (a) the quantity of private sector credit, and (b) the cost, and government’s
domestic debt and other covariates.
I used a regression model of the form Yt = β0 + β1X + εt, where Yt is the
dependent variable, β0 and β1 are regression constants, Xt is the independent variable,
and εt is the error term. My independent variable is the government’s domestic debt
represented by Xt in the model. In the presence of crowding out, the constant β1 < 0
for the quantity model and β1 > 0 for the cost model. If the error term, εt, is random,
the constant β1 will be an unbiased, consistent, and efficient estimator of FCO in both
the short and long term. If the dependent variable correlated with both the current and
lagged values of Xt, a distributed-lag model will result, and the relation between the
variables will be of the form: Yt = β0 + β1Xt +β2Xt-1 + β2Xt-2 + …+βnXt-n + εt. Under
these circumstances, there is both a short-run and long-run relationship between the
variables. The short-run relation shall be β1 whereas the long-term relationship will be
of the form Σnt=1βt = β1 + β2 + β3 + ..+ βn. The two estimators were the key results I
relied on to answer the research questions.
My data analysis tools were visual, the IBM’s Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSS) software (IBM, 2015), also known simply as SPSS. I also
used Microsoft Excel, and the Eviews software, to perform analyses not available
through the SPSS. I used visual inspection of my data to find duplicates, missing data,
and mistakes. I replaced randomly missing data by interpolation. I used correlation
methods to check the collinearity relation among my research variables and removed
one of any pair of variables that had a correlation coefficient greater than 0.9. I used
the augmented Dickey-Fuller method (ADF) to check the unit root properties of my
variables and the bounds test method to check for the existence of a level relationship
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between the independent and dependent variables. I performed my regression analysis
using the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) method. The ARDL cointegration
method yielded my long- and short-term regression models. Finally, I checked the
construct validity of my model using the Ramsey stability analysis method. I tested
my hypotheses by examining the magnitude and sign of the regression coefficient of
the government’s domestic debt and the other macroeconomic covariates.
Definitions
Access to finance: Access to credit (with or without a formal loan), deposit
(with/without commercial, rural bank, other banks), insurance. Sourced from Brazil:
Access to Financial Services, World Bank Report No. 27773-BR (2004).
Annual budget deficit (D): The annual budget deficit of the government
measured as a percentage of GDP. The data were made available by the Bank of
Ghana.
Annual inflation (I): Inflation as measured by the consumer price index (CPI).
The model used average annual rate of inflation expressed as a percentage. Data were
made available by the Bank of Ghana.
Bank concentration (C): The variable measures the assets of the three largest
banks as a share of the assets of all commercial banks in the country expressed in a
percentage.
Bank efficiency (E): E is the ratio of overhead costs to total assets, defined as
the accounting value of a bank’s overhead costs as a share of its total assets.
Bank risks (Rb): Rb is the proportion of all outstanding loans-to-total assets
measured at the end of the year.
Bank size (S): S is the total assets of commercial banks relative to the GDP.
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Exchange rate (R): R is the official exchange rate calculated as an annual
average based on monthly averages of local currency units relative to the U.S. dollar.
Government domestic debt (DEBT): DEBT is the entire stock of direct
government fixed-term contractual obligations to others outstanding on a particular
date. It includes loans, treasury bill purchases, and bonds issued to banks. Banks
measure debt on the last day of the reporting period.
Gross domestic product (GDP): GDP at purchaser’s prices is the sum of the
gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes
minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products.
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI): The HHI measures competition in an
industry. Lijesen, Niljkamp, and Rietveld (2002) defined HHI as the sum of squared
market shares of all firms in the market.
Institutional quality (INSQUAL): The institutional or regulatory quality
captures the perception of the ability of the government to formulate and implement
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.
The estimate gives the country’s score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a
standard normal distribution (i.e., ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5). Kaufmann,
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010) derived the definition and estimate.
The level of financial intermediation (FINT): The ratio of total deposits,
comprising time and savings, to the monetary base (M2) in the economy. Rother
(2001) provided the definition.
Money supply or monetary base (M2): Money and quasi-money comprise the
sum of currency outside banks, demand deposits other than those of the central
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government, and the time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors
other than the central government.
Net interest margin (NIM): The NIM is the accounting value of net income as
a ratio of total bank assets (Ho & Saunders, 1981). I estimated the variable from data
made available by the Bank of Ghana.
Private sector credit (PSCREDIT): PSCREDIT refers to financial resources
provided to the private sector by deposit-taking companies (i.e., banks, except the
central bank). Financial resources include loans, purchases of non-equity securities,
trade credits, and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment.
Public-private partnership (PPP): Contractual agreement between a public
entity and a private sector organization with the objective of providing infrastructure
and services usually provided by the public sector.
Pure spread (α0): The pure spread is the bank’s margin due to transactions
uncertainty (Ho & Saunders, 1981). The variable was the regression intercept in the
model.
Treasury bill (TBRATE): A Treasury bill is a short-term investment product
issued for a specific time duration of either 91, 180, or 365 days and offered by the
Bank of Ghana on behalf of the government. The TBRATE used in the research was
the 91-day rate averaged monthly and provided by the BoG.
Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs): Firms that employ fewer than
140 persons (Aryeetey, 1994).
Special purpose vehicles (SPVs): Companies set up to execute a single project
under a PPP contract.
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Assumptions
I made three assumptions in undertaking my research. Musgrave (1981)
distinguished between three types of assumptions: negligible, with minimal impact on
the theory; domain, which describe applicable conditions; and heuristic, which
simplify the logical development of the theory. Mulgrave stated that an assumption
may start out as negligible but can progress to domain and heuristic after subjection to
extensive evaluation and analysis of its effect on the theory. In performing my
research, I made certain assumptions situated within the domain assumptions
framework.
My first assumption was about the choice of theory. The three schools of
economic thought argue different positions on the theory of FCO. The neoclassical
school support crowding out, the Keynesian school argued crowding in, and the
Ricardian school argues a no consequence relation (Mallick, 2013). One of these
theories must operate in the country, and I assumed that the neoclassical theory
applied to Ghana given the country’s status as a lower-middle-income economy with
frequent episodes of IMF interventions.
My second assumption was about my research data. I used data from the Bank
of Ghana and the World Bank. I assumed that the data they provided was accurate,
unbiased, and adequate to make predictions and generalizations based on the theory.
I used time series data, which is a special case of panel data. Flannery and
Hankins (2013) challenged the case of bias in panel data but also acknowledged the
existence of scientific methods for treating such bias. I assumed that I could use one
of the available methods to treat any symptoms of bias in my data.
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Scope and Delimitations
Financial services offered by the banking industry include credit supply,
deposit taking, payments, and insurance services. I focused only on the demand and
supply of credit to private corporations. I adopted this research focus because of the
complaint by corporate Ghana that access to finance was one of their greatest
challenges (World Bank, 2014).
I limited the study to the 33 deposit money banks (DMBs) in Ghana (Bank of
Ghana, 2017). They controlled 85.6% of the assets of the banking industry in the
country, and their contribution to the presence or otherwise of the phenomenon of
FCO could be substantial. The other financial institutions, that is, the rural and
community banks (RCBs) and the nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) also
advance loans to customers but, despite their large numbers, they control only 14.6%
of the total assets of the industry. The quantity of credit they advance is relatively
small to be of any significance.
The GoG’s borrowing was not limited to the domestic market only. The
government borrowed between 1% and 5% of GDP from foreign sources to finance
the deficit (Ministry of Finance, 2015). However, this source of funding did not
compete with local firms for access to credit from the domestic market. Thus, I
excluded foreign borrowing by the GoG from the analysis.
Limitations
In this research, I sought to correlate the quantity and the cost of credit to the
private corporate sector with government debt. The sector comprised industries of
various types and sizes, and with different credit ratings. I did not attempt to
differentiate between the institutions. It was possible that some sectors received better
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services than others. However, I overcame this limitation by aggregation, that is, the
estimates were at country and not at the level of the firm. The implication was that the
results I obtained addressed the issues of cost and quantity of private sector credit at
the aggregate level without distinguishing between sectors of the economy.
I used data from the Bank of Ghana and World Bank. The reliability and
accuracy of the data were beyond my control as a researcher. However, these are
credible institutions with several years’ experience in data collection, cleaning,
analysis, and dissemination. The reliability of the data from these sources was a
reasonable expectation.
The frequency of my data was a mixture of annual and monthly intervals.
Macroeconomic variables were reported annually, whereas banking data was
monthly. To assure adequate power for the research’s findings, I adopted the monthly
intervals and, to overcome the lack of monthly macroeconomic data, I used the annual
data for each month for the reporting year.
Significance of the Study
Different levels of economic development, openness, and systems of
governance characterize the countries of the world (Kaufmann et al., 2010). These
systems affect the management of budget deficits and government debt. The import of
the different administrative setups is that research may reveal country-specific effects
of FCO.
Regionally, Ghana is in sub-Saharan Africa, one of the least developed regions
of the world. The country is lower middle income and has been a beneficiary of
substantial International Development Association (IDA) and IMF loans, and bilateral
assistance from several countries. In addition to the external loans, the GoG also
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borrows extensively from the domestic market to supplement its revenue shortfalls.
Therefore, a potential for the FCO of Ghana’s private corporate sector existed which
motivated my research.
Significance of Theory
The specific problem that I investigated in this study was whether the
government’s domestic borrowing caused FCO in Ghana. I undertook this research in
the knowledge that researchers remain divided on the subject of FCO. All the
empirical research had yielded different results and interpretations of the phenomenon
according to Hubbard (2012). The Ricardian theorists, for example, concluded that
FCO did not exist, the Keynesians argued that government debt had crowding in
effect, and the neoclassical theorists posited that government debt crowded out the
private corporate sector.
I adopted the neoclassical position following Asogwa and Okeke (2013), who
found FCO of investments in Nigeria. However, the neoclassical paradigm is not
without differing points of view. For example, Sharpe (2013) argued that crowding
out occurs only in non-sovereign countries because those governments cannot print
their currency and could only finance their deficits through increased taxation or
borrowing. Gjini et al. (2012) stated that crowding out occurs only in developed
economies. They concluded that public expenditure in developing countries crowds in
private investment. However, their argument referred to public investments without
indicating the source of financing and therefore left a gap in the theory. My study has
contributed to the rhetoric on FCO by indicating the presence of FCO in Ghana.
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Significance to Practice
The GoG adopted a PPP policy (Ministry of Finance, 2011) for infrastructure
development in the country. PPPs are project financed and, therefore, highly levered
with debt-to-total capital ratios up to 75%. According to Esty, Chavich, and Sesia
(2014), approximately one-third of such projects has debt-to-total capital ratios of
80%. Bank loans and bonds constitute 81% and 19% of these debts respectively.
Ghana’s PPP program can be successful if private sector firms have access to bank
credit and other forms of debt. Unfortunately, the need to finance budget deficits
drove the government to the financial market to raise funds. These actions made the
government a competitor of the private sector in the market. Ahiawodzi and Sackey
(2013) stated that Ghanaian banks preferred to invest in the low-risk government debt,
thus depriving the private sector of funds for investment.
Studies in Ghana confirm the low level of use of bank credit by Ghanaian
businesses. Abor (2005); Antwi, Mills, and Zhao (2012); Awunyo-Vitor and Badu
(2012); and Tornyeva (2013) found that internal or firm-specific factors influenced
capital decisions. Andani and Al-hassan, (2014) also found that Ghanaian firms use
short-term credit, trade credit, and other nonbank sources to finance their businesses.
These findings could indicate the absence, or the rationing, of credit by the banks
while they invested in government debt.
The government, acting through its Ministry of Finance, is responsible for the
macroeconomic policies and management of the country. Policymakers can use my
results to quantify the extent and effect of government fiscal policies on the private
corporate sector and to support policy revision.
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Significance to Social Change
Gaye (2013) stated that a financially crowded-out private sector could result in
a slowdown or stagnation in economic activities, growth, and welfare. It can also
induce a financial crisis in affected countries as observed by Broner, Erce, Martin, and
Ventura (2014). Other potential problems include low industrial growth and job losses
(Asogwa & Okeke, 2013) and low investment in research and development in the
economy (Cecchetti & Kharroubi, 2015). On the other hand, financial crowding in,
where government stimulates the economy by not borrowing or by cash injection, can
lead to growth and prosperity for all (Kaboski & Townsend, 2012).
FCO reduces the supply of credit to the private sector in quantity or increases
the cost. When businesses cannot finance their operations, they downsize and lay off
staff. Laid-off workers may move into the informal economy (Adom & Williams,
2012) and pay no taxes, remain unemployed and experience a deterioration in their
quality of life, or become a burden on society. On the other hand, when businesses
have access to affordable credit in their desired quantities, they are likely to expand
operations, create jobs, and contribute to social programs for the benefit of their host
communities.
My research findings help produce a positive social change in Ghana in
several ways. My results can contribute to policy revision in deficit financing. I
expect that government would borrow less so that cheaper and adequate funds will be
available to the private sector for investment and other productive uses. Individual
Ghanaians will have jobs, and all will pay taxes that government can use to provide
social services to improve the quality of life of citizens. I also expect that my research
will inspire other research on the financing of Ghanaian businesses to understand their
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operational challenges. Such research may lead to the formulation of policies that
would support their operations and survival.
Summary and Transition
The purpose of this quantitative research was to investigate the presence of
FCO in Ghana by examining the relationship between government domestic debt and
credit advanced to the private corporate sector by Ghanaian banks. In this first chapter
of the dissertation, I have provided a background to the study, identified the problem,
and stated the purpose of the research. I also posed my research questions, stated my
hypotheses and assumptions, delineated the scope of the study, set the limits, and
delimited the research. I also defined key terms and indicated the potential
contribution of the research to positive change in the lives of Ghanaians.
Chapter 2 is a review of relevant literature in support of the research. I begin
the chapter with a discussion of my strategy for reviewing literature. I indicate the
scope and the source of literature reviewed. I also discuss the theoretical foundation
on which I based my research and followed it up with a detailed review of the
literature on FCO. The review of FCO includes a discussion of the definition,
theories, determinants, and methods of assessing the presence and operation of the
phenomenon in an economy.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The GoG borrows from domestic and foreign sources to finance the budget
deficit. In 2013, 55% of the public debt was from domestic sources (Ministry of
Finance, 2015). Government’s domestic borrowing is competitive and has a potential
crowding out effect on PSCs. FCO theory is not conclusive (Aisen & Hauner, 2013)
and not proven specifically for Ghana. Therefore, the specific research problem was
whether the government’s domestic debt caused FCO in Ghana.
The purpose of this quantitative research was to investigate the presence of
FCO in Ghana. I did this by examining the relationship between the government’s
domestic debt and the credit advanced to the private corporate sector by Ghanaian
banks. In this chapter, I discuss the theoretical bases of my research, followed by a
detailed review of the literature on FCO and its determinants: the cost of credit and
the quantity of credit. I end Chapter 2 with a preview of the methods of measuring the
presence of FCO in an economy.
Literature Search Strategy
I designed my literature review to provide a comprehensive examination of the
subject matter. I undertook my research using the Walden University library’s
resources, the Google Scholar search engine and, to a limited extent, the Google main
search engine. Within the Walden University Library resources, I relied on the
Business Source Complete and the Academic Source databases for my literature. I
also set up a Google alert for published articles on FCO and government debt as they
related to my research topic. The alert service provided a continuous source of latest
articles on my research topic. Occasionally I would also use the Thoreau database to
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provide additional research material not specifically related to finance. I also used
relevant textbooks and encyclopedias when necessary.
Scope of the Literature Review
Peer-reviewed literature. Walden University requires the use of peerreviewed literature only. Using the Walden library search engine, I could select peerreviewed literature by specifying the selection criteria. The peer review feature is,
however, not available through the Google Scholar search engine. I, therefore, used
the “verify peer review” feature available through the Walden library to check the
status of every journal article that I sourced from Google.
Years reviewed. As much as practicable, I kept the age of my reviewed
articles within a 5-year band. Accordingly, the publication dates of 55% of my
reviewed articles were between 2013 and 2017. Some of the pieces that fell outside
the time range were either seminal, provided definitions and background information,
or were those that I needed to include to provide better and complete explanation of
the issues under discussion. Some of these were articles by Ho and Saunders (1981)
and Myers (1984). Twelve percent of all references related to my methodology and
8% were from institutional websites. Institutional articles were not necessarily peer
reviewed but provided background information critical for explaining issues,
especially as pertained to the Ghanaian situation. These sources were the Bank of
England (2015), the Bank of Ghana (2017), the Ministry of Finance and Economic
Planning of Ghana (Ministry of Finance, 2015), and the World Bank (2013, 2014).
Strategy for Reviewing the Literature
Framework for the review. The first task that I undertook was to design a
framework within which the literature review would take place. The framework,
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shown in Figure 1, served as my guide for a systematic search, review, acceptance, or
rejection of selected articles.
Keyword search. The bulk of the search revolved around keywords. The
main keyword was financial crowding out (FCO). I conducted searches related to
FCO definition, theories, indicators, and measurements. FCO manifests in increased
cost of credit and reduced quantity of credit to the private sector. Interest rates, the
interest rate spread, and the net interest margin measure the cost of credit. Interest
rates are affected by macroeconomic factors such as gross domestic product (GDP),
inflation, and exchange rates, all of which became search terms.
Both the cost of credit and the quantity of credit are affected by bank
operational costs and savings habits of households and firms. Theories that explain
the savings habit such as the loanable fund’s theory and the quantity theory of funds
also emerged as search terms. The quantity of credit available for lending is also a
function of the central bank’s reserve requirements, the monetary policy, budget
deficits, and the fiscal policy of the government. I adopted these as my search terms
for the literature review.
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Figure 1. Literature review organogram.
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Theoretical Foundation
Three schools of economic thought or theories define and describe the FCO
phenomenon. These are the neoclassical theory, the Ricardian equivalence theory, and
the Keynesian theory. Each theory reflects a unique position regarding the
phenomenon.
Ricardian Equivalence Theory
The Ricardian equivalence theory, as posited by Barro, (1989); Larbi, (2013);
and Mahmoudzadeh et al. (2013), is that when a government tried to increase
borrowing, demand for credit remained unchanged. Barro (1989) explained the theory
that households’ response to the government’s demand for credit to finance the budget
deficit is to increase their level of savings in anticipation of future tax increases.
Hence, the presence of government debt increases savings that will increase the
quantity of credit available to borrowers. Banks do not have to increase the savings
interest rates to attract these extra savings. Thus, the cost of credit available to firms
will remain unaffected, and private investment will also remain unchanged. In sum,
the Ricardian theory does not support the crowding out effect.
Some researchers have refuted the claims of the Ricardian theory. Schlicht
(2013), in refuting the theory stated that its premise, the rational behavior expectation
of households, invalidated it because it omitted interest payments on the public debt.
Schlicht argued that extracting interest payments on government debt from
households will reduce their savings. Thus, there will be a reduction in the volume of
funds available to the banks to extend credit to borrowers. The author concluded that
the rational behavior of households would not support the Ricardian theory.
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Caparole (2015) also argued against the Ricardian equivalence theory. Using
the efficient markets model of interest rates, Caparole researched the influence of
taxation on interest rates in the U.S. bond market and found a significant negative
relationship between the two. The author concluded that the effect of externally
imposed taxes on interest rates did not support the Ricardian theory of FCO.
Keynesian Theory
The Keynesian approach to FCO argues a complementary relation between
credit supply and government spending (Mahmoudzadeh et al., 2013). The theory
states that public expenditure signals positive economic conditions to the private
sector, which responds with higher investments. Government spending will, therefore,
have a crowd-in effect on the private sector's investment. However, when Balcerzak
and Rogalska (2014), and Mahmoudzadeh et al. (2013), analyzed data from different
countries using the Keynesian IS-LM framework, they found that the theory yielded
different results depending on the type of government spending. Expenditure on
capital formation yielded a crowd-in effect for all countries they investigated, whereas
consumption spending led to crowding out in developed economies but a crowd in
developing countries. In both cases, however, the results were marginal implying a
weak explanatory power of the theory. Also, Balcerzak and Rogalska found
contradicting results from the same country when they applied other methods or used
different data periods. These finding led me to conclude that the Keynesian theory is
not reliable for explaining FCO in an economy.
Neoclassical Theory
The neoclassical theory evolved from and is considered a continuation of the
classical theory espoused by Smith (Lawson, 2013). In classical theory, the
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distribution of the production of an economy is proportional to the cost incurred by
different strata of society in production. Hence, the price of a product will reflect the
cost of production.
Researchers, however, quickly noted that people are willing to pay more than
the production cost to acquire a product, leading to the formulation of three basic
assumptions that underpin the neoclassical theory. Weintraub (2002) stated these
theories to be that individuals, households, and firms have rational preferences among
outcomes; individuals maximize utility and firms maximize profits; and all persons
act independently using all the information available to them. The neoclassical theory
thus explains the notion of value (i.e., the relationship between an object and its
acquirer) and leads to the formulation of relationships among demand, supply, and
price. The price of a good comprises both the cost of production and the value placed
on it by the demanders and suppliers. Price, therefore, determines the relationship
between the quantities demanded and supplied. Producers are willing to sell at the
highest price they can get whereas buyers will want to purchase at the lowest price
possible. Price then becomes the clearing mechanism for market operations in
neoclassical theory.
Weintraub (2002) stated that neoclassical theory dominated economic
discussions. Researchers use the theory to spawn new ones rooted in its basic
assumptions. Thus, there is a neoclassical theory of FCO, which was the theory that I
preferred for my research.
The neoclassical theory postulates a rational relation between demand and
supply of resources. The theory, as it related to access to credit, (Aisen & Hauner,
2013; Claeys et al., 2012), posited that increases in budget deficits have a direct
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correlation with interest rates. The rationale behind this theory is that growing
demand for credit by the government to finance the budget deficit exerts an upward
pressure on interest rates. Higher interest rates increase the probability of bankruptcy
for borrowers, and thus rational managers will refrain from issuing debt, that is, they
will be crowded out.
The ability to apply rigid mathematical formulae for testing hypotheses is the
major advantage of the neoclassical approach. The fields of economics and finance
have a strong tradition of repeated applications of mathematical modeling to explain
phenomena. Both Weintraub (2002) and Lawson (2013) averred that neoclassical
theory lends itself to a deductive approach, that is, the process of relying on
mathematical correlations to provide explanations for events. Coad (2007) stated that
neoclassical theorists have developed an impressive set of mathematical models that
enable objective tests of economic theories.
Bernheim’s (1989) seminal paper on budget deficits guided my adoption of
the neoclassical approach. Bernheim disaggregated deficits into permanent and
temporary components. Permanent deficits are long-term while the temporary, yearon-year deficits are deviations from the norm. The neoclassical analysis sheds light on
the effect of the permanent deficit while Keynesian analysis concerns itself with the
effect of temporary deviations. Temporary deviations, however, are not useful for
studying and testing theory. The analysis of deficits and the subsequent enactment of
policies must, therefore, adopt the neoclassical approach. Bernheim advised that the
neoclassicist should focus on the total outstanding public debt instead of year-to-year
changes to provide a more informed measurement of the impact of government’s
fiscal policy on capital formation and consumption. Neoclassical theorists have, as
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noted by Coad (2007), developed the right mathematical framework and models to
enable this analysis. Such an analysis may yield results which can inform public
policy in support of a positive social change.
Literature Review
FCO refers to an increase in cost and a reduction in the quantity of credit to
the non-financial private sector resulting from government competition for loanable
funds from the financial market (Graham, Leary, & Roberts, 2014). Sharpe (2013)
stated that the phenomenon resulted from borrowing from domestic lenders to finance
rising public debt and budget deficits leading to increases in interest rates. Agnello
and Sousa (2013) indicated that rising government debt imposed a fiscal shock on
asset prices that manifest in reduced access to affordable credit for businesses. A
decline in credit conditions can be a major obstacle to business and can affect their
survival (Haselip et al., 2014).
FCO is, therefore, a phenomenon created by the actions of government and its
institutions on the money market. Governments, operating through their central banks,
play the role of regulating the amount of liquidity available to the private sector of the
economy. In times of excessive liquidity, the central bank intervenes by selling
financial instruments in a mop-up exercise. During periods of low liquidity, central
banks release extra funds into the market by selling bonds and other financial
instruments, or by creating new money in a process described by the Bank of England
(2015) as quantitative easing. These actions form part of monetary policies designed
to keep inflation on target. However, under circumstances of budget deficits,
governments’ purchase of credit from the market can become excessive and may
exclude other players from accessing funds. Fan, Titman, and Twite (2012) described
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the borrowing activity of government as FCO while Agnello and Sousa (2013) called
it a negative fiscal shock.
FCO also occurs under other actions of central banks and public institutions.
Foreign reserve accumulation, a process in which central banks purchase foreign debt
to stabilize the local currency, can have a crowding out effect on domestic businesses.
Reinhart and Tashiro (2013) reported that in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis,
Asian central banks embarked on the purchase of foreign reserves as a measure to
cushion their currencies against depreciation. The action had the effect of limiting the
amount of credit available to their private sector borrowers thus crowding them out of
the credit market.
The preferential treatment of government-owned businesses in gaining access
to credit is another cause of FCO for private business. Private sector firms are unable
to compete with government-owned or government-sponsored institutions that receive
preferential treatment in access to government contracts, supplies, and tax treatment.
Under these circumstances, even in the presence of loanable funds, the private sector
will not invest because of the potential for low returns on their investments. Menon
and Ng (2013) described the phenomenon when they studied the effect of the
operations of government-linked corporations (GLCs) on the investment activities of
other corporate entities in the Malaysian economy. They found that where GLCs
control about 60% of the market, non-GLCs receive such low returns on capital
employed that investments were not worthwhile, effectively crowding them out of the
investment market.
Crowding out can operate in reverse. A reversed crowding out phenomenon
exists when the government is crowded out especially in the provision of services.
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Isaac and Norton (2013) described a scenario of reserve crowding out in which
service delivery by, for example, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) crowded
out government from providing these services. Health, education, and other social
services benefit from provision by NGOs which can crowd out government supply.
However, I will not consider the crowding out described by the authors because it
does not conform to the definition of crowding out I have adopted in this research.
FCO is not directly observable in an economy or a firm. However, there are
directly observable events or measurable variables that can serve as pointers to the
existence of the phenomenon. These indicators operate at the country and corporate
levels.
Country-Level Indicators of Financial Crowding Out
The variables and events that indicate the presence of FCO in an economy are
increasing accumulation of foreign reserves (Reinhart & Tashiro, 2013), public
investments, domestic and external public debt, and the degree of integration with
other economies (Broner et al., 2014). Other indicators are the Treasury bill rate
(Fayed, 2013), policy rate, reserve requirements, and domestic savings.
Accumulation of foreign reserves. Capital flies from an economy through
the acquisition and accumulation of foreign reserves, a measure adopted by central
banks to shore up the currency against foreign currencies. The purchase of foreign
exchange by the central bank is an indication that the private sector in the country is
likely to be crowded out of credit for investment purposes due to the reduction in the
available loanable funds. Reinhart and Tashiro (2013) therefore, defined FCO to
include the purchase and accumulation of foreign reserves by a central bank.
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Treasury bill rates. Treasury bills are debt instruments sold and bought by
the central bank. The Treasury bill rate represents the price the central bank is willing
to pay for its debt. Movements in the rate can, therefore, serve as an indication of the
demand for debt. The higher the rate, the more debt the public and banks will be
willing to purchase from the government or the central bank, and the less the amount
available to the private sector (Fayed, 2013). Therefore, movements in the Treasury
bill rate can proxy for the presence of FCO in an economy.
Monetary policy rate. The monetary policy rate, the rate at which the central
bank sells short-term debt to banks can serve as an indicator of the cost of debt in the
country. Central banks announce the monetary policy rate periodically, usually on a
quarterly basis. They use the rates to expand or contract the economy by reallocating
credit between the private and the public sectors as explained by Broner et al. (2014).
In an expansionary policy, the central bank will lower the rate to make government
securities unattractive. A contractionary policy increases the policy rate thus
increasing the cost of credit and restricting the supply of loans to the market. Addo
and Seyram (2013) found a positive correlation between the policy rate and bank
borrowing rates in Ghana which suggests that the policy rate may serve as an
indicator of the potential for FCO of the private sector. The reaction of banks to these
policies, however, do not always correlate with the actions of the central bank. Banks
may resist the urge to increase interest rates in response to increases in the policy rate
to attract and serve high-quality clients. Banks may also refuse to reduce lending rates
if they perceive a recession. Notwithstanding these exceptions, Amidu (2014) noted
that the policy rate always influences lending and bank managers will normally set the
interest rates on bank debt instruments higher than the policy rate.
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Reserve requirements. Central bank reserve requirements have a negative
correlation with the quantities of loans banks can make available to their customers.
The central bank requires banks to deposit a fraction of clients’ savings as reserves.
The higher the reserve requirements, the less the deposits available to extend as credit,
and the higher the cost due to a higher non-interest earning liabilities carried by the
banks (Addo & Seyram, 2013). Banks will, according to Ahinful (2012), then resort
to credit rationing as a demand management strategy. Thus, movements in the
statutory reserve requirements can serve as an indicator of FCO of bank customers.
Public investments. Public spending is an indicator of FCO or crowding in.
As noted by Bello, Nagwari, and Saulawa, (2012), and Traum and Yang (2015), some
government expenditures crowded in while others crowded out credit. In Nigeria for
example, Bello et al. (2012) found that public spending on manufacturing and
construction crowded out the private sector while expenditure on education, health,
agriculture, communication, and transport infrastructure crowded in private
investments.
Domestic savings. An increase in government spending leading to a rise in the
budget deficit reduces the level of national savings by both the public and private
sectors. The effect of such action is a reduction of loanable funds on the market
(Sharpe, 2013). Under conditions of credit supply constraints, government debt, used
to finance increased spending, competes with private debt, exerting upward pressure
on market interest rates. When the government decides to fund the increased spending
through taxation, according to Sharpe (2013) and Traum and Yang (2015), the result
is a reduction in both public and private savings. There is also a corresponding
decrease in the size of loanable funds available to industry. A persistent reduction in
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domestic savings, therefore, is an indication of crowding out of the private sector
from the financial market in the country.
Economic integration. FCO correlates with the economic development of a
country as well as its degree of integration with other economies. In developed
economies, deficits may not have any effect on the financial markets resulting in a
minimum incidence of crowding out. Where economies are integrated, the spillover
effect of the international bond market mitigates FCOs. Government debt instruments
are tradeable (Broner et al., 2014) thus minimizing the impact on the local economy.
Public debt. In emerging and low-income countries, there is a more severe
effect of deficits. In what they described as a laissez-faire approach to banking, Fayed
(2013) and Shetta and Kamaly (2014) described the phenomenon of emerging country
banks purchasing government bonds at the expense of credit to the private sector. The
sale of bonds by governments to pay for the public debt creates conditions for the
operation of FCO in developing countries.
Sovereign borrowing has a direct correlation FCO. Agca and Celasun (2012)
examined the relationship between sovereign debt and the cost of borrowing in
countries where there has been a default on sovereign debts. They found a positive
correlation between the cost of corporate borrowing and the level of sovereign
borrowing: the more a country borrowed from foreign lenders, the higher the cost of
credit to its business sector from foreign banks. Significantly, they also found that the
cost of lending to the corporate sector by foreign lenders increased substantially in
countries where the sovereign debt was perceived to be at risk of default, and where
there was weak legal protection for creditors. These findings indicated that the
phenomenon of FCO was not limited to domestic markets.
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Firm-Level Indicators of Financial Crowding Out
FCO from the perspectives of the firm manifests in the holding of cash and
other short-term securities (Graham et al., 2014). When businesses increase their
holdings of cash and other short-term securities, it serves as an indication that
government may be crowding out the private sector. Firms anticipating crowding out
may also hold foreign treasuries instead of corporate bonds and will resort to reduced
capital expenditures.
A company's debt can also result in the crowding out of investments according
to Diamond and He (2014). A substantial debt overhang can cause a firm to refuse to
invest in positive net present value projects because of the perception that the
proceeds will service the debt. Thus, the debt creates a crowding out effect on new
investments in the firm.
Qualitative Indicators
Credit rationing is a leading qualitative indicator of FCO. Banks choose credit
rationing as a demand management strategy (Ahinful, 2012) whereby they deny some
clients credit irrespective of the interest rate there are willing to accept. Credit
rationing is not an observable behavior as noted by Bellier, Sayeh, and Serve (2012).
Field surveys remain the only way of acquiring data. In Kumasi in Ghana, for
example, Ahinful (2012) found that 41.7% of respondents in a survey needed five
times more credit than their banks granted them. Ghanaian banks allocate credit to
clients based, according to Ahiawodzi and Sackey (2013), on borrower information
and not on interest rates, even though the Ghanaian financial market has liberalized
interest rates.
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Determinants of Financial Crowding Out
The indicators of FCO emphasized two variables--interest rates (Sharpe, 2013)
and the quantity of credit (Djankov et al., 2007; Fayed, 2013) as the key determinants
of the phenomenon. In this section, I discuss the two variables, their different
definitions and their effect on FCO.
Interest rates. Interest rates are the cost and benefits of using or giving up the
use of money respectively for a period. The interest rate on loans, expressed as a
percentage of the balance outstanding, may be fixed or variable depending on the
terms of the loan agreement. There are different definitions of interest rates based on
its application (Aboagye, Akoena, Antwi-Asare, & Gockel, 2008). For the lender, it is
the fee charged for supplying the funds and represents the opportunity cost of
forgoing the use of the money for alternative purposes. From the perspectives of the
borrower, an interest rate is a cost incurred for using other people's money. When the
same institution is responsible for attracting both lenders and borrowers, the
difference between the lending and borrowing rates is called the interest rate spread.
Classification of interest rates. The classification of interest rates varies with
purpose. Classification can be by the length of maturity, by their relation to the
economy, by their rigidity, by type of instrument, by mode of compounding, and by
its application on the market. Maturities can be short-term--up to 1 year; mediumterm--more than 1 year but less than 5 years; and long-term--more than 5 years.
Interest rates can be nominal or real. The nominal interest rate denotes the speed at
which invested money will grow over a period (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014), while the
real interest rate is the nominal interest rate adjusted for inflation.
Let:

39
n

=

nominal interest rate

r

=

real interest rate

i

=

inflation rate,

Then, r = (n – 1)/ (1 + i) and for small values of i, r = n – i.
The real interest rate indicates the purchasing power of the invested sum and
earned interest. Real interest rates can be positive or negative depending on the rate of
inflation. Where the real interest rate is also the discount rate, there is an adjustment
of the cash flows to account for inflation, that is, the cash flow is in real terms.
However, given the constant movement in inflation rates, Berk and DeMarzo (2014)
cautioned against the use of the real interest rate and instead recommended the
nominal interest rate as the discount rate.
The rigidity of interest rates and type of financial instrument serves as modes
of classification. Thus, there is a fixed interest rate, a variable or floating interest rate,
or a combination of the two in a loan agreement. Berk and DeMarzo (2014) defined a
floating interest rate as one which varies with the demand and supply of loans in the
market. A fixed interest rate is set ab initio determined by several internal and
external factors affecting the issuing institution. There are also deposit instruments
such as savings, time, and some demand or current accounts with different interest
rates. Investment instruments like bonds and securities have different classifications
depending on the tenor.
The mode of compounding of interest rates is another criterion for
classification. Interest calculation is simple or compound. In simple interest
calculations, the principal earns interest at specified intervals. In compounding mode,
the sum of the interest and the principal in a preceding period serves as the principal
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for the next interest calculation period. Thus, there is a continuous change of principal
throughout the tenor of the investment or loan.
Compounding can be at discrete intervals or continuously throughout the tenor
of the investment or loan. Discrete compounding calculates interest accrued on the
previous period’s principal at fixed or specified intervals. The intervals can be annual,
semiannual, quarterly, monthly, or daily. Continuous compounding estimates interest
on a continuous basis by assuming that there is no interval between compounding
periods. The relation, 𝑖 = 𝑒 𝑟𝑡 , where r is the interest rate and, t is the time elapsed
yields the accrued interest, i, at any time.
Two other classifications of interest rate are the spot and future rates. The
spot rate is the rate applicable on-the-spot, that is, today's interest rate applied to an
investment maturing on a specific date. A forward interest rate is a rate that applies to
an investment in a future period. Forward rates are forecast and may not be attainable
in practice.
Other important interest rates for making capital investment decisions include:
•

Base rate—this is a rate set by banks and serves as the starting-point for loan
negotiations. The rate has four modules namely the cost of funds, return on
equity, provision for bad debt and risk premium. The BoG provided a formula
for calculating this rate to introduce more transparency into the banking sector
in Ghana. The BoG requires banks not to lend below the advertised base rates
that it adjusts the rate periodically to reflect changes in the larger market.

•

Policy rate—the rate which central banks charge on loans made to commercial
banking institutions. In Ghana, the policy rate design is targeting single-digit
inflation (Bank of Ghana, 2014).
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•

Commercial paper rate—these are short-term discount bonds issued by
established corporate borrowers to mature in 6 months or less.

•

Treasury bill rates--central banks issue these bills at fixed interest rates. These
are short-term measures to increase or reduce the amount of credit in the
economy. The BoG issues 91-day and the 182-day Treasury bills. Treasury
bills are risk-free, sold at a price less than the value at maturity, and
operationalize both the fiscal and monetary policies of the government.

•

Government bond rates—government issues debt at a fixed rate to raise funds.
In Ghana, the government has 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 10-year bonds on the market. It
also has longer duration bonds issued in the international markets. The bonds
have different interest rates related to their maturity.

•

Corporate bond rate—corporations issue debt instrument as a means of raising
long-term financing. Bonds have different interest rates based on the time to
maturity and the risk profile of the issuing institution. The corporate bond
market in Ghana is nascent but promising (Ghana Stock Exchange, 2016).
Determinants of bank interest rates. Bank interest rates represent the risk

banks associated with lending to a customer. Interest rates also reflect the cost of
obtaining and managing the funds that the bank makes available to the borrower.
Banks retain the power to determine how much interest a borrower must pay on the
borrowed sum. In some instances, the interest rate will be subject to negotiation
between the lender and the borrower, but the lender still retains the right to determine
the final rate. Several factors influence and determine the interest firms should pay for
borrowing. Macroeconomic conditions, financial industry parameters, bank-specific,
and firm-specific factors come into play in determining the interest rate.
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Economic conditions. Entrop, Memmel, Ruprecht, and Wilkens (2014)
averred that both macro and micro economic conditions affect interest rates. The
macroeconomic conditions reflect the uncertainty surrounding interest rate changes
whereas microeconomic conditions involve exposure to risks. Banks, therefore, price
their loans to include the risks associated with both conditions.
The macroeconomic conditions which affect the interest rate spreads are,
according to Churchill, Kwaning, and Ababio (2014) GDP, exchange rate, prime rate,
and the Treasury bill rate. Among these variables, they found GDP to be negatively
correlated with the spread whereas all the other variables had a positive relation.
Another variable that affects interest rate spread is the level of inflation in the
economy. Mensah and Abor (2014) stated that the degree of inflation correlates
positively with higher NIMs in Ghana. Meanwhile, Were and Wambua (2014)
reported that in Kenya, macroeconomic factors such as economic growth were not
significant determinants, and neither was the monetary policy rate of the Bank of
Kenya even though it had a positive correlation with interest rate spreads.
Bank level. At the bank level, the determinants of interest rates include
liquidity, overhead costs, loan loss provisioning, and profit margins. Additionally,
Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2014) intimated that the relations between the bank and the
customer could influence the interest rate charged. A close lending relationship
between a bank and a customer will result in a lower cost of borrowing for the client.
Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2014) also noted that a bank's business model plays
a significant role in interest rate setting. Banks which specialize in lending tend to
have lower interest rates. Also, banks with substantial capital and liquidity buffers,

43
and those which require securitization of loans are more likely to charge lower
interest rates.
The risk associated with lending is another influencing factor and one of the
determinants of the interest rate charged by banks. Entrop, et al. (2014) observed a
positive correlation between interest rate and risk. Banks may increase the interest
rate premium when interest payments face an uncertain future but will adopt a more
favorable regime at lower perceived risks.
Other determinants of interest rates are, according to Were and Wambua
(2014) the size of the bank, credit risk, return on average assets, and operating costs.
Mensah and Abor, (2014) also added that executive compensation, asset size, the
level of concentration in the banking industry, capitalization, and the reserve
requirements correlates positively with higher NIMs. The authors also suggested that
corporate governance could be critical in determining IRS, noting that rent-seeking
managers would seize every opportunity to tweak the IRS to their advantage.
Interest rate measurement. A review of the classification of interest rates
reveals the potential for a multitude of deposit and lending interest rates. Such a
multiplicity of deposit and loan types, applicable rates, and conditions made the
World Bank (2014) declare the limited utility of interest rate as a tool for comparison
or analysis across the board. The limitation spawned a surfeit of definitions of the
interest rates as researcher’s devised different means of measuring the variable. The
most popular proxies are the interest rate spread and the net interest margin which was
preferred by Ho and Saunders (1981). I discuss these two proxies in the sections
following and indicate my preferred choice.
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Interest rate spread. The IRS is the difference between the interest charged on
loans and the interest paid on deposits. However, because of the several different
definitions of interest rates, the IRS also has several definitions and measurements.
Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2014) for example, measured the IRS as the difference
between the interest rate charged on credit lines (i.e., overdrafts) and the 3-month
interbank rate. Mannasoo (2013) estimated the spread using two definitions: first, the
loan-deposit spread, calculated as the difference between the loan and deposit interest
rate; and second, the loan-Euribor spread, computed as the difference between the
loan rate and the Euribor 6-month rate. These two examples give an indication of the
potential of deriving many and different spreads based on the frame of reference of
the research.
The role of IRS. The IRS is a measure the efficiency of a bank or the entire
banking industry in a country. Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, and Morduchp (2014) estimated
the IRS as the difference between a bank’s lending and deposit interest rates and
posited that it served as a proxy for assessing the efficiency of the banking industry.
The correlation between the IRS and efficiency is negative, that is, the higher the
spread, the less efficient the bank, and vice versa.
IRS also serve as a proxy for gauging the FCO of households and industries in
a country. Mannasoo (2013) posited that lower IRS increase access to credit which
can serve as a boost for economic growth. Therefore, IRS has a direct link to the GDP
of a country, all things being equal.
Determinants of IRS. Studies of the determinants of IRS yielded three
variable groups--bank specific, macroeconomic, and industry-specific. Researchers
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use the three variable groups in their assessment of IRS. For example, Ho and
Saunders (1981) derived the net spread as in Equation 1:
s = α/β + 0.5Rσ2IQ

(1)

where:
α
β

= pure spread or bank risk-neutral spread

R = the bank’s management’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion
Q = the size of bank transactions
σ2I = the instantaneous variance of the interest rate on deposits and loans
Ho and Saunders (1981) inferred that modeling could yield the pure spread.
They also showed that pure spread is a function of four factors: the degree of
managerial risk aversion, the size of transactions undertaken by the bank, bank market
structure, and the variance of interest rates.
Following their work, researchers established other determinants for modeling
the impact and effect of the IRS. Were and Wambua, (2014) identified bank-specific
factors that play significant roles in the determination of IRS. These include bank
size, credit risk as measured by the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, return
on average assets, and operating costs. These factors have a positive correlation with
IRS. Higher bank liquidity ratio, on the other hand, hurts the spreads. On average, big
banks have higher spreads than small banks.
Sheriff and Amoako (2014) showed that some of the determinants of the IRS
in Ghana were inflation, total deposits, Treasury bill rates, and domestic public
borrowing. Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2014) also found that the borrower's
relationship with the bank, securitization, and the degree of lending as a proportion of
banking operations affected the interest rate pass through. Churchill et al. (2014) also
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found the determinants of the IRS in Ghana to include GDP, inflation, exchange rate,
prime rate, Treasury bill rate, liquidity position of banks, overhead costs, loan loss
provisioning, and profit margins. Banks' operational variables including their hedge
against deposit and loan maturity asymmetry and macroeconomic changes in interest
rates were key determinants according to Entrop et al. (2014). They also found that
banks price the interest risk premium based on interest income and expenses after
controlling for earnings that arise from bank-specific maturity structure. Haruna
(2012) added that banks hide the actual cost of lending in the fees and commissions
they charge borrowers. Banks do not report these charges as part of their interest
income thus giving the impression of low-interest rates while the effective interest
rate is high. Therefore, the real IRS shall be calculated to include fees on loans levied
on borrowers. His definition of IRS is by Equation 2:
IRS = (interest plus commission received/total earning assets) – (interest plus
commission paid/interest-bearing liabilities)

(2)

The definition by Haruna (2012) is very similar to the definition of NIM
which suggests that the NIM may be a better variable to use in assessing the presence
of FCO in an economy.
Concluding remarks on the IRS. The preceding suggests that interest rates
and their spreads are stochastic. Modeling can deduce the pure spread (Ho &
Saunders, 1981), but determining the actual spread can be challenging. Ghanaian
banks publish their base rates (Business Ghana, 2015) but do not disclose their
interest rates. Thus, any research in Ghana that relies on the IRS is likely to encounter
difficulties in assembling credible data compared with the NIM.
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Net Interest Margin
The NIM is the net interest income expressed as a percentage of the total
average earning assets. The NIM thus measures the difference between interest earned
on assets and interest paid on liabilities according to Amuakwa-Mensah and Marbuah
(2015). It has the advantage that it accounts for a bank's investment of non-interestbearing liabilities in income earning assets. For example, current account deposits
earn no interest income to the holders, but the bank can invest such sums in income
earning assets for its benefit. The NIM has a direct relation with and derives from the
IRS. NIM has better utility for research because it is directly observable compared
with the IRS. NIM also aggregates all interest rates charged and paid on banks’
earning assets and liabilities without regard to the different rates applied to individual
customers.
Role of the NIM. While both the IRS and the NIM measure the profitability
of banking operations, the IRS is an average rate that applies only to interest-earning
assets and liabilities. The NIM, on the other hand, measures the actual amounts paid
and received by the banks on their assets and liabilities including non-interest earning
liabilities. The NIM thus provides a real measure of the earnings from the
intermediation services provided by the bank as noted by Ho and Saunders (1981). By
relating NIM to the asset base of the bank, NIMs can be aggregated for all banks thus
making it appropriate for industry-wide research.
Determinants of NIM. The determinants of the NIM are similar to the
determinants of the IRS because they are both measures of interest rates on loans and
deposits. Therefore, the NIM is affected by the same macroeconomic factors, bankspecific factors and industry factors identified by Agca and Celasum (2012); Mensah
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and Abor (2014; and Sharpe (2012). Equation 3 defines the relationship between the
NIM and these factors:
NIM = f{industry variables; macroeconomic variables; bank-specific
variables}

(3)

According to Mensah and Abor (2014), the bank-specific variables include
bank-specific risk (loans-to-total-assets), bank size (log of total assets), and bank
efficiency (cost-asset ratio). The industry-specific variables are the level of
competition among banks captured by the HHI, the capital asset ratio, and the
statutory reserves imposed by the regulator which represents non-income earning
liabilities. The macroeconomic variables are inflation, the volatility of interest rates
proxied by the standard deviation of the 91-day Treasury bill rate, and the exchange
rate. Other variables are public debt represented by the ratio of government debt to
GDP and the budget deficit, (Agca & Celasun, 2012).
Application of the NIM in research. Researchers’ make extensive use of the
NIM. Ho and Saunders (1981) were some of the early adopters of the NIM in their
seminal paper on the determinants of bank interest margins. Researchers modified and
adapted the original equation by Ho and Saunders (1981) to suit different research
objectives related to IRS. Entrop et al. (2014) adopted NIM in their study of the
pricing of interest risk exposure in bank margins in which they extended the model of
Ho and Saunders (1981). Mensah and Abor (2014) study of the relationship between
IRS and agency conflict in Ghanaian banks regressed NIM with executive
compensation, macroeconomic factors, and bank-specific factors. These researchers
provided the justification for adopting NIM as my proxy for the interest rates on loans
and, by extension, the cost of borrowing to Ghanaian businesses. In my research, I
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used data from the databases of the BoG and the World Bank. I adopted the definition
of NIM as the accounting value of a bank’s net interest revenue as a percentage of
GDP.
Quantity of Credit
The second variable for assessing FCO is the demand and supply of credit to
the private sector. The use of the quantity of credit as a research variable was the
preferred approach by Djankov et al. (2007) and Fayed (2013) in what they called the
quantity channel. Credit is the money received and used in the present for
reimbursement later, otherwise known as bank loans (Bernanke & Blinder, 1988). The
demanders of credit pay interest on the amount received for the privilege of using
other peoples' money. The suppliers of the money receive the interest as
compensation for forgoing the use of their money in the present. The arrangement
between the demanders and suppliers can be private, that is, between the two parties
without an external intermediary, or through an intermediary for a fee. The role of
intermediaries evolved due to information asymmetry between the parties. Banks
have assumed the role of intermediaries in the demand and supply of credit (Ho &
Saunders, 1981) and bear the risk of guaranteeing a refund of deposits to the
suppliers. For their services, Haruna (2012) stated that banks levy the cost of
intermediation on the interest rates, commissions, and fees they charge the borrowers.
Neoclassical theory suggests that the demand and supply of credit should
follow purely economic principles (Lawson, 2013). Demand will follow an upward
sloping curve while supply exhibits a downward sloping curve. The interest rate
charged by banks for granting credit then serves as the clearing mechanism.
Following from Say's law, the demand for credit should provide its supply. However,
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recent events such as the financial crisis involving subprime loans and other market
imperfections make it difficult to operationalize the law.
Classification of credit. Credit consists of two components--the direct
demand for credit through loan applications, and the sale of all classes of interestbearing financial assets denoted as bonds, as a means to raise funds. Credit
classification is in several different ways. Classification can be by type of security,
payment plan, tenor, or by a combination of these classes.
Credit may be securitized or not. Bankers secure credit by placing a lien on an
asset belonging to the borrower. In the event of a default, the lender can sell the asset
to defray the loan amount outstanding. Trust underlies the use of unsecured credit.
There is no collateral, but the expectation is that the borrowers will honor their
obligations. Government debts, for example, are unsecured but backed by full faith in
the government that it will honor its obligations when it falls due.
The repayment plan can be a means of classifying credit. Installment credit
allows the borrower to make fixed periodic payments on the loan amount. A balloon
makes one payment of the entire amount and the interest at the end of the term.
Another classification of credit refers to the frequency of borrowing. A
revolving credit or an open-ended loan allows the borrower to borrow as often as
needed up to a limit set by the creditor. There are requirements for the borrower to
make periodic repayments according to terms agreed by the parties. A closed-end loan
is a one-off arrangement without the option of renewal, that is, each loan application
is a stand-alone agreement.
Loans may be conventional or non-conventional. Unconventional loans may
be insured by or be provided by the government through a nominated bank.
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Governments may use unconventional loans to target specific sectors of the economy
or as part of special economic programs. Conventional loans, by contrast, are not
insured by the government and can be considered pure loans extended by the banks as
part of their operations.
The tenor of a loan is one determinant of its classification. Loan durations may
be short-term or long-term. There are different classifications of tenor depending on
the source of the funds. Short term loan maturities range between 1 and 3 years
whereas long-term loans last more than 3 years. Some definitions also introduce a
mid-term loan which lasts between 1-to-3 years.
Bonds have similar classifications, but with higher tenors. A short-term bond
may have a tenor of 5 years, a mid-term bond between 5-to-10 years and a long-term
bond is usually more than a decade with many lasting up to 30 years (Dass & Massa,
2014). The difference between a bond and a loan is that bondholders can trade them
on the bond market. Bondholders, therefore, do not have to hold until maturity.
Instead, they can trade to recover their investment when necessary. Loans, on the
other hand, are private agreements between two parties and so cannot be traded.
Creditors must pay the full amount to their debtors at agreed terms for principal and
interest until they retire the loan.
The final classification of credit I reviewed is by Werner (2012). Werner
distinguished between credit that used for GDP transactions (CR) and credit that used
for non-GDP transactions (CF). CR drives nominal growth in GDP while CF drives
asset transaction values that is, they are for providing collateral.
Sources of credit. Werner (2012) disaggregated credit into physical money
and credit. Central banks create physical money by printing. Both the central bank
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and commercial banks create credit money by making loans. Central banks require
banks to reserve a percentage, R, of customers' deposits. Banks can then extend credit
to households and firms up to 100-R percent of the deposited amount. However, a
bank can make loans by increasing their reserves without receiving money from
depositors. The power to extend credit based on the reserve requirements grants
money creating abilities to banks. The import of this reserve requirements is that
theoretically, researchers may estimate the quantity of credit that an economy can
create from the total commercial bank reserves and the loans and bonds issued by the
central bank.
Determinants of credit demand. The demand for credit (D) is in three parts.
These are for household consumption (C), investment (I), and government borrowing,
(G). Mathematically, the demand function is D = C + I + G. The major determinants
of the demand for households and investors are, according to Herrera, Hurlin, and
Zaki (2013), the level of economic activity, and the availability of alternative funding
sources. The intensity of economic activity correlates positively with the demand
while the presence of alternative funding has a negative relation with demand. The
fraction of the budget deficit financed by domestic borrowing establishes the level of
government demand for loans.
Determinants of credit supply. Banks supply credit to the market. The
quantity of credit available for loans depends on the sources and uses of funds.
Herrera et al. (2013) identified the sources as savings by households (S) dissaving or
disinvestments (Di), and liquidity injection by central banks or government as part of
a stimulus package (Li). The uses of funds by banks are for operational purposes (B),
reserve requirements by central banks (R), and excess reserves by banks with the
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central bank (Re). The sources have a positive effect on credit while the use of funds
reduces the amount available. Mathematically, the supply function is L = S + Di + Li
– B – R – Re, where the variables are as defined previously.
Theories on the demand and supply of credit. Two theories that explain the
relationship between demand and supply are the neoclassical and the Keynesian.
According to Lawson (2013), the basis of the neoclassical economic theory is the
premise that free markets can regulate themselves if left alone, free of any human
intervention. Therefore, the demand for credit will equal the supply. The neoclassical
approach indicates that the intersection of the upward sloping supply curve of savings
and downward sloping curve of demand for credit determines the cost of credit. As far
as the theory goes, there is no external influence in the determination of the cost and
quantity of funds available and requested--the so-called invisible hand ensures that the
market clears and corrects itself in the long term.
A critique of the classical theory is that everything happens in the long term.
As famously stated by Keynes (1936), ‘in the long run, we are all dead.' There is,
therefore, the need to intervene in the short term to correct market imperfections and
stimulate the economy. Monetary authorities, therefore, intervene regularly in the
market to regulate the flow of funds. The intervention led to the evolution of the
Keynesian loanable fund's theory which acknowledges the role of central banks in
regulating the amount and cost of credit. The role of monetary authorities in the funds
market includes the purchase and sale of government debt, revision of the reserve
requirements, sale and acquisition of central bank bonds, and adjustments to the
policy rates for interbank borrowing.
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Both the neoclassical and Keynesian theories acknowledge the role of the
interest rate as a clearing mechanism for the market. According to the neoclassical
theory, the intersection of the upward sloping supply curve of savings and downward
sloping demand curve determines the cost of credit represented by the interest rate.
Higher interest rate increases the risk of bankruptcy. Therefore, firms facing an
upward-sloping interest rate regime reduce their demand for loans.
Banks also, knowing that higher interest rates can attract risky investors, may
restrain themselves from increasing interest rates beyond a certain level. Instead, they
may ration credit and use their excess loanable funds to purchase government bonds
and loans if the applicable interest rate ensured a minimum profit level for their
operations.
The exception to the rule is the demand for credit by the government.
Governments can borrow at any price but can also negotiate to borrow at concessional
rates. These two conditions place governments in an advantageous position, and
therefore they will not curtail their demand for credit at higher interest rates. The
scenario of high-interest rate and strong demand for credit by the government can
limit resources available and supplied by banks to the private sector. It can shift the
supply of funds from the private sector to the public sector (Krishnamurthy &
Vissing-Jorgensen, 2015) and financially crowd them out. Crowding out, therefore,
results from increased government borrowing, higher interest rates, banks purchase of
the public debt, credit rationing by banks, central bank reserves –both statutory and
voluntary, and bank operating costs.

55
Models for Analyzing Financial Crowding Out
Investigating the incidence of FCO is a backward-looking process according
to Guyton (2014). A fundamental assumption of this process is that past data can
predict the future when used in the appropriate mathematical model. Coad (2007)
stated that the adoption of a neoclassical theoretical base for research made possible
the use of quantitative approaches in undertaking such investigations.
The purpose of quantitative research is to make generalizable conclusions
about the subject of study. The results of such studies are useful for predicting the
outcome of similar studies (Gippel, 2013). The quantitative process is deductive,
enabled by the use of statistical models and large datasets. Deductive research
according to Wayhuni (2012) follows a neoclassical and a rational expectations
paradigm which derives from a positivist philosophy. Deductive research is scientific,
driven by theory, seeks to confirm or falsify hypotheses, and contributes towards the
generalization of results because they are replicable in similar contexts.
Scientific inquiry uses models to describe and explain the phenomena under
study. Von Bertalanffy (1972) stated that the use of models finds application in
everyday life and language. Finance researchers seek to explain, describe, and predict
the performance of financial indicators and variables. Such research is mainly
quantitative. Research in finance is a scientific inquiry and has benefited from the use
of models. Qualitative methods also find application in finance research but, as noted
by Kaczynski, Salmona, and Smith (2014), such methods are meant to supplement, or,
serve as a prelude to the quantitative methods.
Nelder and Wedderburn (1972) popularized the use of models in their seminal
work on the Generalized Linear Models (GLM). GLMs has three components: a
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random element, which specifies the conditional distribution of the response variable;
a linear predictor, that is, a linear function of regressors; and an invertible linearizing
link function. The function transforms the expectation of the dependent variable to the
linear predictor. GLMs adapts to varied applications.
Two specialized applications of GLM are multiple regression and correlation
analysis. Johnson (2001) stated that both correlation and multiple regression are
applicable in explanatory, descriptive, and predictive research. They also find
application in the control of extraneous variables.
In finance research, one of the most common multiple regression methods is
the ordinary least squares involving multiple independent variables and a dependent
variable. The analysis yields explanations on which of several independent variables
have a relationship, and the form of the relationship, with the dependent variable.
Researchers use variants of the multiple regression analysis in reporting on FCO and
other finance phenomena. Mahmoudzadeh et al. (2013) found four models, all
adaptations of the multiple regression procedures, as the preferred methods for
measuring FCO and other time series variables. These are the Vector Autoregression
(VAR) model, the Error Correction Model (ECM), the Vector Error Correction Model
(VECM) and One-Way Error Terms model. Researchers use these models in
combination with time series data.
Other models in the literature include the Generalized Autoregressive
Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) family of models for forecasting the
volatility of time series data. The GARCH models predict variance by utilizing the
previous period's data in predicting the next period's outcome.
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The Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) and the Autoregressive
Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models are a class of stochastic processes used
to analyze and to forecast using time series data. ARIMA models are a form of
regression analysis. The models predict the future movements of seemingly random
data series by examining the differences between values in the data instead of using
the actual values. Lags of the differenced series are "autoregressive," and lags within
forecasted data are "moving average''. The model's specification is ARIMA (p, d, q),
where the letters p, d, and q refer respectively to the autoregressive, integrated and
moving average parts of the data set respectively. ARIMA modeling allows the
analyst to account for trends, seasonality, cycles, errors, and non-stationary aspects of
the data.
There is also the Rule-Based Forecasting model (RBF) which evolved out of
the need to incorporate expert knowledge and judgment into the analyses and
forecasting of time series data (Adya & Lusk, 2013). The RBF is thus an expert
system that translates forecasting expertise into a set of rules that uses the analyst's
knowledge and the characteristic of the data being analyzed to develop a model from
a combination of simple extrapolation methods.
Model selection. Analysts adopt the model that most suit their data set and
research objectives. Naa-Idar, Ayentimi, and Frimpong (2012) took a cointegration
approach to study the determinants of private investments in Ghana for the period
1960 to 2010. They were able to analyze the 50-year period data because of the use of
a time series model. Fayed (2013) similarly used a cointegration method to study the
relationship between public borrowing and private credit. Mahmoudzadeh et al.
(2013) on the other hand used the one-way error terms component of panel data in a
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regression model to study the effect of fiscal spending and budget deficits on FCO in
both developed and developing countries.
Model variables. Selecting variables to use in analyzing financial data is a
combination of the model's requirements and availability. Data selection assumes that
there is information on a large number of potential variables to sample for relevant
variables for the preferred model. The second assumption is that data is accurate,
unbiased, and adequate to make predictions and generalizations. Flannery and
Hankins (2013) however, revealed the inaccuracy of these assumptions. They
contended that analysts have to make approximations and adjustments to existing data
to be able to analyze, make predictions, and propound theories.
The preceding can show the preponderance of variables used by different
researchers in their analysis. Mahmoudzadeh et al. (2013) for example used private
investment, the inflation rate, gross domestic product, government investment
expenditure, government consumption expenditure, and deficit in their assessment of
FCO. Fayed (2013), on the other hand, used private credit, government borrowing, the
log of industrial production, the level of financial intermediation, the institutional
quality, and the lending interest rate in analyzing the effect of FCO in Egypt.
Time selection. The purpose of my research is to investigate the presence of
FCO in Ghana. It is an attempt to explain the effect of excessive government debt on
interest rates and the quantity of private sector credit in Ghana. My research will span
the period from 2006 to 2016. During this time, Ghana continued with economic and
financial reforms under the aegis of the IMF and the World Bank. The country
borrowed from both domestic and international banks to resuscitate the economy. The
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period, therefore, defines the frame of reference for my data and is sufficient to
provide the desired power and the effect size of my analysis.
Research Models
Quantity of Credit Model
I adopted Fayed (2013) approach for estimating the quantity of credit available
to the private sector because my study location is in a developing country with fairly
similar characteristics. I investigated the quantity of credit available to the private
sector by using Equation 4:
PSCREDITt = α0 + β1DEBTt + β 2FINTt – 1 + β 3INSQUALt + β 4TBRATEt + β
5GDPt

+ εt

(4)

where:
PSCREDIT

=

private credit as a percentage of GDP,

DEBT

=

government debt as a percentage of GDP,

GDP

=

the log of GDP,

FINT

=

the level of financial intermediation,

INSQUAL

=

the institutional quality, and

TBRATE

=

the Treasury bill rate.

The subscript t is the time index.
The focus was on the parameter β1. Crowding out of private credit by
government borrowing implied that β1 < 0. My set of control variables were the log of
GDP, the level of financial intermediation measured by the ratio of total deposits
comprising time and savings to the monetary base in the economy as defined by
Rother (2001), and the degree of institutional quality. I used a one period lagged value
of the financial sector deposits to allow for a positive response of deposits to a higher
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interest rate in the current period. I used the institutional quality indicator (I), as an
indicator of the quality governance in the economy. The World Bank reports the
regulatory quality indicator as part of its worldwide governance indicators (WGI)
report. The indicator reflects the perception of the government’s ability to formulate
and implement sound policies and regulations in support of private sector
development.
Cost of Credit Model
Interest rates represent the cost of credit to borrowers. Banks also borrow and
pay interest to depositors. The IRS, the difference between the lending and deposit
interest rates charged by banks (Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, & Morduchp, 2014; Entrop et
al., 2014; Gambacorta & Mistrulli, 2014) is the net gain to banks for their
intermediation services. The IRS is, therefore, a measure of the cost of credit. There
is, however, such a multiplicity of deposit and lending types, and applicable rates and
conditions that the World Bank (2014) stated that there are limitations to their
comparability across the board.
Ho and Saunders (1981) in their seminal paper on the determinants of bank
interest margins, adopted NIM, the difference between the interest revenue and
interest expense as reported by banks as their measure of interest rate spread. For a
countrywide analysis, Mensah and Abor (2014) averaged all the interest margins by
weighting with the total assets of each participating bank. The resulting average
indicated the scale of interest margins in the country. Following their example, I
adopted the NIM as my measure of the cost of credit.
Studies of the determinants of IRS yielded four sets of determinants- pure
spread, bank operations, macroeconomic, and industry induced spreads (Ho &
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Saunders, 1981). I advance the same arguments for the NIM. Therefore, following in
the steps of earlier researchers such as Agca and Celasum (2012), Ho and Saunders
(1981), Mensah and Abor (2014), and Sharpe (2012), I adopted an econometric model
for my research. The model included all the four determinants of the NIM in the form
stated in Equation 5:
NIM = f{industry variables; macroeconomic variables; bank-specific
variables}

(5)

My dependent variable was the cost of credit represented by the NIM. The
independent variable was the government’s domestic debt expressed as a ratio of
domestic public debt to GDP. Macroeconomic variables, bank-specific variables, and
industry variables served as my covariates. I lagged the regression terms for
government debt to account for their delayed effect on the economy.
Following Agca and Celasun (2012) but replacing IRS with NIM, and
eliminating all variables related to foreign debt, I examined the incidence of changes
in the cost of credit to the private sector by Equation 6:
NIMt = α0 + α1Debtt-1 + α2Xt + α3Yt + α4Lt + εt

(6)

where
NIMt

= net interest income as a ratio of total bank assets in year t,

α0

= the pure spread, obtained by the regression intercept

DEBTt-1

= lagged ratio of domestic public debt to GDP,

Xt

= a vector of macroeconomic variables for the country in year t
including inflation, budget deficit, exchange rate,
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Yt

= a vector of bank operational variables (including information
on bank size, efficiency, and risks for all banks in the country
for year t,

Lt

= a vector of industry characteristics, including the level of
competition and regulations

εt

= error term.

The effect of government debt is likely to lag the cost of credit. I, therefore,
lagged the regression terms for the public debt by one period to account for their
expected delayed effect.
Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, I presented the state of the literature on the theory of FCO. I
began the chapter by discussing my approach to the literature review. I continued with
an introduction and discussion of the theory and literature behind the phenomenon of
FCO. I discussed the determinants, operations, indicators, and the means of assessing
the existence of FCO in an economy.
Bernheim (1989) asserted that researchers do not seem to agree on the FCO
concept. One of the major points of departure related to economic geography.
Developed economies experience minimal levels of FCO due to economic integration
and their ability to trade government debt across borders. In developing economies,
government debt may induce FCO, but additional factors such as macroeconomic
conditions and banking industry factors may be influential as well. Fayed (2013)
found long-term financial crowd-in in Egypt; whereas, Asogwa and Okeke (2013)
found that public investment crowded out private investments in Nigeria. These
findings are supportive but not necessarily applicable to Ghana. My research extended
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knowledge in this area by showing that FCO existed in the Ghanaian economy where
public debt is a significant proportion of bank assets.
In the next chapter, I develop and justify my methodology for studying FCO in
Ghana based on available data and my research questions. I also discuss my data
sources and collection methods. I identify the limitations and threats to data collection
and analysis and discuss the strategies to minimize their impact on my research.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
The purpose of this quantitative research was to investigate the presence of
FCO in Ghana. I did this by examining the relationship between government domestic
debt and credit advanced to the private corporate sector by Ghanaian banks. I used the
results to determine whether the government crowded out the private sector regarding
the quantity of credit, the cost of credit, or both, to confirm the presence of FCO in
Ghana.
In this chapter, I discuss my research design and the rationale behind it. I also
discuss my research philosophy, the theoretical basis, and my choice of analytical
method. I define and operationalize my research variables and present a detailed
methodology for the study. In the method section, I identify my research population
and the sampling methods that I used. I also discuss my data analysis plan and my
strategies to mitigate any threats to the internal and external validities of the research.
I conclude the chapter with a summary and provide a transition to the next chapter.
Research Design and Rationale
In this research, I tested two hypotheses related to FCO. The first hypothesis
related to the quantity of private sector credit, whereas the second hypothesis related
to the cost of credit. The dependent variable for the first hypothesis was the quantity
of private sector credit. The independent variable was domestic government debt. The
covariates were the GDP, the level of financial intermediation, the institutional
quality, and the treasury bill rate. In testing the second hypothesis, the dependent
variable was the cost of credit operationalized as the NIM. The independent variable
was the government’s domestic debt. The covariates were annual inflation, the annual
budget deficit, the exchange rate (i.e., Ghana cedi to US dollar), the size of the
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banking industry, bank efficiency, bank risks, Herfindahl-Hirschman index, bank
concentration, and the regulatory quality index.
The research design was quantitative. I classified it as explanatory and
correlational. Explanatory research describes the relationship between variables
(Vogt, 2011), whereas correlational research explores causation and association
between the research variables (Chen & Krauss, 2011).
Research Philosophy and Theoretical Base
I grounded my study in the positivist philosophy as per the classification of
Wahyuni (2012). In positivism, reality is external, objective, and independent of the
researcher. Positivists also focus on fact-based causality and generalizations, and
value-free interpretation of results. The positivist philosophy thus suited my research
in which I analyzed and based my conclusions on data procured and stored by the
BoG and the World Bank, two objective and independent institutions. By its nature,
the positivist approach is quantitative, which justified my design. Other research
philosophies such as postpositivism, interpretivism, and pragmatism are value-laden,
and interpretation of data depends on the researcher. The results of such research
approaches are not generalizable to other jurisdictions and did not serve my purpose
in this study.
I based my research on the neoclassical theory of FCO. Lawson (2013) stated
that the neoclassical approach allows the researcher to adopt rigid mathematical
formulae and models to test his or her hypothesis. The use of mathematical formulae
makes the research replicable in similar circumstances, thus giving it a distinct
advantage over qualitative methods. According to Coad (2007), neoclassical theorists
have developed an impressive set of mathematical models that enable an objective test
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of theories. Researchers in economics and finance prefer these models because they
yield results that can inform public policy in support of a positive social change.
Choice of Analytic Method
I adopted multiple regression data analytic process in my research consistent
with previous similar research including studies by Fayed (2013), Mahmoudzadeh et
al. (2013), and Sharpe (2013). Another quantitative method that I could have used was
correlations. Correlations estimate the strength and the direction of the association
between pairs of data. Correlation, however, does not infer causality; that is, I could
not use it to explain whether the changes in the independent variable caused changes
in the dependent variable (Chen & Krauss, 2011). Correlations also cannot be used to
process data with multiple independent variables, rendering them unsuitable for my
research in which I used one independent variable, one dependent variable, and
several covariates.
I used time series data consistent with Fayed (2013), who stated that
measuring the crowding out effect of government borrowing requires the use of data
through an extended period. Time series data can be regression analyzed, after data
cleaning and transformation, to test hypotheses and draw conclusions.
My data consisted of the total outstanding measurement of the variables
instead of periodic changes. The approach was consistent with Bernheim’s (1989)
advice that the neoclassicist should focus on the total outstanding measure of the
variables under study instead of the changes that occurred between periods. The
objective is to provide a more informed measurement and effect of the independent
variables on the dependent variables.
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Methodology
Population
The research population comprises the 802 financial sector operators listed in
the 2016 Annual Report of the BoG (Bank of Ghana, 2017). They comprised 33
DMBs, 64 NBFIs, 141 RCBs, and 564 microfinance institutions (MFIs). The list
formed the frame of reference for the financial institutions whose data I used. I
sampled participants from this population of financial institutions who purchase
government debt in its various forms.
Sampling and Sampling Procedures
My research involved a two-stage sampling approach. The first was to sample
the number of financial institutions to participate in the study. The second was the
number of periods of data used in the analysis. The second sampling arose because of
my use of time series data. I had to specify the length of data I used, which introduced
the second set of sampling required.
Sampling the number of financial institutions. My data sources were the
Bank of Ghana and the World Bank’s world governance database. I limited my
sample to the commercial banks, also referred to as DMBs, because their asset value
constituted 85.6% of all the Ghanaian financial institutions in 2016 (Bank of Ghana,
2017). They, therefore, represent a significant size of the financial sector of the
Ghanaian economy.
Sampling the duration of research data. Determining the size of the sample
involved first estimating the power and effect size and then using the result to
determine the extent of data required for the study.
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Power estimation. The power of a test measures the ability of the analysis to
reject the null hypothesis when it is false (Coffey, 2010). I, therefore, chose a sample
size that ensured adequate power for my research findings. The basis of power
analysis is the F distribution. The power of research findings is a function of the
significant level of the test, α; the number of explanatory variables, m; the effect size,
ƒ; and the sample size, n.
Ioannidis, Stanley, and Doucouliagos (2015) stated that researchers in
economics and finance have no preferred power for their analysis. According to
McCloskey (1985), these researchers routinely ignore the advice of statisticians to
estimate the power of their analyses because they prefer substantive to statistical
significance in their studies. Such scientists seem to adopt the maxim of Kelley and
Maxwell (2003) that sample sizing must aim at obtaining accurate and not just
statistically significant results. In the absence of accepted practice, researchers adopt
the general methods of others in their disciplines. I adopted Coffey’s (2010)
recommendation of power level of between 80% and 90% for estimating the size of
the sample in my research.
Effect size. Effect size is the nonscalar measure of the strength of the
relationship between variables (Maher, Markey, & Ebert-May, 2013). Effect size and
statistical significance testing are complementary, and both are necessary when
evaluating research findings. Different effect size measures exist for various research
objectives. In my research, I used multiple regression data analysis processes to
investigate whether my independent variable and covariates jointly explain the
variation in the dependent variable. Maher et al. (2013) recommended that the right
effect size measure for such research be the coefficient of multiple determination, R2.

69
R2 explains how much of the variation in the dependent variable resulted from
changes in the independent variables. I preferred as strong a relationship as possible to
ensure significant research findings.
The relationship between effect size and R2 was given by Zaiontz (2016) in
Equation 7:
R2 = f 2(1 + f 2)-1

(7)

where:
R2 = coefficient of multiple determination, and
𝑓 2 = the effect size measure
I observed that finance and econometric research did not specify effect sizes.
Durlak (2009) advised that under such circumstances, researchers could adopt Cohen
(1988) recommended effect sizes. By this recommendation, I selected a medium
effect size of 0.15 for estimating my sample size. The choice of 0.15 effect size
resulted in an R2 of 0.13 which was the minimum value to assure adequate power for
the findings of the research.
Estimating the sample size. Using any three of the four variables: the
significant level of the test, α; the number of explanatory variables, m; the effect size,
ƒ2; and the sample size, n; the analyst can estimate the fourth by employing an
appropriate test. I adopted the methodology used by the G*Power software to estimate
the sample size I needed for each research question. I summarized the results of the
G*Power analysis of the determination of my sample size in Table 1.
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Table 1
Sample Size Selection
Number of
predictor
variables

Effect
size, f

Significant Assumed Sample
level, α
power
size, n

Research
Question 1

5

0.15

0.05

Research
Question 2

9

0.15

0.05

0.8
0.9
0.8
0.9

82
123
101
125

Periods
of data
available
131
131
131
131

By the results shown in Table 1, I needed a maximum of 82 periods of data to
answer Question 1 and 101 periods data to answer Question 2 assuming a power of
0.8, and 123 and 121 respectively for an assumed power of 0.9. The BoG provided
monthly data for the period February 2006 to December 2016 which yielded a sample
size of 131. I, therefore, adopted a power of 0.9 and a sample size of 131 for both
questions. The larger sample size would result in a higher explanatory power for the
findings of my research.
Archival Data
I followed Walden University’s procedure for data collection. I obtained
approval to collect data from Walden University's Institutional Review Board (IRB).
The IRB approval is a prerequisite for data collection designed to ensure that
researchers adopt ethical standards and comply with US federal regulations.
I employed secondary data for my research. I sourced my data from the Bank
of Ghana and the World Bank databases. These are open source databases available to
the public. Data on some variables were not publicly available on the BoGs website.
The BoG considers data from individual banks sensitive and will only release them in
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an anonymized format to prevent users tracing their source. I wrote to request such
processed data from the BoG.
Definition and operationalization of research variables. I measured two
key variables that explained the incidence of FCO in my research. These are the
quantity of private sector credit measured as a percentage of total loans, and the cost
of credit represented by the NIM and measured as a percentage of GDP. The two
variables were key indicators of the potential use of debt by firms and served as my
dependent variables.
Quantity of credit variables. I adopted Djankov et al. (2007) and Fayed (2013)
approach for estimating the quantity of credit available to the private sector. I
investigated the quantity of credit available using Equation 8:
PSCREDITt = α0 + β1DEBTt + β 2FINTt–1 + β3INSQUALt + β 4TBRATEt +
β5GDPt + εt

(8)

I have summarized the model's variables, their operational definition, and
sources in the following sections:
1. Private Sector Credit (PSCREDIT): PSCREDIT is the dependent
variable in the model. It refers to financial resources provided to the
private sector by deposit-taking companies (i.e., banks, except the
central bank). Financial resources include loans, purchases of
nonequity securities, trade credits, and other accounts receivable that
establish a claim for repayment, measured as private credit as a
percentage of total credit. The Bank of Ghana provided financial
statements of individual banks from which I extracted data for this
variable.
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2. Government Debt (DEBT): DEBT was the government’s domestic
public debt outstanding measured as the ratio of government domestic
debt to total credit in percentage. DEBT is the entire stock of direct
government fixed-term contractual obligations to others outstanding on
a particular date. It comprises loans and credit advanced by
commercial banks to the central government, government ministries,
departments, and agencies, and government corporations. It also
includes treasury bill purchases of the central bank and bonds issued in
the domestic market by the government and the central bank. It is the
gross amount of government liabilities to the banks reduced by the
amount of equity and financial derivatives held by the government.
Debt is a stock rather than a flow, measured as of a given date, usually
the last day of the reporting period. The data I used in the model was
the total debt outstanding at the end of the reporting period divided by
the total credit. I collated and summarized the data from the balance
sheet of individual banks.
3. Gross Domestic Product (GDP): GDP measured at purchaser's prices
is the sum of the gross value added by all resident producers in the
economy plus any product taxes minus any subsidies not included in
the value of the products. Data are in current Ghana cedi. I transformed
the GDP of the country by a log function in the model. I sourced GDP
data from the BoG.
4. The level of financial intermediation (FINT): FINT is the ratio of total
deposits, comprising time and savings, to the monetary base (M2) in
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the economy. Rother (2001) defined the variable. The Bank of Ghana
provided financial statements of individual banks from which I
extracted data for this variable.
5. Institutional Quality (INSQUAL): INSQUAL captures the perception
of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector
development. The estimate gives a country's score on the aggregate
indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution (i.e., ranging from
approximately -2.5 to 2.5). The definition and estimate were by
Kaufmann et al. (2010). I sourced INSQUAL data from the World
Bank’s world development indicators database at
https://worldbank.org/indicators.
6. The treasury bill rate (TBRATE): A treasury bill is a short-term
investment product ranging in duration from 91 days to 365 days and
which the BoG sells on behalf of the Government. In the research, I
used the average monthly rate for the 91-day treasury bills I sourced
from the Bank of Ghana.
7. Time Index (t): The time index was monthly to conform to the format
of the data I used in the model. Time was not a research variable.
Cost of credit variables. Following Agca and Celasun (2012), but replacing
interest rate spread with net interest margin, and eliminating all variables related to
foreign debt, I examined the incidence of changes in the cost of credit by Equation 9:
NIMt = α0 + α1DEBTt–1- α2DEFt + α3EXCHRt + α4INFLt + α5RISKt +
α6CONCENt + α7EFFt + α8SIZEt + α9HHI + α10RQUALt + εt

(9)
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I summarized the model's variables, their operational definition, and source in
the following sections:
1. Net Interest Margin (NIM): NIM represents the cost of credit, the
dependent variable in the model. NIM is the accounting value of net
interest income (NII) as a ratio of total assets. I estimated this variable
from the financial statements of Ghanaian banks made available by the
BoG. The BoG data reports NII cumulatively from the beginning of
each financial year. I subtracted the preceding months’ data from the
current month to obtain the net for each month for the periods February
to December. January figures were net.
2. The pure spread (α0): The pure spread is the banks’ margin due to
transactions uncertainty (Ho & Saunders, 1981). The variable is the
regression intercept in the model.
3. Government domestic debt (DEBT): DEBT refers to public debt
defined as the outstanding government debt owed to domestic lenders.
The variable used in the model was the ratio of domestic government
debt to GDP following Agca and Celasun (2012). The Bank of Ghana
provided financial statements of individual banks from which I
extracted data for this variable.
4. Inflation (INF). INF is a measure of periodic changes in the consumer
price index (CPI). The model used the monthly average rate of
inflation expressed in percent. The BoG provided the INF.
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5. Annual budget deficit (DEF): DEF is the annual budget deficit of the
government measured as a percentage of GDP. The BoG provided the
data.
6. Exchange Rate (EXCHR): EXCHR is the official exchange rate
calculated as monthly average based on daily averages of local
currency units relative to the U.S. dollar. EXCHR data was available
from the Bank of Ghana.
7. Bank Size (SIZE): SIZE is the total assets of commercial banks as a
ratio of GDP. Assets included claims on the whole nonfinancial real
sector, including government, public enterprises, and the private sector.
I extracted the variable from the financial statements of individual
banks made available by the BoG.
8. Bank efficiency (EFF): EFF is the ratio of overhead costs to total
assets, defined as the accounting value of a bank's overhead costs as a
share of its total assets in percent. I estimated the data from the
financial statements of individual banks made available by the BoG.
9. Bank risks (RISK): RISK is the ratio of loans-to-total assets, defined as
the proportion of all outstanding loans-to-total assets measured in
percent at the end of the period. I estimated the variable from the
financial statements of individual banks made available by the BoG.
10. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI): The HHI measures the level of
competition in the banking industry. Lijesen et al., (2002) defined the
HHI as the sum of squared of market shares of all firms in the market. I
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estimated the HHI using the total assets data from individual bank
financial statements made available by the Bank of Ghana.
11. Bank Concentration (CONCEN): CONCEN measures the assets of the
three largest banks as a share of assets of all DMBs in the country
expressed in percent. I estimated the variable using the total assets data
from individual bank financial statements made available by the Bank
of Ghana.
12. Regulatory Quality Index (RQUAL): RQUAL captures the perceptions
of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector
development. The estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate
indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution (i.e., ranging from
approximately -2.5 to 2.5). The data was available at World Bank’s
Worldwide Governance Indicators website.
13. Time Index (t): The time index was monthly to conform to the format
of the data I used in the model. Time was not a research variable.
Data Analysis Plan
I used IBM’s Statistical Package for Social Scientists software (IBM, 2015)
also known simply as SPSS, the statistical software package known as EViews, and
the Microsoft Excel software package to analyze my data. The SPSS software can
perform some of the statistical analysis I envisaged. The software also has the
capabilities to import data from other sources including Microsoft Excel, which
improved on its versatility as an analysis tool. However, SPSS had limitations when
applied to dynamic econometric data, and so I employed EViews to perform some of
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my analysis. I used the Microsoft Excel software to collate my data before I exported
them to SPSS and EViews for analysis.
In this section, I described the methods I used to clean and screen my data and
to check for the independence of the variables. I also restated my research questions
and each of the hypotheses I tested. In the final part of this section, I presented a
detailed plan for analyzing each of the research questions.
Data Cleaning and Screening
My first action on acquiring the data was to screen and clean it. The screening
took the form of visual inspection to find duplicates, missing data, outliers, and
mistakes. There were no duplicate data entries, but some data were missing, and
others were obvious mistakes. I drew the attention of the BoG to obvious mistakes
and subsequently received corrected data. Three months data entries were completely
missing. I determined that the loss was random. I resolved the missing data by
replacement using interpolation between adjacent values and by assuming linearity of
the variable within that space.
Data transformation. Regression models assume linearity of the variables
employed. However, all the variables may not obey the rule. Data may be present in
different scales and dimensions and would require transformation to be useful in a
model. Roberts (2008) explained that transforming data involves applying a nonlinear operator to the data and analyzing the resulting data instead of the raw data. The
transforms could be a logarithm, reciprocal, or root. Negative data can be converted
into a logarithm form by the addition of a constant to convert to a positive value
before transformation. From Table 2 and
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Table 3, all of the models’ variables are in the range of zero to thousands. The
exception is the GDP data which were in millions. Following from Roberts (2008), I
transformed my GDP variable using the logarithmic transformation as indicated in
Table 2. The other variables required no transformation.
Table 2
Transformed Variables of Research Question 1
Variable

Description

Dimension

INSQUAL

Private credit as a
percentage of GDP
Government
domestic debt as a
percentage of GDP
GDP
Level of financial
intermediation
Institutional quality

TBRATE
t

Treasury bill rate
Time index

PSCREDIT
DEBT

GDP
FINT

Transform

%

Order of
magnitude
%, max 100

%

%, max 100

None

$
%

106
%, max 100

Logarithm
None

Units of a
standard
normal
distribution
%
Year

-2.5 to 2.5

None

Max 100
Units

None
None

None
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Table 3
Transformed Variables of Research Question 2
Variable

Description

Dimension

NIM

Net interest
margin
Pure spread

%

α0

INF
DEBT

DEF

EXCHR
SIZE
EFF
RISK
HHI
CONCEN
RQUAL

Inflation
Ratio of
government debt
to GDP
Ratio of annual
budget deficit to
GDP
Exchange rate
Bank size
Bank efficiency
Bank risks
Level of
competition
Bank
concentration
Regulations

Order of
magnitude
Max 100

Transform
None

Depends on the
measure of the
NIM
%
%

Related to
NIM

None

Max 100
Max 100

None
None

%

Max 100

None

¢/$

Units

None

%
%
%
% squared

Max 100
Max 100
Max 100
Thousands

None
None
None
None

%

Max 100

None

Units of a
standard normal
distribution

-2.5 to 2.5

None

Data Analysis Process
Descriptive statistics. The first set of analysis I performed was a descriptive
analysis of my research data. I reported on the mean, median, standard deviation, the
skew, and kurtosis of the data. I also inspected the data graphically to check the
presence of outliers (Field, 2013).
Check for normality of data. Ordinary least squares regression assumes
normality of the data employed. Normally distributed data make possible the
application of standard statistical methods to analyze the data. Three models for
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testing the normality of data are the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test for nonparametric data, the Shapiro-Wilk (S-W) for continuous variables, and the JacqueBera (J-B) which tests whether a sample data had the skewness and kurtosis to qualify
as a normally distributed data. I checked for the normality of my research data using
the J-B method. The test rejects a J-B statistic greater than 5.5 for normality.
Solutions to normality violations include converting the data, or the researcher
may elect to use non-parametric analytic methods. However, I adhered to Field’s
(2013, p 184) caution that in large samples, researchers need not worry about
normality as results are likely to be significant. I chose to ignore the non-normal
distribution exhibited by some of my research variables.
Check for multicollinearity. I checked for multicollinearity between the
variables by estimating the correlation coefficient between pairs of variables. Models
with more than one predictor shall not have significant correlations between any pair
of the predictors (Field, 2013, p. 132). Correlation coefficients greater than 0.90
indicates the presence of collinearity. The solution to collinearity is to remove one of
the predictor variables and so I eliminated one of the two collinear variables from the
dataset in the model.
Check for stationarity. Ordinary least squares regression method analyzes
and produces efficient estimates when the data is stationary (Beck, 2004) A stationary
time series has a constant mean, variance, and autocorrelation over time. Researchers
assess stationarity of a time series by examining the coefficient of regression of a
series on its first lag. The three tests for checking stationarity status of research data
are the Dickey-Fuller (DF), the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), and the bounds test.
The DF test checks whether a time series data has autoregressive properties.
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Researchers perform by regressing the variable over its first lag and examining the
estimate of the coefficient of regression. In general, we test if the following property
of Equation 10 holds:
xt – xt-1 = α0 + δxt-1 +μt

(10)

The hypothesis test is to reject the null when 𝜕 ≠ 0, and assume unit roots.
The ADF method introduced three variations to the model as follows in
Equations 11, 12, and 13:
•

no constant, no trend: Δxt = δxt-1 + Σni=1αiΔxt-i + εt

(11)

•

constant, no trend: Δxt = α + δxt-1 + Σni=1αiΔxt-i + vt

(12)

•

constant and trend: Δxt = α + δxt-1 + γt + Σni=1αiΔxt-i + vt

(13)

where the parameters α denotes a non-zero constant, 𝛾𝑡 is a deterministic time
trend, and 𝑣𝑡 represents the residuals generated by the test. The parameter i is the
lagged term of each variable, xt-i represents the ith lagged term of the variable, t = 1, 2,
3, …., n, and n is the dimension of the vector variable. Equation 11 denotes a
stationary time series with no intercept and trend when the null is rejected; Equation
12 denotes a stationary time series with an intercept but no time trend implying that xt
is stationary with a nonzero mean when the null is rejected; Equation 13 includes an
intercept and a time trend, implying that xt is a stationary series around a deterministic
trend when the null is rejected.
To run the ADF test, the researcher must decide the number of lags to apply to
the model by the vector auto-regression method. The length of the lag shall be such
that there is no serial correlation between the residuals. The options for selection are
to minimize Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) or the Bayesian information
criterion (BIC) or drop lags until the last lag is statistically significant.
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The bounds test developed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2001) determines if
there is a level relationship between a dependent variable and a set of regressors when
it is not known with certainty whether the underlying regressors are stationary in
levels or first difference. An F statistic greater than the critical I(0) value implied a
short run relationship while a statistic greater than the critical I(1) value indicated a
long run relationship. An F statistics between I(0) and I(1) returns an indeterminate
situation. The Bounds test was available in the EViews software. According to
Pesaran et al. (2001), the unrestricted ECM must be dynamically stable based on its
autoregressive structure and errors must be serially independent. When these
conditions are satisfied, a bounds test can be conducted to determine whether there is
a long run relationship between the variables.
Performing the regression. The test of stationarity can yield four different
results: the variables are stationary in levels; the variables are stationary in first
difference but not cointegrated; the variables are stationary in first difference and
cointegrated; the variables are a mix of I(0) and I(1).
Where the variables were stationary in levels, that is, they were I(0), I
performed the regression model to establish the relationship between the variables
using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. Where the variables were stationary in
first difference, that is, they were I(1), but not cointegrated, I modeled the regression
using their differenced variables in an OLS method. Where the variables were
stationary in first difference and cointegrated, I used the Johansen cointegration
method to establish a cointegrating relationship between the variables. The
cointegration method developed by Johansen and Juselius (1990) uses the multivariate
maximum likelihood test to determine the number of cointegrating equations.
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Researchers use the test to establish if there was a linear combination of the dependent
and independent variables that results in a stationary model, Equation 14:
Yt + γ1X1,t + γ2X2,t + … + γkXk,t ~ I(0)

(14)

where Yt is the dependent variable, and Xkts are the independent variables.
The Johansen test has two forms--the trace test and the maximum eigenvalue
test. In the trace test, we test for the number of linear combinations (K) to be equal to
a given value Ko and the alternative hypothesis for K to be greater than Ko, that is, Ho:
K = Ko; and H1: K > Ko. The test sets Ko = 0, for no cointegration and attempt to reject
the null hypothesis to confirm the existence of at least one cointegration relationship.
The maximum eigenvalue test examines the relations Ho: K = Ko and H1: K =
Ko + 1. By rejecting the null hypothesis, we could infer that there was only one
cointegrating relationship between the variables.
After establishing the stationarity and cointegration status of the series at some
combination, researchers use a vector error correction model (VECM) to estimate the
cointegrating equation. The VECM combines the Vector Autoregression (VAR) and
the cointegration results. Niyimbanira (2013) described the ECM as an estimate of the
linear transformation of an autoregressive lag model. The ECM model is the Equation
15:
NΔyt = MΔxt + α(yt-1 – β0 – β1xt-1) + εt

(15)

where N, M are vectors of the dependent and independent variable
respectively. The regression equation yields the parameter, α, of the error variable
which describes how quickly the model returns to equilibrium. For the model to return
to its long-run equilibrium position after drifting, α must be negative and less than
one. I used the model to describe the short run impact of the independent variables on
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the dependent variable. Where my variables exhibited a mix of I(0) and I(1), Perasan
and Shin (1999) proposed the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to
finding a cointegration relationship between the variables.
The ARDL method formulates an unrestricted ECM with an appropriate lag
structure for each variable. The BIC or the AIC determines the lag structure. In the
EViews software, determining the lag structure can be automated such that the
software determines the optimal lag length for each variable. The key assumption of
the ARDL method is that the errors of the unrestricted ECM are not serially
correlated.
The ARDL methodology has some advantages over the traditional
cointegrating model. These include application in a mix I(0) and I(1) data; a singleequation set-up, making it simple to implement and interpret; and differing lag lengths
for each of the model’s variables. The model is autoregressive because the lagged
values of the dependent variable explain part of variable’s values.
The basic ARDL regression model is of the form in Equation 16:
yt = β0 + β1yt-1 + … + βpyt-p + α0xt + α1xt-1 + … + αqxt-q + εt

(16)

where εt is an error term.
The ADRL model generates the long run relationship between the research
variables. The model also generates the short run cointegrating model which specifies
how fast the model returns to its long-run equilibrium state after a drift. The short-run
equation of the ADRL method uses the first differences of the regression variables.
Tests of Residuals
Following from the ADRL analysis, I performed tests on the residuals. These
tests were to satisfy the requirement that results were best linear unbiased estimates

85
(BLUE) and could explain the relationship between the dependent and independent
variables in the model. I checked for outliers, serial correlation, and heteroscedasticity
of the residuals.
Check for outliers. Observations or data which lie outside a specified region
of a dataset qualify as outliers (Ben-Gal, 2005). Outliers may be univariate affecting
one variable only or multivariate, affecting multiple variables simultaneously.
Outliers can be peculiar observations, the result of mistakes in data entry, or sampling
error. Baragona and Battaglia (2007) stated that compared with random samples, time
series outliers may not always be the largest or smallest records. They may be outliers
because they are inconsistent with adjacent data entries. Their presence can affect the
statistics by introducing bias in estimated parameters, the wrong specification of
research models, or incorrect research results (Ben-Gal, 2005; Field, 2013). Detecting
outliers are to identify data that lie in the defined outlier region using distance-based
methods. Distance-based methods measure an observation from a reference parameter
usually the mean, median, or the trend line. The method identifies an observation as
an outlier when it lies beyond a specified distance from the reference.
A scatter plot, a box plot, or a histogram of the data can reveal the presence of
outliers in univariate data and some multivariate data (Field, 2013). However, for
some data, graphical methods may not necessarily unearth outliers, and researchers
must rely on non-graphical methods to detect such outliers (Baragona & Battaglia,
2007). Among the non-graphical methods are the z-score approach, the Mahalanobis
distance (MD) approach, the Cooks’ distance (CD) approach, and the median absolute
deviation (MAD) method of Leys, Ley, Klein, Bernard, and Licata (2013). The
authors argued that all the methods except the MAD included the outlier(s) in the
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estimation of the mean and the standard deviation. The resulting statistic is, therefore,
biased and may not properly identify the outlier(s). The MAD method uses the
median observation of the data as a reference and therefore presents an unbiased
determination of outliers. The MAD method is most suitable for univariate data.
The MD is a measure of the distance between populations (Vogt, 2011). It is
one of the most used test methods for investigating the presence of multivariate
outliers. Researchers also use the MD to test the assumption of homogeneity of
variance. The measure considers the variance and covariance between variables. It
measures the distance of the predictor data entries from their means. According to
Field (2013, p. 307), these measurements follow a chi-square distribution with the
degree of freedom equal to the number of predictors in the model. A cut-off point,
established by specifying the desired alpha level, indicates which cases are outliers. In
my research, I used an alpha level of 0.05 (i.e., p = 0.05) to determine my cut-off
points.
CD measures influential cases in the regression model (Stevens, 1984) by
assessing the changes in the regression coefficient with a case omitted. It is an outlier
measure which examines the joint effect of a case on both the predictor and dependent
variables. The distance, CD, is given by Equation 17:
CDi = (p + 1)-1ri2hii

(17)

where ri is the standardized residual, and hii is the hat element. A CD value
greater that one is large and warrant further examination of the data (Field, 2013, p
306). The solution to large CDs is to examine the case for validity, omitting the case,
including additional data points to improve the estimation, and investigating the data
set to see whether more data points would be required.

87
I adopted the non-graphical methods recommended by Baragona and Battaglia
(2007) to check for outliers. I used the MD method to check the presence of outliers
and the CD method to check for influential cases. Together, I was able to make
informed decisions on the status of my residuals.
Check for serial correlation. Serial correlation occurred when the residual
terms of any two variables were correlated, also referred to as autocorrelation (Field,
2013, p. 311). The presence of serial correlation violated the assumption of
independence and identical distribution of variables and rendered the results of
significance tests and confidence intervals invalid. The Durbin-Watson (DW), the
Breuch-Godfrey LM, and the Durbin’s h tests test for serial correlation.
The DW statistics tests for the presence of serial correlation among variables.
It tests the null hypothesis that residuals of an OLS regression are not autocorrelated.
The alternative hypothesis is that they follow an auto-regression (AR1) process. The
DW statistics range in value from zero to four. As a rule of thumb, values close to
zero means a positive autocorrelation while a value close to four implies a negative
autocorrelation, with values near two implying no autocorrelation. Lagged values of
the dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation violates the assumptions
of the DW test making it unfit for use to test serial correlations. In such instances the
Breusch-Godfrey LM test or Durbin’s h-test were appropriate.
The Breusch-Godfrey’s LM test tests for higher order regressions while the
Durbin’s h-test applied to AR(1) models only. I therefore chose and checked for serial
correlation using the Breusch-Godfrey method.
The Breusch-Godfrey LM test stated that if by Equation 18:
yt = β0 + β1x1 +β2x2 + … + βkxk + μt

(18)
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where μt is given by Equation 19:
μt = ρ1μt-1 + ρ2μt-2 +…+ ρnμt-n + εt

(19)

then combine Equations 18 and 19 into Equation 20:
yt = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + … + βkxk + ρ1μt-1 + ρ2μt-2 + … + ρnμt-n + εt

(20)

and test the null hypothesis H0: ρ1 = ρ2 = … = ρn = 0 (i.e., no serial correlation
in the residuals against the alternative hypothesis Ha: at least one of the ρs is not zero,
implying there is serial correlation).
Check for homoscedasticity. Homoscedasticity is a necessary condition for
performing an OLS. Homoscedasticity assumes that variability in the residual scores
of one continuous variable is roughly the same at all values of another continuous
variable (Field, 2013). Homoscedasticity simplifies the OLS estimation techniques,
leads to an unbiased and efficient OLS estimates, allows hypothesis testing, and the
construction of confidence intervals and variances of coefficients in regression
models.
Homoscedasticity is verifiable by visual inspection of the graphical plot of the
residuals with the independent variable. Breusch and Pagan (1979), White (1980), and
Perasan et al. (1980) provided methods to test whether the variance of errors from a
regression correlated with the independent values. These tests are chi-square tests
with k-degrees of freedom. A test return of p < 0.05 rejects the null hypothesis of
homoscedasticity and assumes heteroscedasticity of variance. The Breusch-Pagan
method tests for homoscedasticity where data is assumed to be parametric. The White
method tests for both heteroscedasticity and model misspecification and applies to
non-parametric data. The Perasan et al. (1980) bounds test tests for heteroscedasticity
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when the variables are a mix of I(0) and I(1). I have described the bounds test in
another section of this dissertation.
Both the Breusch-Pagan and the White tests for heteroscedasticity are not
available in SPSS. The White test can, however, be performed indirectly in SPSS. I
used the EViews software for the Breusch-Pagan test. I based my choice of method on
the results of the normality test of the data which exhibited both I(0) and I(1)
characteristics.
Heteroscedasticity does not result in biased parameter estimates, but its
presence means that the OLS does not provide the estimate with the least variance. It
may also produce biased standard errors but may not affect significance tests. The
solution to heteroscedasticity is data transformation. The Box-Cox transformation
(Box & Cox, 1964), lists three common types of transformations: power
transformation, used when there is moderate skewness or deviation; logarithm
transformation used when there is substantial skewness or deviation; and data
inversion, used for extreme skewness or deviation cases. Their test estimates a lambda
(λ) value between -5 and +5 which determines the power of the transformation
applicable with the proviso that a λ = 0 implied a logarithmic transformation of the
variable. EViews calculates the best λ value to apply. I did not have to transform any
of my variables because my tests returned non-significant results of
heteroscedasticity.
Data Analysis Plan for Research Question 1
I investigated my first research question by using the equation of Djankov et
al. (2007) and Fayed (2013) as shown in Equation 21:
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PSCREDITt = α0 + α1DEBTt + α2FINTt – 1 + α3INSQUALt + α4TBRATEt +
α5GDPt + εt

(21)

Research variables. The key variables were the quantity of private sector
credit, PSCREDIT, and the government’s domestic debt, DEBT. The key regression
parameter was the regression coefficient β1. Crowding out of the corporate sector due
to DEBT implied that there should be a negative relationship between PSCREDIT and
DEBT. I expected a negative coefficient of regression of DEBT.
The model included four control variables. These were the log of GDP, FINT,
INSQUAL, and the TBRATE. Djankov et al. (2007) were the first to adopt these
control variables in their study of private credit in 129 countries. The log of real GDP
captured the idea that the cost of setting up credit market institutions required an
economy to be large. I expect a positive relation between GDP and PSCREDIT
because it captures business cycles (Dietrich, Wanzenried, & Cole, 2015), which in
turn affect the demand for credit.
I expected FINT to be positively related to PSCREDIT because banks were
expected to increase their lending activities in response to the availability of deposits.
Fayed (2013) argued that increases in liquidity may result in a spurious relation
between government borrowing and private credit. To overcome this situation, Fayed
(2013) adopted the ratio of time deposits and savings to the monetary base as her
measure of the level of financial intermediation. However, to allow for the effect of
government borrowing on interest rates and thus higher saving rates, the model used a

91
one period lagged values of the deposits. The variable I used was, therefore expressed
in the form FINTt-1.
INSQUAL measured the quality of governance institutions in the economy.
When creditors can use the institutional systems to enforce repayment of loans, they
would be more willing to extend credit. Accordingly, Djankov et al. (2007) found a
positive relationship between the quality of the governance institutions and private
credit. I, therefore, expect a positive relationship between INSQUAL and PSCREDIT.
I expected TBRATE to have a negative relationship with PSCREDIT. Banks
have the option of purchasing government debt or extending credit to borrowers.
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) found a negative relationship between
treasury demand and credit. At lower treasury rates demand falls off, and banks
channel their funds as loans to borrowers.
Regression analysis. In testing the hypotheses for my first research question, I
used the methods I outlined in the preceding sections. Following Fayed (2013), I
performed the ADF test on my data to establish their unit root properties. My data
were a mix of I(0) and I(1), and so I adopted the method of Pesaran and Shin (1999)
and used the ARDL method to analyze my data and make inferences. The dependent
variable was PSCREDIT. The independent variable was DEBT). The covariates were
TBRATE, the log of GDP, the FINT, and INSQUAL. I lagged FINT in the regression
model to account for the delayed effect of government policy on the financial market.
I used the ADF method to check the unit root properties of my data. I followed
up with a bounds test to confirm their cointegration status. I then derived and tested
both the long run and short run cointegration coefficients from the ADRL model.
Following the ADRL analysis, I performed the Ramsey test to confirm the validity of
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the analysis and the stability of the long run model. I then drew my conclusions on the
effect of government borrowing on the quantity of credit available to the private
sector.
Data Analysis Plan for Research Question 2
In Research Question 2, I investigated the correlation between government
borrowing and the cost of credit to Ghanaian firms by using Equation 22:
NIMt = α0 + α1DEBTt – 1- α2DEFt + α3EXCHRt + α4INFLt + α5RISKt +
α6CONCENt + α7EFFt + α8SIZEt + α9HHI + α10RQUALt + εt

(22)

I derived my model from that of Agca and Celasun (2012) who used a similar
model for investigating the relation between corporate borrowing costs and public
debts for 580 loan agreement in 15 countries. Unlike these authors, however, I used
the NIM to proxy for the cost of credit instead of the loan spread, and I limited myself
to corporate borrowing in the domestic market instead of in the foreign market.
Agca and Celasun (2012) used panel data for their analysis. Their use of panel
data was inevitable given that their research covered individual loan applications in 15
countries and had to analyze their data by country. My study differs from theirs in that
I used data from a single country. Secondly, I used national data and not data on
individual loan agreements. My data was, therefore, time series instead of a panel. I
used sampled data derived from the number of periods required to assure adequate
power of the research's findings.
The change in research focus from external to domestic borrowing
necessitated changes to the original model. Agca and Celasun (2012) focused on
individual loans and firms. I investigated the cost of credit from an economy-wide
perspective.
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Research variables. The key variables were the cost of credit represented by
NIM, and DEBT. The key regression parameter was the regression coefficient α1.
Covariates were DEF, EXCHR, RISK, CONCEN, EFF, INF, SIZE, HHI, and
RQUAL. Crowding out of the corporate sector due to the domestic financing of
government debt implied that there should be a positive relationship between public
debt and the cost of credit. I expected a positive coefficient of regression of DEBT.
Financing the deficit would require the government to borrow from the
domestic market. I expected a negative coefficient for DEF. However, DEF entered
the model as a negative variable, and so the sign would remain unchanged.
EXCHR is a measure of inflation in the economy (Loloh, 2014) and its passthrough can affect profitability if the speed of adjustment were not the same (Dietrich
et al., 2015). INF also measures the degree of macroeconomic instability which can
lead to higher interest spreads and by extension higher NIM. Therefore, I expected a
positive relationship between NIM and EXCHR and between INF and NIM.
Dietrich, Wanzenried, and Cole (2015) stated that good governance’s effect on
the net interest margin could be ambiguous for two reasons. Margins can narrow
because of enforcement of creditor rights which may lead to the speedier recovery of
overdue loans. As a consequence, banks will reduce their pricing of risk and thus
decrease their margins. On the other hand, good governance may attract risky
borrowers and the increase in default risk may lead to wider margins. By these
arguments, I could not predict the outcome of the relationship between NIM and
RQUAL.
RISK was also expected to have an ambiguous relationship with the NIM
(Dietrich et al. 2015). While RISK can be low during times of economic booms,
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higher volumes of lending can lead to banks suffering higher default rates. Similarly,
RISK may be high during economic downturns but lower demand for credit in such
periods may lead to lower default rates.
I expected EFF, a measure of the operational cost of banks to positively
correlate with NIM. Dietrich et al. (2015) argued that banks need to cover their
operational costs through their interest margins. Banks pass these costs on to
borrowers that will lead to a positive correlation between NIM and EFF.
Bank SIZE shall have a negative correlation with NIM. Larger banks have
economies of scale which they can pass on to their customers in the form of lower
interest rates (Dietrich et al., 2015). I expected a negative coefficient of bank SIZE.
CONCEN and HHI measure the structure of the banking industry. CONCEN
is a measure of the size of the three largest banks in the industry. According to
Dietrich et al. (2015) in a highly concentrated banking structure, banks can engage in
collusive activities which can drive up spreads. Therefore, I expected CONCEN and
HHI to be positively correlated with NIM.
Regression analysis. Following Agca and Celasun (2012), I used regression
analytical methods to document the variation of cost of credit with the government’s
domestic debt and to make inferences. My data analysis plan, therefore, mirrors the
method I adopted to answer my first research question.
Stationarity tests yielded a mix of I(0) and I(1) variables. I, therefore, adopted
the ARDL method to analyze my data and make inferences. In the model, the
dependent variable was the NIM. The independent variable was DEBT. Covariates
were macroeconomic variables including INF, DEF, and EXCHR. Others were SIZE,
EFF, and RISK; industry variables were CONCENRQUAL). Following Agca and
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Celasun (2012), I lagged DEBT to account for the delayed effect of government fiscal
policy on the financial market.
Threats to Validity
External Validity
External validity is the ability to generalize the research’s findings to other
jurisdictions and times. An inappropriate sampling of persons, time of the study, or
location of the survey can threaten the external validity of the research (Trochim,
2006). A random sampling of data, replication of the study in different jurisdictions,
or selecting different time periods for analysis can eliminate these threats.
I used time series data in my research. The advantage of using time series data
is that there was no sampling of the data per se thus effectively eliminating the
potential for sampling bias. For a defined number of study variables, the number of
periods of data required determined the sample size. I selected the time span for data
collection by statistical methods to assure adequate power of the analysis. I eliminated
sampling bias by this approach.
I used mathematical models in my study which made the study replicable in
different jurisdictions and times. My research was an attempt to replicate studies
undertaken elsewhere. For example, to answer the first research question, I adopted a
mathematical model from Fayed (2013) applied to a study in Egypt. My research was
an attempt to generalize the model to Ghana and to present it as appropriate for
predicting FCO in developing and emerging economies.
In answering the second research question, I established the causal
relationships between the cost of credit to the private sector and government
borrowing from the domestic market. I adapted a mathematical model by Agca and
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Celasun (2012) to test my hypothesis. The use of this mathematical model ensured
replicability and generalizability of the findings, thus eliminating any threat of
external validity of the research’s findings.
Internal Validity
Trochim (2006) established the relevance of internal validity in cause and
effect relations. Internal validity confirms that the effect measured or assessed by the
research is the result of the causes attributed to it. Internal validity is, therefore, an
attribute of the data used in the analysis and is not generalizable to other research
even in the case of quantitative research such as mine. Quality issues such as history,
maturation, mortality, testing, instrumentation, and regression threats may affect the
data and create internal validity problems.
Mortality, testing, instrumentation, and regression threats are the result of
primary data collection. I eliminated the potential for these threats by employing
secondary data collected by the World Bank and the BoG. These institutions collect
data as part of their normal reporting requirements and not for specific research
purposes. Therefore, I expected that the most likely internal validity issues would be
history and maturation.
History results from general changes that occur in the data over time.
Unexpected changes in the economy can affect trends in the data. These unexpected
effects or shocks (Sharpe, 2013) to the economy results in variations in the GDP.
Therefore, to overcome the influence of history on the data, I weighted some of the
variables by the GDP in the year of reporting.
Triangulation of data collection (Zohrabi, 2013) is one method of assuring
data quality. My two sources of data checked each other and assured internal validity.
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Additionally, I included covariates in the model which served the purpose of
examining the dependent variable from other perspectives and supported the
triangulation of data and results. These covariates also captured the effect of history in
the data.
The BoG and the World Bank eliminated maturation effects by introducing
definitions for each variable and ensuring their strict adherence. Reporting banks and
countries do not have the opportunity to define or report data other than in the
specified format.
Construct Validity
Construct validity, according to Trochim (2006) measures the extent to which
the inferences made from a study are attributable to the theoretical constructs which
underpinned the research. In my research, the validity test was to check the functional
form of my models to ensure that they do not suffer from misspecification errors. I
used the Ramsey’s (1969) Regression Specification Error Test (RESET) method to
test the functional form of my model.
The RESET detects functional form misspecification in a linear regression
model. Ramsey (1969) postulated that if a linear model of the form in Equation 23:
yt = β0 + β1xk + … +βkxk + μt

(23)

is correctly specified, then nonlinear functions of the independent variables
should not be significant when added to the equation. The RESET test is to add
polynomial of the OLS fitted values to linear model to detect functional form
misspecification. The added polynomials are usually the squared and cubed terms
(Wooldridge, 2009) to create Equation 24:
yt = β1 + β2x2 + … + βkxk + δ1ŷ2 + δ2ŷ3 + ϑt

(24)
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where 𝜗𝑡 is an error term.
I used Equation 24 to test whether Equation 23 missed important nonlinear
functions of xi. The null hypothesis is that Equation 23 is correctly specified, that is,
Ho: δ1 = δ2 = 0 in the equation. If the RESET test returns a significant F statistic, it
suggests that there was a problem with the specification of the regression model and it
has to be re-specified. The RESET test was available in EViews. The software reports
both the t and F statistics.
Ethical Procedures
Walden University (2015) rules regarding the conduct of research are that
researchers must be ethical in dealing with human subjects in the collection, storage,
retrieval, and use of data. I adhered to the rules which required that researchers
obtained approval from the University’s IRB before proceeding with data collection.
My approval number was 05-15-17-0406581.
I did not collect my data from human subjects. However, I requested for some
data from the Bank of Ghana. The bank does not publish confidential data on its
website. Specifically, data on individual bank performance were not available. My
estimation of the HHI, for example, required data on individual bank’s market share.
The BoG provided anonymized data which made possible the calculation of the index
without compromising on their confidentiality obligations.
I obtained some of my data by downloading from the websites of the World
Bank and the BoG. These websites require no permissions. Researchers may also send
comments on the data to their owners when they have any to make.
I treated the data with the utmost care. I made copies of all data I received and
stored them on a backup disk. I also purchased cloud storage facilities for a 5-year
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period and uploaded the data for storage. I maintained a working copy on my
computer. As required by Walden, I will maintain the collected data for 5 years and
destroy them afterward.
Summary
I discussed my research method in this chapter. I began with a restatement of
the purpose of my research. I followed that with a discussion of my research design
and the rationale for adopting a quantitative methodology. I identified my research
population, discussed my sampling, and data collection method, provided operational
definitions, and my expectation of the independent variable and the covariates’
relationship with the dependent. I also detailed my plan for data cleaning, screening,
and checking the unit root properties of my variables to determine the best estimation
method. I detailed my method for performing my cointegration regression and for
checking my models’ residuals. I was guided by the methods Fayed (2013),
Niyimbanira (2013), Pesaran et al. (2001), Pesaran and Shin (1999), and Ramsey
(1969). My use of mathematical formulae and secondary data minimized any external
validity threats. I stated my method for checking the stability of my models and my
compliance with Walden’s requirement for ethical behavior.
In next chapter, I report the results of my investigations. I start by re-stating
my research the purpose, questions, and hypotheses. I follow with a discussion of my
data collection efforts and conclude by reporting the findings of the statistical analysis
for each research question.
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Chapter 4: Results
The purpose of this quantitative research was to investigate the presence of
FCO in Ghana. I posed two questions with associated hypotheses to assist with my
investigations. The first research question was:
RQ1: What was the relationship between government’s domestic debt and the
quantity of private sector credit?
My null hypothesis was that there was no significant relationship between
government’s domestic debt and the quantity of private sector credit. I tested my
hypothesis by regressing the quantity of private corporate sector credit with
government debt and other covariates.
The second research question was:
RQ2: What was the relationship between government’s domestic debt and the
cost of credit to the private sector in Ghana?
My null hypothesis was that there was no significant relationship between
government debt and the cost of credit to the Ghanaian private corporate sector. I
tested the second hypothesis by regressing the cost of credit with government debt
and other covariates. I operationalized cost of credit as the net interest income earned
by banks in Ghana.
In the rest of this chapter, I present the of my data collection and cleaning. I
follow with a detailed presentation of my data analysis and results. I end the chapter
with a summary and a transition to the final chapter.
Data Collection
My data sources were the BoG and the World Bank Group databases. The
World Bank data were available on their website. I downloaded data on the
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governance indicator for Ghana, specifically the regulatory quality index, published
by the World Bank’s Governance Institute. These data are published annually and
uploaded to the institute’s website.
The BoG uploads banking time series data on its website aggregated at the
industry level. The BoG, however, considers some data confidential, such that the
BoG does not upload them to its site. I wrote to the BoG to request data from each
Ghanaian bank and received financial statements on each of the banks in operation in
Ghana between the years 2006 and 2016. I received anonymized data designed to
prevent tracing to individual banks, an action that would have breached its
confidentiality obligations. I extracted data on all my research variables from the data
supplied by the BoG as shown in Table 4 and Table 5.
Data for Question 1
I summarized the variables I used to answer Question 1 in Table 4. These were
one independent variable—private sector credit as a percentage of total credit; one
dependent variable—government debt expressed as a percentage of total credit; and
four covariables—log of GDP, level of financial intermediation, institutional quality,
and the treasury bill rate. I defined each of these variables in Chapter 3. I presented
data on each variable in Appendix A. In this section, I will discuss only how I
obtained each variable from the data that I received.
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Table 4
Source and Measurement of Variables of Research Question 1
Variable
PSCREDIT

DEBT

GDP
FINT

INSQUAL

TBRATE

Measurement
Total loans to the private sector as a
percentage of total bank credit--all
loans, treasury bills, and bond
purchases
Credit to government and its
agencies--loans, treasury bills, and
bond purchases as a percentage of
total bank credit
Annual nominal GDP expressed in
natural logarithm
Total deposits as a percentage of
monetary base (M2)
World Bank measure of the quality
of governance ranging from -2.5 to
+2.5 produced annually.
Average monthly 91-day treasury bill
rate in percentage

Source
Bank of Ghana

Bank of Ghana

Bank of Ghana
Estimated from
data available at
the Bank of Ghana
World Bank
governance
database
Bank of Ghana

Private credit (PSCREDIT): I obtained the industry level data by summing all
the individual private corporate credit entries for all banks in each reporting period. I
divided the credit to the private sector by the total credit extended by the banks to
obtain the variable.
Government domestic debt (DEBT): DEBT comprised treasury bill purchases,
government bonds, loans, and credit advanced by commercial banks to the central
government, government ministries, departments, agencies, and corporations
expressed as a percentage of total credit advanced by the banks. The data used in the
model were the total outstanding amount at the end of each month. I collated and
summarized the data from the balance sheet of individual banks.
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Gross domestic product (GDP): The Bank of Ghana supplied annual GDP
data for the research period. The data were in annual installments only. I used the
annual data to represent the GDP for each month of the applicable year in the model.
Level of financial intermediation (FINT): I obtained bank deposits comprising
savings and time deposits from the balance sheets of individual banks. The BoG
supplied the M2 data. I divided the total deposits by the M2 for each month to obtain
the variable.
Institutional quality (INSQUAL): I downloaded the data from the website of
the World Governance Institute. The data were in annual installments only. I used the
annual data to represent the monthly data for each month of the applicable year in the
model.
Treasury bill rate (TBRATE): The Bank of Ghana supplied the monthly
average treasury bill rates as part of the data I requested.
Data for Question 2
I summarized the variables I used to answer Question 2 in Table 5. These were
one independent variable, the net interest margin expressed as a percentage of GDP,
and one dependent variable, government debt expressed as a percentage of GDP.
Covariates were macroeconomic variables comprising inflation, exchange rate, and
budget deficits; banking variables comprising bank size, bank efficiency, bank risks,
bank concentration, and the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index; and institutional and
regulatory quality index. I defined each of these variables in Chapter 3. I presented
data on each variable in Appendix B. In this section, I will discuss only how I
obtained the variables from the data that I received.
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Table 5
Source of Variables of Research Question 2
Variable
NIM

Measurement
Net interest income of banks
as a percentage of nominal
GDP
Percent change in headline
inflation measured by the
consumer price index
Credit to government and its
agencies--loans, Treasury
bills, and bond purchases by
banks as a percentage of
nominal GDP
Difference between
government revenue and
expenditure
Ghana cedis per US dollar

Source
Estimated from data from
the Bank of Ghana

SIZE

Total assets of banks

EFF

Non-interest expenses as a
percentage of total assets
Total loans as a percentage of
total assets
Sum squared of percentage
total bank assets
Sum of assets of three largest
banks
World Bank measure ranging
between -2.5 to +2.5

Estimated from data from
the Bank of Ghana
Estimated from data from
the Bank of Ghana
Estimated from data from
the Bank of Ghana
Estimated from data from
the Bank of Ghana
Estimated from data from
the Bank of Ghana
World Bank database

INF

DEBT

DEF

EXCHR

RISK
HHI
CONCEN
RQUAL

Bank of Ghana

Bank of Ghana

Bank of Ghana

Bank of Ghana

Net interest margin (NIM): I obtained net interest income data from the
income statements of the banks. The net interest income (NII) was the interest income
less the interest expense. I estimated the NIM by dividing the NII by the GDP and
expressed it as a percentage. I collated the data at industry level on a monthly basis.

105
Inflation (INF): The BoG provided data on annual inflation in the country
expressed in percentage. I used the annual data to represent inflation for each month
of the applicable year in the model.
Government domestic debt (DEBT): DEBT comprised treasury bill purchases,
government bonds, loans, and credit advanced by commercial banks to the central
government, government ministries, departments, agencies, and corporations
expressed as a percentage of total credit advanced by the banks. The data used in the
model were the total outstanding amount at the end of each month. I collated and
summarized the data from the balance sheet of individual banks.
Budget deficit (DEF): The BoG provided annual data on the budget deficit.
The variable that I used in the model was the annual budget deficit divided by the
GDP and expressed as a percentage. I used the annual DEF data to represent the data
for each month in the applicable year.
Exchange rate (EXCHR): The BoG supplied monthly exchange rate data from
their database.
Bank size (SIZE): I collated and summarized the monthly total asset values
from the balance sheet of individual banks. In the model, I used total bank assets
expressed as a percentage of GDP.
Bank efficiency (EFF): I collated the noninterest expense data from the income
statement of banks, and the total asset data from their balance sheets and aggregated
at the industry level. I presented the data at monthly intervals.
Bank risks (RISK): I extracted the total loan outstanding and total asset data
from the balance sheets of the individual banks and aggregated at the industry level. I
presented the data at monthly intervals.
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Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI): I derived the variable by squaring the
percentage of total industry assets held by each bank and aggregating at the industry
level.
Bank concentration (CONCEN): I derived the concentration variable from the
balance sheet of the banks, by dividing each bank’s total assets by the total industry
assets expressed as a percentage. I followed that by ranking the obtained values to
arrive at the three largest which I summed and used in the model.
Regulatory quality (RQUAL): I obtained the variable by downloading from the
website of the World Governance Institute.
Study Results for Research Question 1
I used my first research question to find out whether there was any statistically
significant relationship between DEBT and PSCREDIT. On acquiring my data from
the sources discussed in the preceding section, I subjected it to screening and cleaning
before I entered them into the regression models for analysis.
Data Cleaning and Screening
My first action on acquiring the data was to screen and clean it. I visually
inspected the data to check for duplicate data, missing data, outliers, and mistakes.
Screening yielded no duplicate data. There were three missing entries and some
obvious mistakes. The BoG replaced the wrong data. Data for January 2006, July
2007, and May 2015 were missing. The missingness was completely random. The
BoG could not supply the missing data, so I resolved it by omitting the data for
January 2006 from the database and replacing the others by interpolation between
adjacent values, assuming linearity of the variable within that space. My dataset,
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therefore, started from February 2006 for a total of 131 months. I reported the
descriptive statistics for my first research question in Table 6.
Descriptive Statistics and Tests
I conducted descriptive statistics and tests of the data which I reported in
Table 6. I reported on the range, mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, and
normality for each variable. Skewness test results yielded non-significant results, (|S|
< 0.5) for all variables. Kurtosis test also yielded non-significant results, (|K| < 3) for
all variables.
Table 6
Descriptive Statistics of Question 1 Variables

Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis
Jarque-Bera
Probability
Sum
Sum Sq. Dev.
Observations

PSCREDIT
49.85484
48.81041
59.49003
37.90047
5.040178
-0.017881
2.097781
4.450063
0.108064
6530.984
3302.441
131

DEBT
FINT
GDP INSQUAL TBRATE
39.94554 1.133739 24.77127 0.029801 18.22409
40.84071 1.141808 24.81454 -0.007182 20.87348
51.22951 1.322745 25.84315 0.132062 27.80000
30.93421 0.988024 23.65206 -0.071557 9.130000
5.021522 0.064496 0.714354 0.079469 6.421331
0.060913 -0.217788 -0.054931 0.114191 -0.206244
2.013978 2.771176 1.653200 1.308571 1.296771
5.387815 1.321391 9.966589 15.90062 16.76327
0.067616 0.516492 0.006851 0.000353 0.000229
5232.866 148.5198 3245.037 3.903962 2387.356
3278.039 0.540768 66.33917 0.820990 5360.353
131
131
131
131
131

Check for normality of data. I checked for the normality of my research data using
the Jarque-Berra (J-B) method. The test rejects a J-B statistic greater than 5.5 for
normality. The results of the J-B test as presented in Table 6, indicated that
PSCREDIT and FINT had normal distributions at the 5% level. DEBT was normal at
the 10% level. GDP, TBRATE, and INSQUAL were not normally distributed, (i.e.,
their J-B values were greater than 5.5).
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The solution to non-normality is data transformation. However, I adhered to
Field (2013, p. 184) caution that in large samples, researchers need not worry about
normality as results are likely to be significant. I chose to ignore the non-normal
distribution exhibited by the affected variables.
Check for multicollinearity. I checked for collinearity among the research
variables. The test is to reject a correlation coefficient of more than 0.9 between any
pairs of variables that are stationary and normally distributed. However, for nonstationary data, the theoretical correlation will vary with time making it impossible to
determine true correlations.
The results presented in Table 7, indicated that there were no signficant
correlations between the variables except for DEBT that correlated highly with
PSCREDIT (r = -.98). I ignored the relationship between DEBT and PSCREDIT in
my analysis because of the potential for serial correlation within the variables. Thus, I
adopted and used all the variables in the regression model.
Table 7
Pearson Correlation Test Results for Question 1 Variables
PSCREDIT DEBT
PSCREDIT
1.00
-0.98
DEBT
-0.98
1.00
FINT
0.60
-0.62
GDP
0.24
-0.31
INSQUAL
-0.21
0.19
TBRATE
0.68
-0.72

FINT
0.60
-0.62
1.00
0.73
0.25
0.67

GDP
0.24
-0.31
0.73
1.00
0.15
0.56

INSQUAL TBRATE
-0.21
0.68
0.19
-0.72
0.25
0.67
0.15
0.56
1.00
0.04
0.04
1.00

Stationarity check. Based on the results of the descriptive statistics and tests,
I concluded that the ordinary least square regression would yield biased and
unacceptable results consistent with the literature that suggests that macroeconomic
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time series data could be non-stationary (Fayed, 2013). I, therefore, proceeded to
check the stationarity status of my data.
I confirmed stationarity by testing for unit roots in my data using the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) method. I used the EViews software to perform the
analysis. My null hypothesis was that there were no unit roots in any of the variables.
I tested each variable independently in levels[I(0)] and first differences [I(1)]. The
results, summarized in Table 8, indicated that the data exhibited a mixture of I(0) and
I(1). FINT was I(0). All other variables were I(1).
Table 8
Test for Unit Roots in Question 1 Variables
Variable

PSCREDIT
DEBT
GDP
FINT
INSQUAL
TBRATE

Levels
Constant Constant
+trend
-2.607
-2.365
(0.094)
(0.396)
-2.581
-2.336
(0.0995) (0.412)
-0.4723
-2.857
(0.891)
(0.181)
-2.784
-4.002
(0.063)
(0.011)
-1.314
-1.076
(0.622)
(0.928)
-2.191
-1.929
(0.211)
(0.633)

First Difference
Constant
Constant
+trend
-11.222
-11.256
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
-9.555
-9.619
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
-2.779
-2.776
(0.064)
(0.209)
-13.027
-12.983
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
-11.274
-11.486
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
-5.425
-5.486
(<0.001)
(<0.001)

Status

I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(0)
I(1)
I(1)

Note. Table reports t-statistics and p values in parentheses

Under these conditions of mixed levels of integration, Perasan and Shin (1999)
proposed the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to finding a
cointegration relationship between the variables. I first performed the bounds test to
determine the unit root properties of the variables and whether there was a long-run
cointegration relationship between the variables.
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Bounds test. I performed the bounds test using the EViews software. I
presented the results of the bounds test in Table 9. The bounds test results returned F
= 8.515. The F result was greater than the critical value for I(1), (F = 3.79, p = 0.05),
thus confirming that the model’s variables were integrated of order I(1). The test
result also rejected the null hypothesis that no long-run relationship existed between
the variables. The model, therefore, had both short- and long-run properties. I
presented confirmation of these results in Table 10.
Table 9
ARDL Bounds Test Results for Question 1 Variables
Test Statistic

Value

k

F-statistic
8.515
Critical Value Bounds

5

Significance
10%
5%
2.5%
1%

I0 Bound
2.26
2.62
2.96
3.41

I1 Bound
3.35
3.79
4.18
4.68

Note. Null Hypothesis: No long-run relationships exist

Specifying the Question 1 Regression Model
Following the results of the bounds test, I estimated the short and long-run
models. I performed the ARDL analysis using the EViews software. In the ARDL
model, I specified an automatic lag selection procedure with the Akaike information
criterion (AIC) to select my model. The software iterated 12500 models and selected a
model with parameters ARDL (1, 1, 0, 0, 3, 1) that yielded the lowest AIC result.
Figure 2 presents the graph of the top twenty models showing that the selected model
had lowest AIC value.
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Akaike Information Criteria (top 20 models)
2.124
2.120
2.116
2.112
2.108
2.104
2.100

ARDL(1, 1, 0, 1, 4, 1)

ARDL(1, 1, 0, 0, 4, 2)

ARDL(1, 2, 0, 0, 4, 1)
ARDL(3, 1, 0, 0, 3, 1)

ARDL(1, 1, 0, 0, 3, 4)

ARDL(2, 1, 0, 0, 4, 1)

ARDL(1, 1, 2, 0, 4, 1)

ARDL(1, 1, 1, 0, 3, 2)

ARDL(1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 1)

ARDL(1, 2, 1, 0, 3, 1)

ARDL(2, 1, 1, 0, 3, 1)

ARDL(1, 1, 0, 1, 3, 1)

ARDL(1, 1, 0, 0, 3, 2)

ARDL(1, 2, 0, 0, 3, 1)

ARDL(1, 1, 1, 0, 4, 1)

ARDL(2, 1, 0, 0, 3, 1)

ARDL(1, 1, 2, 0, 3, 1)

ARDL(1, 1, 0, 0, 4, 1)

ARDL(1, 1, 1, 0, 3, 1)

ARDL(1, 1, 0, 0, 3, 1)

2.096

Figure 2. Akaike information criterion results for PSCREDIT.

Short-run PSCREDIT model. In Table 10, I reported the results of the
cointegration test. The cointegration coefficient strongly predicted the long-run
relationship, β = -.582, ρ < .001. I expected the result given that there was a long run
relationship. It also indicated that the short run drift of the model returned very
quickly to the long run model, that is, within two reporting periods.
DEBT significantly predicted the short-run PSCREDIT, β = -.909, ρ < .001.
FINTt-1, was a non-significant predictor of the short run PSCREDIT, β = 3.453, ρ
=.112 and INQUAL was also not a significant predictor of the short-run PSCREDIT,
β = -1.833, ρ =.665. However, the first lag of the institutional quality, INSQUALt-1,

112
predicted the short-run PSCREDIT, β = -13.499, ρ = .021; the second lag of
institutional quality, INSQUALt-2 was also a significant predictor of short-run
PSCREDIT, β = 12.735, ρ =.003.
Table 10
Short-Run Cointegration Coefficients for Question 1Model
Variable
D(DEBT)
D(FINT(-1))
D(GDP)
D(INSQUAL)
D(INSQUAL(-1))
D(INSQUAL(-2))
D(TBRATE)
CointEq(-1)

Coefficient
Std. Error
t-Statistic
Prob.
-0.909530
0.049252
-18.467006
0.0000
3.453523
2.153556
1.603637
0.1115
-0.405341
0.160574
-2.524322
0.0129
-1.833795
4.228972
-0.433627
0.6654
-13.499041
5.755393
-2.345459
0.0207
12.734713
4.203694
3.029410
0.0030
-0.156803
0.059190
-2.649160
0.0092
-0.581816
0.079382
-7.329334
0.0000
Cointegration equation
Cointeq = PSCREDIT - (-0.9810*DEBT + 5.9358*FINT(-1) - 0.6967*GDP
-3.1543*INSQUAL -0.0165*TBRATE + 100.0108 )

INSQUAL data was in annual installments. Thus it is not likely to affect the
monthly changes in the lending regime in the industry. The growth in GDP predicted
the short-run change in PSCREDIT, β = -.405, ρ = .013. TBRATE was a negative and
significant predictor of the short-run PSCREDIT, β = -.157, ρ = .009.
The short run cointegration equation was given by Equation 25:
ΔPSCREDITt = -0.909ΔDEBTt + 3.453ΔFINTt – 1 – 1.833ΔINSQUALt –
13.499ΔINSQUALt – 1 + 12.735ΔINSQUALt – 2 – 0.157ΔTBRATEt – 0.405ΔGDPt –
0.582ECt – 1

(25)

where ECt-1 is the lagged residual from the long run relationship between the
variables.
Long-run model. Table 11 is a summary of the long-run relationship between
the variables as determined by the ARDL evaluation. DEBT significantly predicted
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PSCREDIT, β = -.981, ρ < .001 as was expected. I found that a one-unit increase in
government debt resulted in a 0.98 decrease in the volume loans extended to the
private sector. In effect, government credit crowded out the private sector in the loan
market.
Table 11
Long-Run Coefficients for Question 1 Model
Variable
DEBT
FINT(-1)
GDP
INSQUAL
TBRATE
C

Coefficient
-0.981039
5.935762
-0.696682
-3.154305
-0.016512
100.010764

Std. Error
0.047686
3.521739
0.249454
1.786238
0.029306
5.013059

t-Statistic
-20.572917
1.685463
-2.792825
-1.765893
-0.563435
19.950048

Prob.
0.0000
0.0946
0.0061
0.0800
0.5742
0.0000

The result for DEBT runs contrary to the crowding in found by Fayed (2013)
in Egypt and the findings of Sharpe (2013) for sovereign countries. Fayed (2013)
found no significant effect of government debt on private credit in the short run. In the
long-run Egyptian government debt predicted a crowd-in of private sector credit.
According to Sharpe (2013), sovereign governments can print money to pay their
debts and need not crowd out the private sector.
FINT was a positive and significant predictor of PSCREDIT at the 10% level,
β = 5.936, ρ < .095. FINT crowded-in private sector credit as expected. FINT is a
measure of bank liquidity. Thus a positive relationship was expected because higher
liquidity would enable banks to make more loans after accounting for statutory
reserves. The descriptive test results of Table 6 indicated a minimum, maximum, and
mean FINT of 0.988, 1.322, and 1.133, an indication that the currency in circulation is
nearly the same as the volume of banks deposits. I inferred from my result that
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government did not resort to printing money as was suggested by Sharpe (2013),
rather it borrowed from the banks to pay its debt which led to a crowding out of the
private sector.
INSQUAL was also a significant predictor of PSCREDIT at the 10% level, β
= -3.154, ρ = .080. The result was unexpected. INSQUAL is a measure of the quality
of governance. Good governance generates confidence in the economy which will
contribute towards increased investments as was reported by Djankov et al. (2007).
Thus, I expected a positive relationship between INSQUAL and PSCREDIT, but the
result was otherwise for Ghana. The effect of the quality of governance on the private
sector credit requires further study to determine the underlying factors.
GDP growth was a significant but negative predictor of PSCREDIT at the
10% level, β = -1.191, ρ = .092. The result was consistent with the findings of
Churchill et al. (2014). Increasing GDP should generate a higher demand for credit as
businesses took advantage of the improved economic conditions to make investments.
Dietrich et al. (2015) had found a positive relationship between GDP growth and the
NIM meaning that credit became more expensive with increasing rate of GDP growth
which could account for the results. The result indicated that the rate of growth of the
GDP in Ghana induces a higher cost of credit probably because of increased demand
that ultimately leads to lower demand as the cost becomes unaffordable for the private
sector. Another reason for the negative significance could be as explained by
Churchill et al. (2014) that GDP does not influence the pricing of loans in Ghana.
TBRATE was not a significant predictor of PSCREDIT, β = -.017, ρ = .574.
TBRATE was expected to be negatively related to PSCREDIT. TBRATE contain
information about the general level of prices in the economy and therefore should
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have a negative relation with the demand for credit consistent with the findings of
Fayed (2013) and Shetta and Kamaly (2014). Banks would prefer to invest in low-risk
government debt than advance loans to perceived risky private sector borrowers. The
negative coefficient is thus consistent with the literature, but the insignificant results
could mean that the pricing of treasury bills was not a major influence on the lending
capacity of banks.
The long-run relationship between PSCREDIT and the variables was:
PSCREDITt = 100.010 – 0.981DEBTt + 5.935FINTt – 1 – 3.154INSQUALt –
0.017TBRATEt – 0.697GDPt + εt

(26)

Test of Residuals
Following from the ADRL test I performed tests on the residuals. These tests
were to satisfy the requirement that results were best linear unbiased estimates
(BLUE) and can explain the relationship between the dependent and independent
variables in the model. I checked for outliers, serial correlation, and heteroscedasticity
of the residuals.
The overall ARDL model which I reported in Appendix C, returned
F=561.809, p < .001, an adjusted R2 of 0.98, and a Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic of
1.929. These results indicated that overall the model was robust in explaining the
relationship between the variables. The DW results indicated that serial correlation
was not an issue in the residuals. Figure 3 is a representation of the graphical plot of
the model and the residuals.
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Figure 3. Private sector credit model diagnostics.
Serial correlation of residuals. I checked the residuals of the model for
possible serial correlation by the Breusch-Godfrey LM test. The null hypothesis is the
presence of serial correlation in the residuals. The results, Table 12, returned F(2,114)
= 0.081, ρ = 0.922 rejecting the null hypothesis of serial correlation between the
residuals.
Table 12
Residual Diagnostics Results for Question 1 Variables
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:
F-statistic

0.081247

Prob. F(2,114)

0.9220

Obs*R-squared

0.182189

Prob. Chi-Square(2)

0.9129

Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey
F-statistic

0.729408

Prob. F(11,116)

0.7084

Obs*R-squared

8.280747

Prob. Chi-Square(11)

0.6880

Scaled explained SS

11.93203

Prob. Chi-Square(11)

0.3688
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Heteroscedasticity test. I tested for heteroscedasticity among the residuals by
the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey method. The null hypothesis is the presence of
heteroscedasticity in the residuals. The result, presented in Table 12, returned F(11,
116) = 0.729, ρ = 0.708, a non-significant output. Thus, I rejected the null hypothesis
and accepted the alternative of no heteroscedasticity in the residuals.
Threats to Validity
Adequacy of the model. I checked the construct validity of my research
model by confirming its adequacy using the Ramsey RESET test. I presented the
results in Table 13. The test result, F(1, 115) = 0.150, ρ = 0.698, is not significant.
Therefore, I rejected the null hypothesis of a non-adequately specified model.
Table 13
Ramsey RESET Test Result for Question 1 Variables

t-statistic
F-statistic
F-test summary:
Test SSR
Restricted SSR
Unrestricted SSR

Value
0.387926
0.150486

df
115
(1, 115)

Probability
0.6988
0.6988

Sum of Sq.
0.071153
54.44553
54.37438

df
1
116
115

Mean Squares
0.071153
0.469358
0.472821

Study Results for Research Question 2
In my second research question, I sought to find out whether there was any
statistically significant relationship between DEBT and the NIM. I subjected the data
to screening and cleaning as I described under Research Question 1 and conducted
other tests described hereunder.
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Descriptive Statistics and Tests
I conducted descriptive statistics and tests of the data which I reported in
Table 14. I reported on the range, mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, and
normality for each variable. Skewness test results yielded significant results, (|S| < 0.
5) for NIM, DEBT, DEF, EFF, and SIZE. EXCHR (|S| = .881) and HHI (|S| = .714)
exhibited slightly positive skews. The kurtosis results indicated that NIM and DEBT
were significant (|K| > 3). The other variables returned non-significant results.
Check for normality of data. I checked for the normality of my data using
the Jarque-Berra (J-B) method. The results, presented in Table 14, indicated that
DEBT, RISK, and SIZE had normal distributions. All the other variables did not.
Similar to Question 1, I adhered to Field (2013, p. 184) caution and ignored the nonnormal distribution exhibited by the other variables.
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Table 14
Descriptive Statistics of Research Question 2 Variables

Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis
Jarque-Bera
Probability
Sum
Sum Sq. Dev.
Observations

NIM
DEBT
0.253
9.613
0.249
9.618
0.529
13.432
-0.055
6.653
0.080
1.420
-0.017
0.325
4.473
3.055
11.846
2.320
0.003
0.314
33.189 1259.325
0.826 262.256
131
131

DEF
-7.284
-6.813
-4.005
-11.483
2.294
-0.407
2.065
8.394
0.015
-954.142
684.390
131

EXCHR
INF
CONCEN
EFF
HHI
RISK
SIZE
RQUAL
1.970
13.434
33.026
3.865
673.875
48.880
31.842
0.030
1.517
12.810
31.465
3.875
626.038
48.532
31.804
-0.007
4.187
20.740
43.925
7.818
982.347
58.797
42.278
0.132
0.909
8.390
23.808
0.537
497.213
38.000
19.335
-0.072
1.036
3.837
5.680
2.090
124.522
4.180
5.339
0.079
0.881
0.276
0.304
0.037
0.714
0.223
-0.351
0.114
2.351
1.625
1.948
1.829
2.436
3.369
2.457
1.309
19.237
11.993
8.057
7.519
12.873
1.829
4.299
15.901
0.0001
0.002
0.018
0.023
0.002
0.401
0.117
0.0004
258.094 1759.832 4326.350 506.349 88277.670 6403.219 4171.334
3.904
139.474 1913.573 4194.083 567.763 2015747.000 2271.113 3705.616
0.821
131
131
131
131
131
131
131
131
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Table 15
Pearson Correlation Test Results for Question 2 Variables

NIM
DEBT
DEF
EXCHR
INF
CONCEN
EFF
HHI
RISK
SIZE
RQUAL

NIM
1.00
0.57
-0.36
0.73
0.42
-0.69
0.29
-0.67
-0.02
0.77
0.02

DEBT
0.57
1.00
-0.33
0.42
-0.08
-0.64
0.32
-0.64
-0.48
0.60
0.42

DEF
-0.36
-0.33
1.00
-0.40
-0.10
0.44
0.08
0.47
-0.03
-0.37
-0.27

EXCHR
0.73
0.42
-0.40
1.00
0.47
-0.87
0.001
-0.80
-0.18
0.75
-0.16

INF
0.42
-0.08
-0.10
0.47
1.00
-0.21
0.005
-0.19
0.65
0.57
-0.33

CONCEN
EFF
-0.69
0.29
-0.64
0.32
0.44
0.08
-0.87
0.001
-0.21
0.005
1.00
-0.001
0.00
1.00
0.99
-0.0002
0.44
0.06
-0.81
0.21
-0.29
-0.05

HHI
-0.67
-0.64
0.47
-0.80
-0.19
0.99
0.00
1.00
0.41
-0.81
-0.39

RISK
-0.02
-0.48
-0.03
-0.18
0.65
0.44
0.06
0.41
1.00
0.02
-0.32

SIZE
0.77
0.60
-0.37
0.75
0.57
-0.81
0.21
-0.81
0.02
1.00
0.24

RQUAL
0.02
0.42
-0.27
-0.16
-0.33
-0.29
-0.05
-0.39
-0.32
0.24
1.00
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Check for multicollinearity. I checked for collinearity among the research
variables. The results presented in Table 15, indicated that CONCEN and HHI were
highly correlated. Both variables were measures of the level of competition in the
banking industry, therefore, and following Dietrich et al. (2015), I retained CONCEN
and omitted HHI from the regression analysis. No other pairs of variables exhibited
any significant level of correlation to be of concern.
Stationarity check. Based on the results of the descriptive statistics and tests,
I concluded that the ordinary least square regression would yield biased and
unacceptable results consistent with the literature which suggest that macroeconomic
time series data could be non-stationary (Fayed, 2013). I, therefore, proceeded to
check the stationarity status of my data. I tested for unit roots in my data using the
ADF method. My null hypothesis was that there were no unit roots in any of the
variables. I tested each variable independently in levels and first differences. The
summarized results in Table 16 indicated that the data exhibited a mixture of I(0) and
I(1). NIM and DEBT were I(0) whereas the rest of the variables were I(1).
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Table 16
Test for Unit Roots in the Question 2 Variables
Variable

NIM
DEBT
INF
DEF
EXCHRATE
SIZE
EFF
HHI
CONCEN
RISK
RQUAL

Levels
Constant
Constant
+trend
-1.671116 -5.361236
(0.4434)
(<0.001)
-3.311802 -3.978110
(0.0164)
(0.0117)
-1.454263 -1.454411
(0.5535)
(0.8399)
-2.081022 -2.284055
(0.2527)
(0.4392)
1.068173 -1.374955
(0.9971)
(0.8637)
-1.871504 -2.717032
(0.3447)
(0.2319)
-1.907101 -2.023612
(0.3281)
(0.5820)
-2.637885 -2.034390
(0.0881)
(0.5766)
-1.116518 -1.819383
(0.7079)
(0.6896)
-1.540241 -1.679339
(0.5101)
(0.7549)
-1.31374
-1.07648
(0.6219)
(0.9282)

First Difference
Constant
Constant
+trend
-11.02985 -10.97943
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
-12.69320 -12.64181
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
-7.680668 -7.632020
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
-11.14596 -11.11351
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
-6.540873 -6.832527
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
-15.92579 -15.86325
(0.001)
(<0.001)
-3.730993 -3.748001
(0.0048)
(0.0231)
-14.25960 -14.57480
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
-15.41393 -15.38694
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
-11.08353 -11.05070
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
-11.2745
-11.4862
(<0.001)
(<0.001)

Status

I(0)
I(0)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)

Note. Table reports t-statistics; p values in parentheses

Under these conditions of mixed levels of integration, I adopted the ARDL
approach to finding a cointegration relationship between the variables. I first
performed the bounds test to determine the unit root properties of the variables and
whether there was a long-run cointegration relationship between the variables.
Bounds test. Following from the ARDL analysis, I performed the bounds test
to determine the stationarity of the variables. I presented the results of the bounds test
in Table 17. The bounds test results returned F = 11.1586. The result is greater than
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the critical value for I(1) (F = 3.30, ρ = 0.05). Thus, the model’s variables are all I(1).
By the test results, I also rejected the null hypothesis that no long-run relationship
existed between the variables. The model, therefore, had both short- and long-run
properties. I confirmed these by the results presented in Table 18.
Table 17
Bounds Test Results for Question 2 Model
Test Statistic
Value
k
F-statistic
22.84775
9
Critical Value Bounds
I0 Bound
I1 Bound
Significance
10%
1.88
2.99
5%
2.14
3.30
2.50%
2.37
3.60
1%
2.65
3.97
Note. Null Hypothesis: No long-run relationships exist

Specifying the Question 2 Regression Model
Following the results of the bounds test, I used the ARDL method to estimate
the short- and long-run models. In the ARDL estimation, I specified an automatic lag
selection procedure with the AIC as my model selection criteria. The software iterated
7812500 models and selected a model with the parameters ARDL (1, 3, 0, 0, 0, 4, 3,
0, 4, 0). I presented the results of the ARDL results in Appendix 4. In Figure 4 I
presented the graph of the top twenty models showing that the selected model had
lowest AIC value.
In the ARDL results, the first lag of NIM, NIMt-1 was significant (β = -.337, ρ
< .001). The other variables returned varying levels of significance in their different
lags. Overall, the model returned an F = 18.250, ρ < .001, a DW statistic of 2.064, and
an adjusted R2 = 0.811. These results confirmed the presence of unit roots in the NIM
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data, a necessary condition for the application of the ARDL methodology. The results
also confirmed the model as adequate for explaining the relationship between NIM,
the independent variable, and the covariates.
Akaike Information Criteria (top 20 models)
-3.596
-3.600
-3.604
-3.608
-3.612
-3.616

ARDL(1, 3, 0, 0, 0, 4, 3, 0, 0, 4)
ARDL(1, 3, 0, 0, 0, 4, 2, 0, 0, 4)
ARDL(1, 3, 0, 1, 0, 4, 3, 0, 0, 4)
ARDL(1, 3, 0, 1, 0, 4, 2, 0, 0, 4)
ARDL(1, 4, 0, 0, 0, 4, 3, 0, 0, 4)
ARDL(1, 3, 0, 0, 0, 4, 3, 2, 0, 4)
ARDL(1, 3, 1, 0, 0, 4, 3, 0, 0, 4)
ARDL(1, 3, 0, 0, 0, 4, 4, 0, 0, 4)
ARDL(1, 3, 0, 0, 0, 4, 3, 0, 1, 4)
ARDL(1, 3, 0, 0, 1, 4, 3, 0, 0, 4)
ARDL(1, 3, 0, 0, 0, 4, 3, 1, 0, 4)
ARDL(2, 3, 0, 0, 0, 4, 3, 0, 0, 4)
ARDL(1, 3, 0, 0, 0, 2, 2, 0, 0, 4)
ARDL(1, 4, 0, 0, 0, 4, 2, 0, 0, 4)
ARDL(1, 3, 0, 0, 0, 2, 3, 0, 0, 4)
ARDL(1, 3, 1, 0, 0, 4, 2, 0, 0, 4)
ARDL(1, 4, 0, 1, 0, 4, 3, 0, 0, 4)
ARDL(1, 3, 0, 0, 0, 4, 2, 1, 0, 4)
ARDL(1, 3, 0, 2, 0, 4, 3, 0, 0, 4)
ARDL(1, 3, 1, 1, 0, 4, 3, 0, 0, 4)

-3.620

Figure 4. Akaike information criterion results for NIM.
Short-run NIM model. In Table 18, I reported the results of the cointegration
test. The error correction coefficient was -1.337 and strongly significant (ρ < .001).
The result was much lower than expected. However, Narayan and Smyth (2006)
intimated that a coefficient between -1.0 and -2.0 is acceptable because it indicates a
diminishing and fluctuating form of convergence of the short-run drift of the model to
the long-run equilibrium.
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Table 18
Short-run Coefficients for Question 2 Model
Variable
Coefficient
Std. Error
t-Statistic
Prob.
D(DEBT(-1))
0.014292
0.008265
1.729239
0.0868
D(DEBT(-2))
-0.003498
0.009739
-0.359224
0.7202
D(DEBT(-3))
0.016166
0.007326
2.206669
0.0296
D(DEF)
0.000726
0.002144
0.338674
0.7356
D(EXCHR)
0.089497
0.01961
4.563841
0.0000
D(INF)
-0.004903
0.002589
-1.894182
0.061
D(CONCEN)
-0.016704
0.005306
-3.148249
0.0022
D(CONCEN(-1))
-0.007213
0.00643
-1.121779
0.2646
D(CONCEN(-2))
0.000807
0.006067
0.13295
0.8945
D(CONCEN(-3))
-0.01034
0.005351
-1.932344
0.0561
D(EFF)
0.004991
0.002515
1.984751
0.0499
D(EFF(-1))
0.004221
0.003379
1.248978
0.2145
D(EFF(-2))
0.003881
0.00272
1.426595
0.1568
D(RISK)
0.005074
0.002384
2.127853
0.0358
D(SIZE)
0.008604
0.002379
3.616583
0.0005
D(SIZE(-1))
0.006751
0.003082
2.19031
0.0308
D(SIZE(-2))
0.003446
0.003025
1.139269
0.2573
D(SIZE(-3))
-0.008673
0.002438
-3.557524
0.0006
D(RQUAL)
0.090602
0.124142
0.729832
0.4672
CointEq(-1)
-1.336792
0.087791
-15.226907 0.00000
Cointeq = NIM - (0.0184*DEBT(-1) + 0.0005*DEF + 0.0669*EXCHR 0.0037*INF + 0.0065*CONCEN + 0.0023*EFF + 0.0038*RISK +
0.0047*SIZE + 0.0678*RQUAL -0.5665 )
All the model’s variables were also significant predictors of the change in the
dependent variable as shown in Table 18. The short-run model’s equation is therefore
given by Equation 27:
ΔNIMt = 0.014ΔDEBTt–1 – 0.003ΔDEBTt–2 + 0.016ΔDEBTt–3 + 0.001ΔDEFt +
0.089ΔEXCHRt – 0.005ΔINFt + 0.005ΔRISKt + 0.007ΔSIZEt + 0.003ΔSIZEt–1 –
0.009ΔSIZEt–3 – 0.017ΔCONCENt – 0.007ΔCONCENt – 1 + 0.001ΔCONCENt–2 –
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0.010ΔCONCENt-3 + 0.005ΔEFFt + 0.004ΔEFFt – 1 + 0.004ΔEFFt–2 + 0.091ΔRQUALt
– 1.34ECt-1

(27)

where ECt-1 is the lagged residual from the long run relationship between the
variables.
Long-run NIM model. In Table 19 I presented a summary of the long-run
relationship between the variables as determined from the ARDL evaluation. DEBT
had a positive and significant relationship with NIM, β = .0184, ρ <.001. The result
was as expected. Significantly, the coefficient of DEBT implied that government debt
in the preceding period accounted for nearly 2% increase in NIM in the current
period.
Table 19
Long-run Model Coefficients for Question 2
Variable

Coefficient

DEBT(-1)
DEF
EXCHR
INF
CONCEN
EFF
RISK
SIZE
RQUAL
C

0.018447
0.000543
0.066949
-0.003668
0.006489
0.002338
0.003795
0.004666
0.067776
-0.566548

Std.
Error
0.003796
0.001604
0.014355
0.001933
0.003032
0.002395
0.001783
0.002238
0.093089
0.128224

t-Statistic

Prob.

4.858948
0.338644
4.663698
-1.8973
2.1399
0.976001
2.128581
2.084892
0.728077
-4.418431

0.0000
0.7356
0.00000
0.0606
0.0347
0.3314
0.0357
0.0396
0.4682
0.00000

Similarly, EXCHR, INF, and RISK were all significant predictors of the NIM,
thus confirming the findings of Churchill et al. (2014), Dietrich et al. (2015), and
Mensah and Abor (2014). EXCHR and INF are macroeconomic variables with major
influence on the economy.
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DEF did not exhibit a significant relationship with NIM, β = -.007, ρ = .749.
The findings could be because of the partial reliance on foreign sources of funds to
finance the budget deficits consistent with the findings of Hubbard (2012) that foreign
savings could reduce the effect of the deficit on interest rates. Data from the Ministry
of Finance (2015) of Ghana indicated that foreign source financing of the deficit had
been up to 50% of the total for the period 2008 and 2014. The second reason that I
can assign to the non-significant results is the fact that the domestic debt accounts for
part of the deficit, thus rendering the variable was redundant in the model. Therefore,
the non-significant result of the DEF was not unexpected.
EXCHR significantly predicted NIM, β = .067, ρ < .001. Significantly
EXCHR explained nearly 7% of the variation in the NIM of banks. The positive
impact on NIM and, by extension, the cost of capital, was expected because increases
in the rate signaled depreciation of the Ghanaian currency, and banks were expected
to adjust their lending rates to maintain their level of profitability. The significant
coefficient indicated a strong pass-through effect of exchange rate shocks on interest
rates contrary to Loloh (2014) who reported an incomplete effect.
INF significantly predicted NIM at the 10% level, β = -0.004, ρ = 0.061. I
expected INF to correlate positively with NIM. Mensah and Abor (2014) had reported
a positive relationship between inflation and interest rates because banks were
supposed to account for inflation in pricing the loans. My result contradicted their
findings. Loloh (2014) reported that Ghanaian producers endure a reduction in their
profit margins because of an inability to pass-through exchange rate shocks to their
consumers. My result seems to show that a similar situation exists in the case of
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inflation and NIM—Ghanaian banks endure a reduction in their margins due to
inflation.
RISK significantly predicted NIM, β = .004, ρ = .036. The role of RISK in
NIM is ambiguous (Dietrich et al., 2015). I measured RISK as the ratio of total loans
to bank assets. I expected therefore that the greater the volume of loans granted, the
higher the interest margins to be earned but also the higher the risk of default. Thus,
the positive relationship was appropriate. The positive and significant relations
between RISK and NIM were as expected and confirm Were and Wambua (2014)
who found a positive correlation between bank-specific factors and interest rate
spreads.
CONCEN was a significant predictor of NIM β = .006, ρ = .035. The results
confirm my expectations and the findings of Dietrich et al. (2015) for developing
countries. My results also confirm the findings of Mensah and Abor (2014) that
concentration in the banking industry in Ghana leads to higher interest margins. The
basic assumptions of the findings of these authors were that in highly concentrated
markets, banks have enough market power to pass their costs to customers. It appears
that competition among Ghana’s banks is not strong enough to affect their earnings.
EFF did not significantly predict NIM, β = .002, ρ = .331. The finding run
counter to my expectations. Bank interest rates contain information about their
overhead expenses as well as the cost of the risk of the loans they advance to
customers. I expected that increases in the variable would be passed on to customers
in the form of higher borrowing and lower saving rates (Dietrich et al., 2015). The
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non-significant nature of the results indicated that Ghanaian banks do not
accommodate all their costs in their interest rates.
SIZE significantly predicted NIM, β = .005, ρ = .0396. Obviously, the growth
of bank assets, my measure of SIZE, had a bearing on NIM thus confirming Mensah
and Abor (2014). It is an indication that Ghanaian banks took advantage of the growth
in their asset base in the market.
Overall, the relations between bank-specific factors and NIM confirm some of
Were and Wambua (2014). The authors found that bank size, credit risk, return on
average assets, and operating costs had a positive effect on interest rate spreads
whereas higher bank liquidity ratio has a negative effect. My findings are that bank
size is significant but not operating costs probably because Ghanaian banks do not
accommodate all their costs in their interest rates.
RQUAL did not significantly predict NIM, β = .068, ρ = .468. The result run
counter to expectations. The quality of regulations, especially, regulations that protect
lenders should to boost confidence in the sector and lead to a high lending regime that
will contribute to higher interest margins. Obviously, the situation in Ghana is
different.
The long-run relationship between NIM and the variables was, Equation 28:
NIMt = -0.567 + 0.0184DEBTt – 1- 0.0005DEFt + 0.0669EXCHRt –
0.0037INFLt + 0.0038RISKt – 0.0065CONCENt + 0.0023EFFt – 0.047SIZEt +
0.0678RQUALt + εt

(28)
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Test of Residuals
Following from the ADRL test I performed tests on the residuals. These tests
were to satisfy the requirement that results were BLUE and can explain the
relationship between the dependent and independent variables in the model. I checked
for outliers, serial correlation, and heteroscedasticity of the residuals.
The overall ARDL analysis, presented in Appendix D, returned an F(18.250, ρ
< 0.001) and a DW statistic of 2.065. These results indicated that overall, the model
was robust in explaining the relationship between the variables. The DW results
indicated that serial correlation was not an issue in the residuals. Figure 5 is a
representation of the graphical plot of the model and the residuals.
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Figure 5. NIM model residual diagnostics.
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Serial Correlation of Residuals. I checked the residuals of the model for
possible serial correlation by the Breuch-Godfrey LM test. The results, Table 20,
returned F(2, 100) = 0.529, ρ = 0.591 rejecting the null hypothesis of serial correlation
between the residuals.
Table 20
Residual Diagnostics Results for Question 2 Variables
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:
F-statistic
0.528756
Prob. F(2,100)
Obs*R-squared
1.328985
Prob. Chi-Square(2)

0.591
0.5145

Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey
F-statistic
1.240585
Prob. F(24,102)
Obs*R-squared
28.69536
Prob. Chi-Square(24)
Scaled explained SS
36.50878
Prob. Chi-Square(24)

0.2267
0.2318
0.049

Heteroscedasticity test. I tested for heteroscedasticity among the residuals by
the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey method. The null hypothesis is the presence of
heteroscedasticity in the residuals. The results F(24, 102) = 41.241, ρ = 0.227, is not
significant. Thus, I rejected the null hypothesis and accepted the alternative of no
heteroscedasticity in the residuals.
Threats to Validity
Adequacy of the model. I checked the construct validity of my model by
confirming its adequacy using the Ramsey RESET test. I presented the results in
Table 21. The test result was not significant F(1, 101) = 0.117, ρ = 0.733. Therefore, I
rejected the null hypothesis of a non-adequately specified model.
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Table 21
Ramsey RESET Test Result for Research Question 2 Residuals

t-statistic
F-statistic
F-test summary:
Test SSR
Restricted SSR
Unrestricted SSR

Value
0.342207
0.117106

df
101
(1, 101)

Probability
0.7329
0.7329

Sum of Sq.
0.000155
0.133779
0.133624

df
1
102
101

Mean Squares
0.000155
0.001312
0.001323

Summary
In this chapter, I presented the results of my data analysis. In my research, I
investigated the incidence of FCO in Ghana along the quantity and cost channels. I
obtained data from the BoG and the World Bank for the period February 2006 to
December 2016, a total of 131 data entries. I subjected my data to initial checks for
multicollinearity, normality, and unit root properties. The variables were a mix of I(0)
and I(1), and some violated the normality assumptions. I, therefore, used the ARDL
method to analyze the data.
The results for PSCREDIT indicated that there was both a short-run and longrun cointegration relationship between the variables. I also found a negative and
significant relationship between my dependent and independent variables an
indication of the presence of FCO in Ghana along the quantity channel. The results
for NIM exhibited similar long- and short-term cointegration relationships between
the dependent, independent, and covariables. The results indicated a significant and
positive relationship between the dependent and independent variable, thus showing
the presence of FCO along the cost channel.
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The next chapter is my final for the dissertation. In that chapter, I discussed
my findings, drew conclusions, made recommendations for further research, and
discussed the positive social impact aspect of my research.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
The purpose of this quantitative research was to investigate the presence of
FCO in Ghana. I did this by examining the relationship between the government’s
domestic debt and the credit advanced to the private corporate sector by Ghanaian
banks. My objective was to use the results to determine whether the government
crowded out the private sector regarding the quantity of credit and the cost of credit to
show that FCO exists in the Ghanaian economy.
FCO is one of the several theories that explain the lack of access to finance for
the private sector. FCO theory is, however, still evolving (Aisen & Hauner, 2013)
with diverging opinions. In Ghana, Sheriff and Amoako (2014) found evidence of a
short-term relationship between macroeconomic variables and the IRS, pointing to a
potential presence of FCO. My research extended their work by incorporating bankspecific variables and investigating FCO along both the quantity and cost channels
following the steps of Fayed (2013) and Sharpe (2013).
My results indicated that there is a long-term negative relationship between
PSCREDIT and DEBT, and a long-term positive relationship between NIM and
DEBT. These results provide evidence that government borrowing affects the supply
of credit to the private corporate sector. In effect, based on the data available at this
time, the GoG’s policy of borrowing from the domestic market to offset some of the
budget deficit crowded out the private sector from the loan market.
Interpretation of Findings
Several factors determine how firms gain access to credit for their operations
in a country. Researchers including Dietrich et al. (2015), Gimet and Lagoarde-Segot,
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(2012), Joeveer (2013), and Love and Peria (2015) identified these factors and noted
that they operated at the levels of the economy, firm, household, and lending
institutions or banks. Using the method of Deltuvaite and Sineviciene (2014), I
concluded that Ghana’s credit market is bank driven. At this level of operations,
neoclassical theory indicates that there will be competition for funds, that can drive up
the cost of credit. In this research, I hypothesized that government’s domestic
borrowing accounted for the high cost and low quantities of credit available to the
private sector in Ghana under the phenomenon described as FCO. I posed two
questions along the quantity and cost channels to investigate whether there was FCO
in Ghana; that is, whether the government’s domestic debt competed with credit to the
private corporate sector.
Research Questions
My first question asked about the relationship between the government’s
domestic debt and the quantity of private sector credit. I tested the null hypothesis that
there was no significant relationship between the government’s domestic debt and the
volume of private sector credit. My second research question asked about the
relationship between government’s domestic borrowing and the cost of credit to the
private sector. I tested the null hypothesis that there was no significant relationship
between the cost of credit, which I operationalized as the NIM and government debt.
Findings of the Research
I used a regression model of the form Yt = β0 + β1X + εt, where Yt is the
dependent variable, β0 and β1 are regression constants, Xt is the independent variable,
and εt is the error term. My key independent variable was the government’s domestic
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debt represented by Xt in the model. In the presence of crowding out, the constant β1 <
0, and if the error term, εt, is random, the constant β1 will be an unbiased, consistent,
and efficient estimator of FCO in both the short and long term. Where the dependent
variable correlated with both the current and lagged values of Xt, it creates a
distributed-lag model, and the relationship between the dependent variable and the
independent will be of the form: Yt = β0 + β1Xt +β2Xt-1 + β2Xt-2 + …+βnXt-n + εt. Under
these circumstances, there is both a short-run and long-run relationship between the
variables. The short-run relation shall be β1 whereas the long-term relationship will be
of the form Σnt=1βt = β1 + β2 + β3 + …+ βn. The two estimators were the key results
that I relied on to answer the research questions to determine whether credit to the
Ghanaian private sector was the product of the government’s domestic debt.
Findings of Research Question 1. The findings of the investigation of FCO
along the quantity channel yielded a β1 and βt of -0.909 and -0.981, respectively.
These results indicated that by the available data, the government’s borrowing
activities crowded out the private sector in both the long and short runs. In the long
term, a one-unit increase in DEBT reduced PSCREDIT by 0.98 units.
Findings of Research Question 2. The findings of the investigation of FCO
along the quantity channel yielded a β1 and a βt of 0.0143 and 0.0184, respectively.
The findings indicated by available data, DEBT was responsible for the net income
margins earned by the banking industry. A one-unit increase in DEBT resulted in a
0.0184-unit increase in the NIM in the long term.
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Importance of the Findings
My study contributed to the rhetoric on FCO by establishing that there was
FCO in the Ghanaian economy. Aisen and Hauner (2013) reported the inconclusive
nature of research findings on FCOs. My results, based on the available data, make a
categorical statement on the phenomenon in the Ghanaian economy. My results
contradict Fayed (2013), who did not find any long- or short-term FCO in Egypt, but
rather a crowding in of credit. My results also contradict Sharpe (2013), who argued
that sovereign states need not suffer FCO because the government can resort to the
printing of money to settle its debts.
The results provide a window into the effect of macroeconomic policies as
well as banking operations in the country. The government, acting through its
ministry of finance, is responsible for the macroeconomic policies and management of
the country. These policymakers can use my results to quantify the extent and effect
of government fiscal policies on the private corporate sector and to support policy
revision.
Ghana is a lower-middle-income country and had benefited from substantial
International Development Association (IDA) and IMF loans, and bilateral assistance
from several countries. In addition to the external loans, the GoG borrows extensively
from the domestic market to supplement its revenue shortfalls. In 2011, the
government adopted a public-private partnership (PPP) policy (Ministry of Finance,
2011) for infrastructure development in the country. The objective was for the private
corporate sector to partner government to deliver needed key public infrastructure and
services to the people of Ghana. PPPs are project financed and, therefore, highly
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levered with debt-to-total capital levels in the range of 74% to 75% (Esty, Chavich, &
Sesia, 2014). Competing with the private sector for bank credit can be detrimental to
the implementation of the PPP policy.
Limitations of the Study
In this research, I sought to correlate the quantity and the cost of credit to the
private corporate sector with government debt. The sector comprises industries of
various types and sizes, and with different credit ratings. I did not attempt to
differentiate between the institutions. It was possible that some sectors received better
services than others. However, I overcame this limitation by aggregation (i.e., the
estimates were at country and not at the level of the firm). The implication was that
the results I obtained addressed the issues of cost and quantity of private sector credit
at the aggregate level without distinguishing between sectors of the economy.
I used data from the BoG and World Bank. The reliability and accuracy of the
data were beyond my control as a researcher. However, these are credible institutions
with several years’ experience in data collection, cleaning, analysis, and
dissemination. The reliability of the data from these sources was a reasonable
expectation.
The frequency of my data was a mixture of annual and monthly intervals. The
BoG reported macroeconomic variables in annual intervals whereas banking data was
monthly. To assure adequate power for the research’s findings, I adopted the monthly
intervals as my period that resulted in 131 data points. To overcome the lack of
monthly macroeconomic data I adopted the annual data for each month for the
reporting year. The resulting dataset violated the normality assumptions. It is possible
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that the distribution led a less than robust statistical estimates. However, these
macroeconomic variables were covariables only, so I expected their effect on the
models to be minimal.
Recommendations
My research has brought to the fore the fact that government debt crowded out
the private sector. If the private sector is to be the engine of growth, then every effort
must be made to support their operations. Government has to review its fiscal
policies. The policy on deficit financing requires revision and reassessment because
the net effect on the economy could be negative.
NIM, the dependent variable for the second research question, had information
on interest rates. Ghanaian businesses report high interest rates. I will recommend
studies that will review interest rate cost build up with the aim of determining the
contribution of government debt to the overall interest charged borrowers. I will
encourage further research to determine other factors that may be driving up interest
rates and by extension the NIM, which does not include increases in the demand for
loans.
Carpenter and Demiralp (2006) stated that open market operations by a central
bank affect nominal interest rates, the so-called liquidity effect. A central bank can,
therefore, stabilize interest rates as well as the quantities of funds available to the
banking system by engaging in open market operations. I would recommend that the
BoG use their open market operations as a strategy to stabilize both liquidity and
interest rates to reduce the incidence of crowding out of Ghanaian businesses.
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The research period was from 2006 to 2016. The period included the credit
crunch period when the world’s economy suffered a major setback. I did not account
for this period in my analysis. I recommend further research to study the effect of the
credit crunch on the quantity and cost of credit in Ghana during the period.
Implications
I investigated FCO as a possible problem confronting the Ghanaian corporate
sector’s quest for credit. The underlying principle of the research was that access to
credit is essential for businesses to survive and thrive in an economy. FCO, according
to Gaye (2013), results in a slowdown or stagnation in economic activities, growth,
and welfare. Broner et al. (2014) stated that it could induce financial crisis, whereas
Asogwa and Okeke (2013) listed low industrial growth and job losses among its many
effects. Another effect would be a lower investment in research and development in
the economy (Cecchetti & Kharroubi, 2015). These identified negative effects of a
credit squeeze would be minimized or avoided in the presence of adequate and
affordable credit. Therefore, the positive social change implications of the study are
obvious: the revision of fiscal policies which can contribute to a better quality of life
for all Ghanaians when the private sector can invest and grow the economy.
Conclusions
The purpose of my study was to investigate the presence of FCO in Ghana. I
did this by correlating government debt with the quantity of credit to the private
sector, and government debt with the NIM of Ghanaian banks. I used data from the
BoG and the World Bank databases for my research. My data spanned the years 2006
to 2016. The findings of the research, based on the available data and my research
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models, indicated the presence of FCO in Ghana along both the quantity and cost
channels. The result contributes to the rhetoric on FCO, which remains inconclusive
among researchers. My results contradict the findings of Fayed (2013), who found
long-term crowding in in Egypt, and Sharpe (2013), who argued that based on the
modern money theory, FCO cannot occur in sovereign states like Ghana. I hope that
policymakers in Ghana will take notice of my findings and revise their fiscal policies.
At the current level of economic development with high interest rates compared with
those in similar countries, unbridled borrowing by the government from the domestic
market will stifle local investment initiatives and stunt economic development.
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Appendix A: Dataset for PSCREDIT Analysis
MONTH PSCREDIT DEBT
FINT
GDP
INSQUAL TBRATE
2006M02
37.900
51.230
1.011
23.652
-0.072
10.290
2006M03
39.729
50.669
1.018
23.652
-0.072
9.800
2006M04
40.155
50.215
1.029
23.652
-0.072
9.630
2006M05
40.005
48.436
1.010
23.652
-0.072
9.680
2006M06
43.628
46.732
1.015
23.652
-0.072
10.200
2006M07
44.087
47.049
0.993
23.652
-0.072
9.680
2006M08
42.935
47.861
1.015
23.652
-0.072
10.280
2006M09
43.786
46.972
1.033
23.652
-0.072
10.350
2006M10
44.585
45.713
1.040
23.652
-0.072
10.500
2006M11
45.354
44.501
1.025
23.652
-0.072
10.400
2006M12
46.822
43.454
0.988
23.652
-0.072
9.600
2007M01
43.799
46.443
1.015
23.865
-0.072
9.900
2007M02
45.388
44.730
1.029
23.865
-0.072
9.700
2007M03
45.988
44.698
1.035
23.865
-0.072
9.600
2007M04
46.431
43.897
1.055
23.865
-0.072
9.600
2007M05
47.414
42.949
1.033
23.865
-0.072
9.600
2007M06
48.248
42.396
1.040
23.865
-0.072
9.600
2007M07
47.060
42.459
1.053
23.865
-0.072
9.700
2007M08
45.708
45.298
1.082
23.865
-0.072
9.800
2007M09
51.388
38.926
1.115
23.865
-0.072
9.800
2007M10
51.398
38.350
1.054
23.865
-0.072
10.250
2007M11
53.221
37.511
1.058
23.865
-0.072
10.600
2007M12
52.813
38.472
1.012
23.865
-0.072
10.600
2008M01
51.966
36.851
1.058
24.130
-0.031
10.800
2008M02
52.185
37.586
1.082
24.130
-0.031
10.800
2008M03
51.485
38.779
1.086
24.130
-0.031
11.100
2008M04
53.088
36.653
1.107
24.130
-0.031
11.800
2008M05
53.754
35.679
1.075
24.130
-0.031
14.000
2008M06
53.957
34.955
1.108
24.130
-0.031
16.300
2008M07
56.397
34.184
1.117
24.130
-0.031
19.800
2008M08
56.785
32.673
1.152
24.130
-0.031
24.600
2008M09
58.304
31.729
1.146
24.130
-0.031
24.600
2008M10
57.757
32.150
1.132
24.130
-0.031
24.700
2008M11
57.138
32.812
1.099
24.130
-0.031
24.700
2008M12
55.109
34.922
1.071
24.130
-0.031
24.700
2009M01
55.070
35.197
1.099
24.130
0.091
24.700
2009M02
54.556
35.425
1.140
24.130
0.091
24.700
2009M03
57.034
33.864
1.171
24.130
0.091
27.800
2009M04
57.970
32.573
1.169
24.130
0.091
25.700
Table continues
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MONTH PSCREDIT DEBT
FINT
GDP
INSQUAL TBRATE
2009M05
57.807
32.877
1.179
24.130
0.091
25.700
2009M06
58.311
32.337
1.196
24.130
0.091
25.800
2009M07
59.490
31.599
1.217
24.130
0.091
25.900
2009M08
57.195
33.559
1.216
24.130
0.091
25.900
2009M09
56.097
34.126
1.184
24.130
0.091
25.900
2009M10
55.139
34.622
1.143
24.130
0.091
25.800
2009M11
53.144
37.406
1.111
24.130
0.091
24.900
2009M12
49.633
41.358
1.157
24.130
0.091
22.500
2010M01
48.809
42.831
1.141
24.553
0.126
18.900
2010M02
47.930
43.750
1.163
24.553
0.126
17.200
2010M03
48.810
42.898
1.142
24.553
0.126
14.600
2010M04
47.624
43.811
1.157
24.553
0.126
13.400
2010M05
48.375
43.392
1.146
24.553
0.126
12.900
2010M06
47.816
42.388
1.172
24.553
0.126
13.300
2010M07
47.392
42.696
1.170
24.553
0.126
12.700
2010M08
47.291
43.391
1.168
24.553
0.126
12.700
2010M09
46.893
43.502
1.149
24.553
0.126
12.500
2010M10
44.874
44.433
1.181
24.553
0.126
12.400
2010M11
45.783
44.428
1.069
24.553
0.126
12.330
2010M12
45.737
44.342
1.053
24.553
0.126
12.250
2011M01
44.518
46.472
1.096
24.815
0.132
12.150
2011M02
41.790
48.442
1.121
24.815
0.132
12.120
2011M03
40.962
48.615
1.103
24.815
0.132
12.110
2011M04
41.061
48.605
1.119
24.815
0.132
12.050
2011M05
41.737
48.153
1.133
24.815
0.132
10.490
2011M06
43.935
45.804
1.147
24.815
0.132
10.570
2011M07
45.363
44.433
1.160
24.815
0.132
10.200
2011M08
45.033
44.220
1.155
24.815
0.132
9.370
2011M09
45.465
42.821
1.150
24.815
0.132
9.410
2011M10
47.325
41.294
1.108
24.815
0.132
9.130
2011M11
46.714
41.368
1.133
24.815
0.132
9.630
2011M12
47.522
42.231
1.093
24.815
0.132
10.670
2012M01
47.759
42.513
1.119
25.045
0.130
10.850
2012M02
48.092
41.639
1.131
25.045
0.130
11.340
2012M03
47.372
42.384
1.188
25.045
0.130
12.300
2012M04
47.238
42.132
1.172
25.045
0.130
13.970
2012M05
47.895
41.365
1.183
25.045
0.130
16.920
2012M06
48.437
40.054
1.186
25.045
0.130
22.443
2012M07
50.683
37.967
1.168
25.045
0.130
22.850
2012M08
50.474
38.095
1.169
25.045
0.130
22.850
2012M09
51.967
36.317
1.155
25.045
0.130
23.030
Table continues
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MONTH PSCREDIT DEBT
FINT
GDP
INSQUAL TBRATE
2012M10
49.790
38.436
1.160
25.045
0.130
23.090
2012M11
47.401
40.841
1.115
25.045
0.130
22.340
2012M12
46.373
43.014
1.101
25.045
0.130
22.900
2013M01
43.295
45.576
1.105
25.260
0.084
22.897
2013M02
45.673
43.154
1.105
25.260
0.084
22.998
2013M03
45.532
43.028
1.137
25.260
0.084
22.861
2013M04
45.175
43.471
1.126
25.260
0.084
22.968
2013M05
46.119
42.624
1.118
25.260
0.084
23.027
2013M06
48.121
41.888
1.132
25.260
0.084
23.060
2013M07
46.274
43.766
1.120
25.260
0.084
23.068
2013M08
43.333
43.716
1.128
25.260
0.084
22.858
2013M09
45.818
43.141
1.128
25.260
0.084
21.587
2013M10
44.799
43.638
1.106
25.260
0.084
20.290
2013M11
43.233
44.602
1.089
25.260
0.084
19.230
2013M12
46.808
43.241
1.117
25.260
0.084
18.800
2014M01
47.264
43.080
1.129
25.454
-0.007
19.463
2014M02
47.900
42.447
1.154
25.454
-0.007
20.378
2014M03
47.168
40.869
1.166
25.454
-0.007
22.893
2014M04
52.404
37.139
1.143
25.454
-0.007
24.043
2014M05
51.759
38.007
1.159
25.454
-0.007
24.066
2014M06
54.880
35.029
1.194
25.454
-0.007
24.071
2014M07
54.712
34.457
1.174
25.454
-0.007
24.646
2014M08
53.991
35.383
1.196
25.454
-0.007
25.009
2014M09
53.793
35.829
1.209
25.454
-0.007
25.337
2014M10
53.220
36.299
1.206
25.454
-0.007
25.681
2014M11
52.691
36.992
1.149
25.454
-0.007
25.727
2014M12
51.018
37.892
1.170
25.454
-0.007
25.791
2015M01
51.148
37.535
1.118
25.643
-0.031
25.832
2015M02
52.092
36.531
1.200
25.643
-0.031
25.622
2015M03
54.143
34.796
1.226
25.643
-0.031
25.552
2015M04
56.262
33.178
1.241
25.643
-0.031
25.179
2015M05
57.790
32.166
1.258
25.643
-0.031
25.050
2015M06
59.012
30.934
1.323
25.643
-0.031
25.170
2015M07
57.370
32.175
1.248
25.643
-0.031
25.202
2015M08
58.403
31.379
1.251
25.643
-0.031
25.218
2015M09
57.039
31.694
1.227
25.643
-0.031
25.285
2015M10
56.367
33.056
1.187
25.643
-0.031
25.328
2015M11
54.458
34.798
1.174
25.643
-0.031
24.498
2015M12
55.020
35.501
1.176
25.643
-0.031
23.120
2016M01
52.568
35.837
1.151
25.843
-0.031
22.729
2016M02
52.787
34.841
1.196
25.843
-0.031
22.668
2016M03
53.855
35.615
1.206
25.843
-0.031
22.616
Table continues
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MONTH PSCREDIT DEBT
FINT
GDP
INSQUAL TBRATE
2016M04
54.147
35.854
1.195
25.843
-0.031
22.765
2016M05
54.505
35.496
1.200
25.843
-0.031
22.788
2016M06
54.471
35.651
1.199
25.843
-0.031
22.802
2016M07
55.366
34.892
1.208
25.843
-0.031
22.771
2016M08
54.170
36.140
1.227
25.843
-0.031
22.771
2016M09
53.448
37.159
1.215
25.843
-0.031
22.867
2016M10
51.651
38.985
1.199
25.843
-0.031
22.761
2016M11
50.000
40.664
1.181
25.843
-0.031
20.873
2016M12
50.477
40.761
1.205
25.843
-0.031
16.814
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Appendix B: Dataset for NIM Analysis
MONTH
2006M02
2006M03
2006M04
2006M05
2006M06
2006M07
2006M08
2006M09
2006M10
2006M11
2006M12
2007M01
2007M02
2007M03
2007M04
2007M05
2007M06
2007M07
2007M08
2007M09
2007M10

NIM
-0.055
0.175
0.164
0.178
0.167
0.185
0.185
0.186
0.191
0.255
0.185
0.163
0.140
0.205
0.101
0.239
0.141
0.216
0.175
0.213
0.197

DEBT
7.980
8.017
8.263
8.173
7.873
8.082
8.435
8.697
8.631
8.565
8.580
7.925
7.718
8.091
8.060
7.999
8.065
8.859
9.618
8.451
8.607

DEF
-4.796
-4.796
-4.796
-4.796
-4.796
-4.796
-4.796
-4.796
-4.796
-4.796
-4.796
-4.890
-4.890
-4.890
-4.890
-4.890
-4.890
-4.890
-4.890
-4.890
-4.890

EXCHR
0.909
0.910
0.911
0.912
0.915
0.916
0.918
0.920
0.921
0.921
0.921
0.921
0.922
0.925
0.926
0.925
0.926
0.927
0.930
0.935
0.942

INF CONCEN
12.10
43.925
9.90
43.259
9.50
42.646
10.20
42.864
10.50
42.615
11.40
42.589
11.20
42.985
10.80
42.641
10.50
42.678
10.30
42.713
10.50
41.291
10.89
41.353
10.42
40.294
10.19
40.235
10.50
41.151
11.02
39.497
10.69
39.387
10.14
39.854
10.41
40.239
10.19
40.329
10.14
41.244

EFF
1.295
1.948
2.658
3.257
3.875
4.523
5.155
5.746
6.407
7.346
7.818
0.704
1.186
1.842
2.632
3.071
3.801
3.782
4.543
5.577
5.807

HHI
982.347
956.756
940.213
944.537
933.093
929.077
933.927
916.037
910.758
906.446
870.696
862.511
848.394
831.778
844.445
809.396
816.343
823.480
834.294
831.390
854.575

RISK
48.652
47.230
47.103
48.673
46.823
48.232
48.704
49.248
49.886
50.485
48.609
48.994
49.344
50.179
48.941
47.585
48.649
49.939
49.017
50.610
51.918

SIZE RQUAL
20.211 -0.072
20.555 -0.072
20.746 -0.072
21.420 -0.072
21.681 -0.072
21.965 -0.072
22.249 -0.072
22.716 -0.072
23.187 -0.072
23.364 -0.072
23.926 -0.072
19.335 -0.072
22.806 -0.072
23.733 -0.072
23.617 -0.072
24.194 -0.072
23.892 -0.072
29.099 -0.072
25.764 -0.072
26.090 -0.072
27.016 -0.072
Table continues
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MONTH
2007M11
2007M12
2008M01
2008M02
2008M03
2008M04
2008M05
2008M06
2008M07
2008M08
2008M09
2008M10
2008M11
2008M12
2009M01
2009M02
2009M03
2009M04
2009M05
2009M06
2009M07
2009M08
2009M09

NIM
0.331
0.050
0.162
0.165
0.171
0.159
0.174
0.195
0.198
0.198
0.209
0.167
0.269
0.219
0.249
0.182
0.261
0.277
0.282
0.289
0.222
0.300
0.181

DEBT
8.490
9.123
6.653
6.969
7.460
7.049
7.099
7.046
7.154
6.883
6.961
7.437
7.701
8.596
8.900
9.182
9.157
8.786
8.905
8.951
8.645
9.394
9.781

DEF
-4.890
-4.890
-6.549
-6.549
-6.549
-6.549
-6.549
-6.549
-6.549
-6.549
-6.549
-6.549
-6.549
-6.549
-6.813
-6.813
-6.813
-6.813
-6.813
-6.813
-6.813
-6.813
-6.813

EXCHR
0.952
0.959
0.969
0.972
0.977
0.981
0.993
1.011
1.040
1.080
1.109
1.138
1.165
1.194
1.240
1.307
1.352
1.384
1.410
1.442
1.461
1.471
1.460

INF CONCEN
11.40
40.989
12.75
41.288
12.81
41.243
13.21
41.048
13.79
40.406
15.29
40.266
16.88
40.516
18.41
39.099
18.31
40.612
18.10
39.737
17.89
39.301
17.30
38.862
17.44
37.728
18.13
37.545
19.86
37.292
20.34
36.894
20.53
36.984
20.56
37.872
20.06
36.709
20.74
35.937
20.50
34.894
19.65
34.183
18.37
35.225

EFF
6.557
6.907
0.658
0.994
1.676
2.245
3.084
4.034
4.669
5.293
5.843
6.278
7.107
7.715
0.663
1.284
1.811
0.905
3.224
3.969
4.223
5.221
5.923

HHI
840.506
837.957
834.587
827.406
820.828
808.946
817.461
784.874
811.800
795.751
789.068
786.881
752.949
744.339
752.990
746.619
749.474
764.271
746.432
732.053
704.819
695.426
710.175

RISK
51.815
53.190
52.637
52.855
54.790
53.558
54.739
55.633
56.318
55.901
55.328
57.447
58.072
55.805
55.067
56.524
58.452
58.797
57.975
58.048
56.668
56.644
55.423

SIZE RQUAL
28.195 -0.072
28.882 -0.072
22.160 -0.031
26.359 -0.031
27.266 -0.031
28.117 -0.031
27.096 -0.031
27.387 -0.031
27.657 -0.031
27.927 -0.031
28.685 -0.031
29.337 -0.031
29.455 -0.031
30.965 -0.031
33.725
0.091
34.165
0.091
36.534
0.091
36.826
0.091
36.600
0.091
36.987
0.091
40.194
0.091
37.283
0.091
37.561
0.091
Table continues
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MONTH
2009M10
2009M11
2009M12
2010M01
2010M02
2010M03
2010M04
2010M05
2010M06
2010M07
2010M08
2010M09
2010M10
2010M11
2010M12
2011M01
2011M02
2011M03
2011M04
2011M05
2011M06
2011M07
2011M08

NIM
0.269
0.427
0.287
0.190
0.213
0.246
0.312
0.239
0.358
0.226
0.326
0.259
0.289
0.224
0.284
0.195
0.176
0.196
0.194
0.213
0.198
0.203
0.188

DEBT
10.210
11.549
13.429
9.505
9.946
9.658
10.052
9.952
9.951
9.911
10.303
10.543
12.140
11.544
11.968
9.802
9.844
10.275
10.754
10.757
10.456
10.162
10.176

DEF
-6.813
-6.813
-6.813
-6.515
-6.515
-6.515
-6.515
-6.515
-6.515
-6.515
-6.515
-6.515
-6.515
-6.515
-6.515
-4.005
-4.005
-4.005
-4.005
-4.005
-4.005
-4.005
-4.005

EXCHR
1.454
1.443
1.435
1.429
1.430
1.427
1.422
1.421
1.423
1.432
1.434
1.433
1.431
1.434
1.445
1.465
1.509
1.517
1.518
1.507
1.506
1.508
1.511

INF CONCEN
18.04
34.395
16.92
34.835
15.97
34.849
14.78
34.071
14.23
34.026
13.32
33.959
11.66
33.484
10.68
33.453
9.52
32.185
9.46
31.465
9.44
31.443
9.38
31.384
9.38
29.026
9.08
31.047
8.58
30.379
9.08
31.541
9.16
31.088
9.13
30.007
9.02
31.543
8.90
30.139
8.59
30.331
8.39
30.677
8.41
29.618

EFF
6.513
6.962
7.789
0.668
1.129
1.831
2.444
2.990
3.716
4.238
5.082
5.780
5.442
6.904
7.349
0.546
1.128
1.694
2.162
2.795
3.427
4.166
4.661

HHI
693.982
693.351
692.593
685.817
675.513
670.343
667.202
663.147
630.994
626.420
623.613
624.707
592.515
613.072
599.958
626.119
622.095
605.193
622.599
602.142
603.215
606.852
596.729

RISK
53.350
53.140
49.282
49.554
49.383
46.991
47.344
47.090
47.749
46.791
47.504
47.365
45.642
45.999
45.953
44.771
41.569
41.151
38.000
39.158
39.776
40.785
41.442

SIZE RQUAL
38.166
0.091
40.183
0.091
39.968
0.091
26.386
0.126
31.021
0.126
30.731
0.126
31.099
0.126
31.141
0.126
30.979
0.126
31.728
0.126
31.167
0.126
31.331
0.126
37.244
0.126
32.285
0.126
33.756
0.126
29.650
0.132
29.700
0.132
30.275
0.132
31.804
0.132
31.066
0.132
31.327
0.132
30.545
0.132
30.641
0.132
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MONTH
2011M09
2011M10
2011M11
2011M12
2012M01
2012M02
2012M03
2012M04
2012M05
2012M06
2012M07
2012M08
2012M09
2012M10
2012M11
2012M12
2013M01
2013M02
2013M03
2013M04
2013M05
2013M06
2013M07

NIM
0.232
0.246
0.185
0.210
0.207
0.147
0.201
0.193
0.208
0.179
0.215
0.230
0.241
0.281
0.280
0.328
0.236
0.221
0.256
0.248
0.255
0.274
0.256

DEBT
10.009
9.535
10.037
10.754
8.935
8.768
9.409
9.213
9.390
9.189
8.894
9.220
8.812
9.700
10.669
11.550
10.143
9.710
9.875
10.151
10.341
10.544
11.497

DEF
-4.005
-4.005
-4.005
-4.005
-11.483
-11.483
-11.483
-11.483
-11.483
-11.483
-11.483
-11.483
-11.483
-11.483
-11.483
-11.483
-9.921
-9.921
-9.921
-9.921
-9.921
-9.921
-9.921

EXCHR
1.524
1.547
1.561
1.574
1.615
1.671
1.700
1.762
1.841
1.884
1.915
1.926
1.908
1.893
1.903
1.884
1.896
1.905
1.924
1.946
1.962
1.986
1.991

INF CONCEN
8.40
30.590
8.56
30.541
8.55
30.570
8.58
30.069
8.73
29.507
8.64
30.398
8.78
29.897
9.11
30.318
9.34
30.733
9.44
32.672
9.54
32.793
9.46
33.165
9.43
32.937
9.24
32.620
9.31
31.664
8.84
31.955
10.09
31.877
10.40
32.307
10.78
31.330
10.87
32.169
11.02
30.914
11.63
30.536
11.79
30.780

EFF
5.210
5.808
6.260
6.827
0.605
1.070
1.647
2.189
2.770
3.309
3.911
4.470
4.964
5.530
6.137
6.586
0.558
1.089
1.583
2.253
2.797
3.379
3.771

HHI
605.999
605.662
604.363
590.079
583.806
592.926
597.486
605.284
605.063
646.856
646.018
652.137
650.918
641.537
624.433
623.099
629.462
638.631
627.084
637.965
620.338
615.744
626.038

RISK
41.351
41.626
42.391
42.397
43.293
43.921
45.874
44.495
45.268
45.409
47.916
49.269
50.407
49.547
48.188
47.809
48.461
48.325
47.736
47.049
49.076
49.926
48.532

SIZE RQUAL
31.915
0.132
32.202
0.132
32.862
0.132
32.789
0.132
29.575
0.130
30.028
0.130
29.900
0.130
30.440
0.130
30.763
0.130
30.706
0.130
30.490
0.130
30.834
0.130
31.498
0.130
31.940
0.130
32.151
0.130
33.154
0.130
28.961
0.084
29.541
0.084
32.084
0.084
30.374
0.084
30.853
0.084
31.036
0.084
32.379
0.084
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MONTH
2013M08
2013M09
2013M10
2013M11
2013M12
2014M01
2014M02
2014M03
2014M04
2014M05
2014M06
2014M07
2014M08
2014M09
2014M10
2014M11
2014M12
2015M01
2015M02
2015M03
2015M04
2015M05
2015M06

NIM
0.325
0.289
0.297
0.297
0.323
0.270
0.259
0.306
0.285
0.298
0.309
0.321
0.345
0.368
0.370
0.364
0.384
0.341
0.274
0.275
0.374
0.333
0.363

DEBT
11.663
11.724
12.131
12.795
12.783
10.873
11.040
10.847
9.686
10.262
9.595
9.474
10.254
10.710
11.067
11.559
11.789
9.649
9.651
9.576
9.153
8.984
9.063

DEF
-9.921
-9.921
-9.921
-9.921
-9.921
-10.191
-10.191
-10.191
-10.191
-10.191
-10.191
-10.191
-10.191
-10.191
-10.191
-10.191
-10.191
-6.891
-6.891
-6.891
-6.891
-6.891
-6.891

EXCHR
1.994
1.998
2.007
2.060
2.111
2.291
2.438
2.583
2.740
2.863
2.982
3.019
3.065
3.182
3.196
3.197
3.197
3.218
3.361
3.591
3.812
3.893
4.186

INF CONCEN
11.45
30.265
11.95
31.194
13.09
30.104
13.22
30.426
13.50
30.395
13.80
30.838
14.00
30.623
14.50
30.286
14.70
30.142
14.80
30.166
15.00
29.230
15.30
28.702
15.90
28.472
16.50
28.001
16.90
28.508
17.00
27.393
17.00
26.498
16.40
26.800
16.50
26.548
16.60
26.698
16.80
26.609
16.90
26.580
17.10
26.429

EFF
4.381
4.963
5.517
6.077
6.565
0.537
1.083
1.646
2.163
2.679
3.220
3.796
4.474
5.099
5.654
6.072
7.035
0.553
1.156
1.784
2.337
2.953
3.436

HHI
614.978
636.406
613.239
618.049
617.285
625.895
613.904
606.354
615.388
614.777
595.119
585.459
587.721
575.703
583.722
571.110
551.899
559.094
548.338
553.484
555.279
550.692
546.004

RISK
47.696
46.607
46.722
46.503
47.076
47.738
47.089
48.554
49.005
49.731
50.272
50.170
49.492
49.779
48.449
48.500
46.857
47.390
47.202
48.806
49.901
50.191
50.867

SIZE RQUAL
32.667
0.084
32.837
0.084
33.198
0.084
33.430
0.084
34.093
0.084
32.058 -0.007
33.263 -0.007
33.900 -0.007
34.632 -0.007
35.300 -0.007
35.861 -0.007
36.081 -0.007
36.091 -0.007
36.353 -0.007
37.107 -0.007
38.638 -0.007
38.201 -0.007
34.773 -0.031
35.466 -0.031
35.313 -0.031
36.748 -0.031
36.536 -0.031
38.543 -0.031
Table continues
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MONTH
2015M07
2015M08
2015M09
2015M10
2015M11
2015M12
2016M01
2016M02
2016M03
2016M04
2016M05
2016M06
2016M07
2016M08
2016M09
2016M10
2016M11
2016M12

NIM
0.319
0.346
0.350
0.355
0.318
0.529
0.290
0.287
0.314
0.316
0.330
0.384
0.307
0.315
0.329
0.353
0.407
0.415

DEBT
8.789
9.000
8.996
9.777
10.596
11.179
9.413
9.007
9.331
9.652
9.748
10.050
9.703
10.339
10.877
11.914
12.950
13.432

DEF
-6.891
-6.891
-6.891
-6.891
-6.891
-6.891
-7.856
-7.856
-7.856
-7.856
-7.856
-7.856
-7.856
-7.856
-7.856
-7.856
-7.856
-7.856

EXCHR
3.532
3.859
3.782
3.764
3.790
3.795
3.806
3.871
3.851
3.820
3.811
3.882
3.939
3.945
3.956
3.967
3.972
4.097

INF CONCEN
17.90
26.692
17.30
26.627
17.40
26.269
17.40
25.888
17.60
25.490
17.70
24.545
18.99
24.736
18.47
24.896
19.22
25.217
18.71
25.572
18.89
25.096
18.40
24.405
16.70
23.808
16.90
24.433
17.20
25.143
15.80
24.493
15.50
24.432
15.40
23.994

EFF
3.969
4.644
5.188
5.724
6.234
7.081
0.549
1.127
1.696
2.271
2.857
3.421
4.057
4.623
5.227
5.825
6.417
6.864

HHI
551.859
546.528
536.599
535.511
529.945
512.448
514.803
519.856
520.860
524.400
521.768
503.202
501.667
519.338
523.498
517.887
515.192
497.212

RISK
50.925
50.042
50.199
49.017
48.199
47.494
47.938
48.072
46.760
47.841
47.458
48.819
47.863
48.315
47.640
45.966
44.441
43.074

SIZE RQUAL
39.490 -0.031
38.972 -0.031
39.459 -0.031
40.036 -0.031
40.476 -0.031
40.710 -0.031
35.913 -0.031
36.734 -0.031
36.921 -0.031
37.043 -0.031
37.252 -0.031
37.779 -0.031
37.338 -0.031
37.679 -0.031
38.137 -0.031
38.835 -0.031
39.595 -0.031
42.278 -0.031
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Appendix C: Results of ARDL Analysis for PSCREDIT
Dependent Variable: PSCREDIT
Method: ARDL
Date: 10/25/17 Time: 18:43
Sample (adjusted): 2006M05 2016M12
Included observations: 128 after adjustments
Maximum dependent lags: 4 (Automatic selection)
Model selection method: Akaike info criterion (AIC)
Dynamic regressors (4 lags, automatic): DEBT FINT(-1) GDP INSQUAL
TBRATE
Fixed regressors: C
Number of models evaluated: 12500
Selected Model: ARDL(1, 1, 0, 0, 3, 1)
Note: final equation sample is larger than selection sample
Variable
PSCREDIT(-1)
DEBT
DEBT(-1)
FINT(-1)
GDP
INSQUAL
INSQUAL(-1)
INSQUAL(-2)
INSQUAL(-3)
TBRATE
TBRATE(-1)
C
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log-likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

Coefficient
0.418184
-0.90953
0.338745
3.453523
-0.405341
-1.833795
-0.765759
13.49904
-12.73471
-0.156803
0.147196
58.18789
0.981575
0.979828
0.685097
54.44553
-126.915
561.8093
0.0000000

Std. Error
t-Statistic
0.079382
5.268001
0.049252
-18.46701
0.094218
3.595336
2.153556
1.603637
0.160574
-2.524322
4.228972
-0.433627
5.781284
-0.132455
5.755393
2.345459
4.203694
-3.02941
0.05919
-2.64916
0.056539
2.603462
8.474535
6.866204
Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criteria.
Durbin-Watson stat

Prob.*
0.0000
0.0000
0.0005
0.1115
0.0129
0.6654
0.8949
0.0207
0.003
0.0092
0.0104
0.0000
50.10312
4.823689
2.170548
2.437925
2.279185
1.928993

Note: p-values and any subsequent tests do not account for model selection

172
Appendix D: Results of ARDL Analysis for NIM
Dependent Variable: NIM
Method: ARDL
Date: 01/21/18 Time: 21:22
Sample (adjusted): 2006M06 2016M12
Included observations: 127 after adjustments
Maximum dependent lags: 4 (Automatic selection)
Model selection method: Akaike info criterion (AIC)
Dynamic regressors (4 lags, automatic): DEBT(-1) DEF EXCHR INF
CONCEN EFF RISK SIZE RQUAL
Fixed regressors: C
Number of models evaluated: 7812500
Selected Model: ARDL(1, 3, 0, 0, 0, 4, 3, 0, 4, 0)
Note: final equation sample is larger than selection sample
Std.
Variable
Coefficient
Error
t-Statistic
Prob.*
NIM(-1)
-0.336792
0.087791 -3.83627
0.0002
DEBT(-1)
0.014292
0.008265 1.729239
0.0868
DEBT(-2)
0.023035
0.010381 2.219037
0.0287
DEBT(-3)
0.003498
0.009739 0.359224
0.7202
DEBT(-4)
-0.016166
0.007326 -2.20667
0.0296
DEF
0.000726
0.002144 0.338674
0.7356
EXCHR
0.089497
0.01961 4.563841
0.0000
INF
-0.004903
0.002589 -1.89418
0.0610
CONCEN
-0.016704
0.005306 -3.14825
0.0022
CONCEN(-1)
0.008632
0.0062
1.392136
0.1669
CONCEN(-2)
0.007213
0.00643 1.121779
0.2646
CONCEN(-3)
-0.000807
0.006067 -0.13295
0.8945
CONCEN(-4)
0.01034
0.005351 1.932344
0.0561
EFF
0.004991
0.002515 1.984751
0.0499
EFF(-1)
0.006235
0.003282 1.89985
0.0603
EFF(-2)
-0.004221
0.003379 -1.24898
0.2145
EFF(-3)
-0.003881
0.00272
-1.4266
0.1568
RISK
0.005074
0.002384 2.127853
0.0358
SIZE
0.008604
0.002379 3.616583
0.0005
SIZE(-1)
-0.000843
0.003031 -0.27798
0.7816
SIZE(-2)
-0.006751
0.003082 -2.19031
0.0308
SIZE(-3)
-0.003446
0.003025 -1.13927
0.2573
SIZE(-4)
8.67E-03
0.002438 3.557524
0.0006
RQUAL
0.090602
0.124142 0.729832
0.4672
C
-0.757357
0.175976 -4.30374
0.00000
Table continues
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R-squared
0.811112
Mean dependent var
0.2577
Adjusted R-squared
0.766667
S.D. dependent var
0.074973
S.E. of regression
0.036215
Akaike info criterion
-3.62418
Sum squared resid
0.133779
Schwarz criterion
-3.0643
Log likelihood
255.1352
Hannan-Quinn criteria
-3.3967
F-statistic
18.250050 Durbin-Watson stat
2.064951
Prob(F-statistic)
0.00000
*Note: p-values and any subsequent tests do not account for model selection.

